National Defence / Défense nationale

B-GL-323-004/FP-003

LAND FORCE

COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

(ENGLISH)

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Ottawa (Ontario)
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1600-1 (DAD 3)

13 December 2008

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THE ISSUE OF B-GL-323-004/FP-003 COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

1. The Canadian Army has recently been called upon to conduct significant and complex counter-insurgency operations. It is highly likely that future operations will also be characterised by the requirement to continue to conduct counter-insurgency operations. As such, it is clearly time to capture our lessons learned and formalise our doctrine. It is most appropriate then, that the Army issues B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations, its first formal publication of this nature.

2. Counter-insurgency is a specific campaign theme and although the key elements of our extant doctrine remain relevant in such campaigns, this publication articulates the specific framing philosophy and guiding principles that must be considered at all levels of command in the prosecution of counter-insurgency. The publication clearly indicates that insurgencies are rooted in political and social issues and thus the military has an overall supporting role to those other agencies and institutions that will create the enduring, indigenous-based conditions for peace. In essence, the military, particularly the land force, provides the manoeuvre space for those other agencies and elements of power working to a shared campaign end-state. Tactical level actions by the land force during a counter-insurgency campaign will be planned and conducted in keeping with the general principles of war and specific tactical principles; however, the tactical actions should not contravene

1600-1 (DAD 3)

Le décembre 2008

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PUBLICATION DE LA B-GL-323-004/FP-003, LES OPÉRATIONS CONTRE-INSURRECTION

1. L'armée canadienne a récemment été appelée à mener d'importantes et complexes opérations anti-insurrectionnelles. Il est très probable que des opérations futures seront également caractérisées par le besoin de continuer à mener des opérations anti-insurrectionnelles. À ce sujet, il est clairement temps de saisir nos leçons apprises et de formaliser notre doctrine. Il est alors plus qu'appropriée que l'Armée de terre lance sa première publication officielle de cette nature, la publication B-GL-323-004/FP-003 opérations anti-insurrectionnelles.

2. La lutte contre-insurrection constitue un thème de campagne particulier et même si les éléments clés de notre doctrine actuelle restent pertinents dans le cadre de telles campagnes, le nouveau manuel articule le cadre philosophique et les principes directeurs qui doivent être considérés à tous les niveaux de commandement pour mener les opérations contre-insurrection. Le manuel indique clairement que les insurrections prennent racine dans les questions politiques et sociales et qu'en conséquence les forces armées jouent un rôle d'appui global auprès des autres organismes et institutions qui créent les conditions durables et fondées sur les valeurs indigènes qui engendrent la paix. Fondamentalement, les forces armées, et les forces terrestres en particulier, offrent l'espace de manœuvre aux autres organismes et instruments du pouvoir qui visent à promouvoir un état final voulu par chacun. Les mesures de niveau tactique prises par la force terrestre lors d'une campagne contre-insurrection doivent être planifiées

the guiding principles and philosophy described in this publication.

3. The publication is nested within land operations doctrine in general and is complementary to that of our key allies. It reflects the enduring nature of insurgencies and draws much from both historical and recent experiences. Although much of the publication's content is generally known and practised currently, the publication is to be formally implemented in land force operations and training institutions as appropriate.

4. As with any doctrine, this publication will require timely feedback in order to help keep it relevant. The normal lessons-learned process should be exploited in dealing with practices and procedures specific to counter-insurgency operations. These in turn will be examined and collated by LFDTS and implemented as appropriate by its doctrine and training institutions. Comments regarding the conceptual nature of the philosophy and principles of counter-insurgency operations, as well as vignettes from recent operations that help to illustrate the principles of counter-insurgency, may be passed directly to the publication's OPI, Directorate of Army Doctrine 3 (Capstone).

5. Subsequent iterations of this publication will capture the invaluable experiences of recent and current operations. However, this will only be possible if current practitioners actively provide input and feedback.

Lieutenant-général A.B. Leslie
Lieutenant-General

Distribution List (page 3)

et dirigées dans le respect des principes de guerre généraux et des principes tactiques particuliers. Cependant, les mesures prises au niveau tactique ne devraient pas entrer en conflit avec la philosophie et les principes directeurs établis dans le manuel sur la lutte contre-insurrection.

3. Le contenu du manuel est imbriqué dans la doctrine des opérations terrestres en général et complète les textes de nos alliés clés. Il tient compte du caractère persistant des insurrections et est inspiré d'expériences historiques et récentes. Même si le contenu du manuel est généralement connu et qu'il est actuellement mis en pratique, il faut formellement le mettre en vigueur de façon appropriée dans le cadre des opérations de la Force terrestre et l'incorporer à la matière des cours de ses institutions d'enseignement.

4. Comme dans le cas de tout autre élément de doctrine, ce manuel doit faire l'objet d'une rétroaction en temps opportun pour rester pertinent. Le processus normal des leçons apprises devrait être exploité au moment de traiter des méthodes et procédures particulières des opérations contre-insurrection. Ces leçons seront étudiées et recueillies par le SDIFT et mises en œuvre de façon appropriée par ses institutions de doctrine et d'instruction. Des commentaires portant sur la nature conceptuelle de la philosophie et des principes des opérations contre-insurrection de même que des vignettes préparées à partir d'opérations récentes qui peuvent aider à illustrer les principes de contre-insurrection pourront être communiqués directement au BPR du manuel, le Directeur – Doctrine de l'Armée de terre 3 (Fondement).

5. Des modificatifs de ce manuel seront publiés en tenant compte des précieuses expériences vécues lors des opérations actuelles et passées. Cependant, ce ne sera possible de le faire qu'avec l'active rétroaction et la contribution des participants aux opérations en cours.

Liste de diffusion (page 3)

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FOREWORD

1. B-GL-323-004/FP-003 *Counter-Insurgency Operations* is issued on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff by the Army Publishing Office, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario.

2. B-GL-323-004/FP-003 *Counter-Insurgency Operations* is effective upon receipt.

3. The French version of this publication is B-GL-323-004/FP-004 *Opérations de contre-insurrection*.

4. The electronic version of this publication can be found in the Army Electronic Library, accessible from the LFDTS Homepage, at http://lfdts.army.mil.ca.

5. Suggested amendments should be forwarded through normal channels to the OPI of the publication, the Directorate of Army Doctrine.

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PREFACE

AIM

1. This publication, B-GL-323-004/FP-003 (FP-004 for French) *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, establishes doctrine for military operations in a counter-insurgency (COIN) environment and campaign.

SCOPE

2. This publication provides a wide range of material in support of commanders and staff at all levels of command. It reflects the concepts of Canadian doctrinal philosophies and principles. This publication addresses the following:

a. introduction to understanding insurgencies;

b. a description of insurgencies and their objectives;

c. the overarching philosophy and principles by which a COIN campaign and its operations should be conducted;

d. considerations for force employment at the strategic, operational and tactical levels;

e. considerations for intelligence staff in support of a COIN campaign;

f. considerations for information operations, specifically focused on influence activities;

g. considerations for sustainment in a COIN campaign; and

h. considerations for pre-deployment and in theatre training in support of a COIN campaign.

PURPOSE

3. This publication is intended to assist in the planning and conduct of a COIN campaign and its constituent operations. It provides guidance to all levels of command.

ASSOCIATED PUBLICATIONS

4. A suggested reading list is affixed to this publication. This publication should be read in conjunction with other appropriate CF and specifically Land Force publications. Particular attention should be paid B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF FIGURES

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Insurgency is rooted in squalor, and fear and suffering are its flowers.

—General Sir Frank Kitson

101. INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to define and introduce the concepts of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and secondly, to provide a general overview for the conduct of a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign within the wider concepts of land operations and doctrine. It will provide the reader a contextual understanding within which to view the details regarding insurgency and COIN.

2. A COIN campaign is conducted using the same means as any other campaign: through the application of a military force's fighting power.[1] It is set within the continuum of operations and is executed through a combination of tactical level activities and tasks. However, it is a distinct campaign with its own philosophy and set of principles that provide guidance for the application of fighting power and the conduct of activities.

3. A number of concepts are discussed within this chapter that have been drawn from B GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*. Fuller discussions of those concepts, as they apply across the spectrum of conflict, will be found therein.

SECTION 1
DEFINITIONS

102. INSURGENCY

1. Insurgency is part of a wider set of irregular activities and threats to a secure and stable environment. Irregular activity may be defined as: "behaviour that attempts to effect or prevent change through the illegal use, or threat, of violence, conducted by ideologically or criminally motivated non-regular forces, groups or individuals, as a challenge to authority."[2]

2. This broader set of irregular activities that threaten authority and stability beyond the capabilities of normal law enforcement includes criminality, disorder, insurgency, terrorism and irregular military forces (e.g., private or sectarian militias). Insurgency is distinct from other forms of threats in that it seeks a desired political effect, namely a desired change or re-ordering of affairs.

3. A number of definitions exist for the term insurgency, and although many have been developed over the years, most have contained the same key elements: violence, or at least the threat of violence, subversion, intimidation of the broad population mass, propaganda and a political aim. Again, it is the last element, a political aim, that distinguishes an insurgency from other forms of conflict or threats to security and stability.

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[1] Fighting power is comprised of three components: moral, intellectual and physical. Combat power refers to the application of physical elements. See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

[2] Draft definition submitted to Army Terminology Panel (ATP) June 2007. For a more detailed discussion of irregular activities, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

4. An insurgency has been defined as follows: "A competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change."[3] In this definition, the following can be noted:

a. Insurgency is not a movement or people. It is a competition, struggle or conflict involving different groups of people. As a manifestation of war, it is a competition of wills.

b. It must include at least one non-state movement to differentiate it from wars between states.

c. The established authority need not necessarily be the government of the nation subject to an insurgency. It could be a local authority, a temporary military authority or a government of a third party.

d. Insurgencies seek political change like all wars. But the political nature of insurgency is so important, it should be emphasized in the definition. The change sought could be government collapse (typically an objective of 1950-60s communist insurgencies) or a lesser objective such as self-determination, regional autonomy or the release of political prisoners.

5. Because of the focus on attaining political change, insurgencies are political problems and are not solely military problems. They require political solutions, with the military playing a largely supporting role.

6. The key to any insurgency is gaining at the very least an indifferent attitude, if not the outright support, of the population. Hence, many insurgencies have sought to persuade through propaganda and subversion and to intimidate through violence large sectors of a population in order to gain support for insurgent aims and undermine support for those countering the insurgency. Insurgents live and operate amongst the population, thus those forces and agencies countering the insurgency must separate, physically and morally, the insurgent from the population base. A hostile populace will create hostile conditions for any side in an insurgency. Therefore, gaining the support of the people is paramount to any COIN campaign.

7. At the basis of an insurgency will be a narrative, a story. Central to this narrative is the idea that motivates the insurgents and is formalized into an ideology. It empowers the insurgents and lends them legitimacy and provides justification for their ends and means.

8. Insurgencies have political aims stemming from a number of sources and a guiding ideology. Regardless of their origins and ideology, all insurgencies will have to some extent, **legitimate grievances** at their root. These grievances may be wide ranging and include political, social or economic characteristics. They will be exploited by the insurgent forces in order to gain additional support and undermine the authority and legitimacy of the official government and supporting forces. Thus, in order to solve an insurgency and create enduring solutions to conflict in the environment, COIN forces must address these grievances.

9. A key to the eventual defeat of an insurgency is that the outbreak of an insurgency must be properly identified as such. The classification or dismissal of a nascent insurgency as a criminal or some other movement will only fuel the insurgency through inappropriate responses, justify the insurgent narrative of systemic injustice and subjugation and provide political and military leaders with the excuse to ignore the root, often legitimate, grievances of the insurgent movement.

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[3] Definition as developed by a counter-insurgency study group during United States Marine Corps (USMC) JOINT URBAN WARRIOR 2005.

103. COUNTER-INSURGENCY

1. Counter-insurgency is defined as follows:

Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency.[4]

2. Since an insurgency is a political problem, the military plays a largely supporting role to other agencies and government departments in countering an insurgency. As indicated in the definition, a wide range of agencies, elements of power and capabilities, in addition to the military, must come together in a unity of purpose to defeat an insurgency.

3. A COIN campaign is conducted through a specific philosophy and a set of specific principles that guide the application of combat power. It is distinctly different from the conduct of an insurgency itself, and the lines of operation within the COIN campaign must counter the lines of operation of the insurgents. Within the guiding principles, each COIN campaign must be a custom approach to the insurgency at hand. The constant is the fact that insurgency and counter-insurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support both at home and in the theatre of operations. If the strategic focal point is public opinion in the local, domestic and international arenas, most initial military tactical efforts will be focused on breaking the link between the insurgent and the people. This is not only a physical link, but the psychological link of moral support. The former will entail physical activities, whilst the latter will entail influence activities that undermine and attack the insurgent ideology, narrative and claims to authority and legitimacy. This will include measures to address and resolve grievances that lend support and credibility to the insurgency. If the insurgent can be isolated, it is then theoretically a relatively simple matter to eliminate him and his cause.

4. In order to reach this point, a COIN campaign will involve more than military engagement. Defeating an insurgency requires not only the neutralization of insurgent military capabilities but also the resolution of the root causes of the political and socioeconomic grievances that enabled its occurrence in the first instance. Therefore, it requires a comprehensive approach, with multiple agencies and other government departments, often enabled through a coalition effort. The mere attrition of insurgents is highly unlikely to result in the defeat of the insurgency. Indeed, any attempt to win an insurgency through attrition may only help fuel that insurgency. Only a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of an insurgency and attacks the legitimacy and authority of the insurgents will obtain an enduring solution.

SECTION 2
COIN CAMPAIGN AS PART OF THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS

104. GENERAL

1. Campaigns and subordinate operations often require military forces to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict, conduct a wide range of military activities simultaneously and transition quickly from one type of operation to another in rapidly changing operational circumstances. Commanders must be able to visualize how a campaign or operation will likely evolve over time in light of changing circumstances.

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[4] NATO Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*

105. THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK[5]

1. The concept of a continuum of operations identifies a number of campaign themes and provides a framework for commanders to understand the complexity of the operational environment and the manner in which missions contribute to a lasting peace or, at least, to an environment in which conflict is diminished. The continuum of operations consists of four aspects:

a. the spectrum of conflict;

b. predominant (operational level) campaign themes, including counter-insurgency;

c. types of tactical activities (offensive, defensive and stability); and

d. the simultaneous conduct of different types of tactical activities, termed full-spectrum operations.

106. PREDOMINANT CAMPAIGN THEMES

1. Military operations may be described through a series of predominant campaign themes plotted at appropriate and relative locations on the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1-1).




Figure 1-1: Predominant Campaign Themes

2. Campaign themes consist of the following: major combat, counter-insurgency, peace support (which entails a range of peacekeeping and peacemaking campaigns) and peacetime military engagement.[6] The location of these themes along the spectrum of conflict is not fixed

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[5] See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations* for a fuller discussion of the continuum of operations.

[6] Peacetime military engagement is defined as: "planned military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. Note: it includes programmes and exercises that nations conduct with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding with other countries and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners" (submitted to Army Terminology Panel June 2007).

but generally reflects the relative level of violence that can be expected within the campaign. A limited intervention, such as a non-combatant evacuation or emergency humanitarian aid mission, may occur at any point along the spectrum of conflict.[7] As well, there may be elements of different campaign themes within a campaign theatre. For example, one region of a nation may require peace support, while another is enduring an insurgency.

107. FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

1. All campaigns are conducted through the combined and simultaneous conduct of tactical-level operations: offensive, defensive and stability operations.[8] They are linked through enabling operations.[9] Each of these types of operations consists of a set of tactical activities that are realized through tactical tasks (see Figure 1-2).




Figure 1-2: The Continuum of Operations and Full-Spectrum Operations

2. Campaigns and operational plans are realized at the tactical level through the simultaneous and sequential conduct of these tactical operations and their constituent activities. The simultaneous conduct of tactical activities is termed full-spectrum operations.

3. As campaigns progress, efforts and resources ebb and flow between these different tactical activities, and their balance reflects the nature of the campaign, the principles by which the campaign should be conducted and the situation at hand.

4. Each of these tactical classifications consists of a number of tactical activities, which in turn are realized through the conduct of tactical tasks. These tactical level activities and their simultaneous conduct are termed full-spectrum operations (see Figure 1-3).

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[7] Limited intervention is defined as: "a military operation limited in objective, scope and timeframe. Note: not considered a campaign, but may involve cooperation with other agencies and government departments" (approved by Army Terminology Panel, May 2007).

[8] Stability operations are defined as: "tactical activities conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved" (Army Terminology Panel).

[9] Enabling operations include those tactical activities that enable others. They include withdrawal, relief in place and advance to contact. For more details, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS	OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS	DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS	STABILITY OPERATIONS
Operations consist of tactical activities **Tactical Activities**	▪ Attack ▪ Raid Ambush ▪ Exploitation ▪ Pursuit ▪ Break-out ▪ Feint and Demonstration ▪ Reconnaissance in Force	▪ Defence ▪ Delay	▪ Security and Control ▪ Support to Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) ▪ Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) ▪ Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance ▪ Assistance to Other Agencies
Activities are realized through the assignment of tasks and effects **Tactical Tasks and Effects (Not an all-inclusive list)**	▪ Destroy ▪ Seize ▪ Secure ▪ Support by Fire	▪ Block ▪ Occupy ▪ Counter-attack ▪ Guard ▪ Fix ▪ Retain	▪ Cordon and Search ▪ Observe/Monitor ▪ Vehicle Checkpoint (VCP) ▪ Framework Patrols ▪ Humanitarian Aid Delivery ▪ Train Indigenous Security Forces ▪ Crowd Confrontation

Notes:

1. Mission statements will be written with both the activity and the task or immediate effect, further described by the purpose, or secondary effect. The activity is not always stated in the mission statement, such as "...(attack to) seize (object) in order to..."

2. Mission statements relating to stability activities and tasks will use the transient verb "conduct" to assign the activity, such as, "...will conduct security and control in order to..." This would then be allocated as tactical tasks and effects to subordinates, such as VCPs, framework patrols, etc. At the lower tactical levels, only the tactical tasks may appear in the mission statement, but again continue to use the verb "conduct," such as, "...will conduct framework patrols in order to..." or "...will conduct humanitarian aid delivery in order to..." In this manner, they are similar to mission statements for enabling operations. See B-GL-331-002/FP-001 *Staff Duties for Land Operations* for further details.

Figure 1-3: Tactical Activities and Tasks

5. These types of tactical-level operations, together with tactical tasks, describe the total tactical activity undertaken by a military force within a campaign. Each type is guided by a set of principles.[10] Note that each subordinate type constitutes individual tactical tasks. An attack may consist of a support-by-fire task and clearing task, while humanitarian assistance may see one sub-unit distributing food and another one conducting a medical clinic. Again, it is important to note that in any type of campaign theme, these tactical tasks may be conducted simultaneously. For example, one sub-unit may be conducting an attack, another may be conducting security of an area through vehicle checkpoints, and another may be distributing emergency water and rations to refugees.

Full-Spectrum Operations during the Iraq War—March 2003

Within a 48-hour period, between 22 and 24 March 2003, Z Coy, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (RRF) conducted full-spectrum operations at the sub-unit level.

Following a forward passage of lines with in-place US forces en route to Basra, Z Company Combat Team conducted the following operations:

- an attack on the near side of a bridge leading to the city of Basra;
- an attack, on their flank, to clear a small Iraqi Army barracks;
- an attack, following nightfall, to seize the far side of the bridge;
- a hasty defensive position in their bridgehead;
- at first light, 23 Mar 03, the combat team had to undertake crowd control operations within their defensive position for civilians attempting to flee Basra but refused passage at the bridge for fear of enemy ex-filtration;
- the combat team defeated an enemy armoured counter-attack;
- whilst maintaining the defensive position, part of the combat team (one platoon, company HQ and a fire team of tanks) conducted a penetration into the city of Basra, destroying five T-55s and a number of infantry detachments in the process, withdrawing after the contact and returning to the defensive position;
- maintained the defensive position the night of 23/24 Mar 03;
- conducted a relief in place the morning of 24 Mar 03; and
- moved to the battle group's rear areas and conducted a series of stability activities, including the delivery of aid, area security and route control, fire fighting and tasks to stop looting and other criminal behaviour.

Whilst the combat team was conducting these activities, other sub-units of the 1 RRF Battle Group were conducting other activities and tasks.

Source: Memoirs of OC Z Coy, 1 RRF, *Major Duncan McSporan, RRF.*

6. The conduct of tactical-level activities should not violate the guiding principles by which the overall campaign should be conducted. For example, the pursuit of fleeing insurgents that will gain a tactical success should not be conducted if it will break the overarching philosophy and principles of a COIN campaign.

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[10] See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations.*

7. The conduct of campaigns should always seek to reach operational objectives and reduce the level of conflict. When operating at any point along the continuum of operations, commanders and staffs should consider how to prevent the escalation of violence by the adversary. During peace support, for example, operations must be conducted with a view to preventing escalation to an insurgency or to major combat. Force must be used discriminately because the undue application of force, lethal or otherwise, can undermine the overall campaign and, in fact, cause an escalation of conflict if secondary effects are not fully considered.

8. Recognizing changing circumstances or conditions, especially ones that require a change to the major theme of a campaign, is both an intellectual as well as an intelligence challenge. This is part of the art of war. The intelligence system must be attuned to, and look for, indications of changes in the environment, and commanders and staffs must be able to interpret the key indicators that demonstrate a shift is taking place. Commanders and staffs must then react to the changing environment, either to prevent escalation of violence or facilitate a shift to a lower level of violence, in such a way that the situation is manageable by the forces at hand.

9. In situations of political instability or disaffection, an insurgency may erupt. Insurgencies are complex and may have several significant factors, including intra- or inter-state violence as well as factional violence between different insurgent groups. Although some models of insurgency, such as the Maoist model, forecast a progression to conventional operations, insurgencies, as defined above, will fall short of large-scale, conventional operations inherent to a major combat campaign.

10. The military role in COIN is to create a security framework that precludes the ability of insurgents to undertake offensive operations. The military will work in co-operation with other agencies addressing the non-military aspects of the security environment in order to solve the root causes and grievances that lead to conflict and insurgency. This will include many of the tactical activities grouped under stability operations. Thus the military's role is one of supporting other agencies by creating manoeuvre space for them through the provision of security and protection and the neutralization of the insurgent threat. It is these other agencies that will bring the enduring political solutions to an insurgency.

Elements of different campaign themes may occur within the same theatre of operations. In 1967, the US Marine Corps was simultaneously conducting conventional and counter-insurgency specific operations in I Corps, the USMC area of operations.

While fighting a conventional war against elements of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) along the Laotian and North Vietnamese borders, the Marines were concomitantly trying to support the Combined Action Program (CAP) that had been slowly but successfully combating the influence of Viet Cong (VC) insurgents. The CAP embedded Marine rifle sections with South Vietnamese militia to live and operate in hamlets and villages throughout I Corps, which, in effect, implemented a form of Lyautey's *tache d'huile* method of COIN. Despite the small size of the CAP at the time (approximately 1,200 Marines and 2,100 Vietnamese militia), the manpower demands of attrition warfare in the border regions hindered an expansion of the CAP, undermining the overall COIN campaign.

The coordination of NVA conventional warfare operations and VC insurgent activities was not a coincidence. North Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap specifically created and implemented a stratagem that sought to draw the bulk of US forces to the peripheral areas of South Vietnam to be engaged in costly and demoralizing battles of attrition in order to create physical and psychological manoeuvre space for insurgents in population centres.

Commanders must be aware that a transition across campaign themes may occur over time and space within a theatre, and a balance must be struck between competing demands and principles. The main effort may shift between operational objectives, dependent upon the situation and threat. At all times, commanders must focus on achieving the operational objectives that will create conditions for enduring success.

Source: Michael Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: the Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972 *(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), pp.128-132.*

108. COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS[11]

1. In order to realize operational objectives, military forces create supporting effects through the conduct of tactical activities, using a range of capabilities. This range of capabilities and activities is classified as fires or influence activities. They are enabled in a simultaneous and complementary manner through manoeuvre and battlespace management and are together known as comprehensive operations (see Figure 1-4).

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[11] For a more detailed discussion on comprehensive operations and other related concepts, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.




Figure 1-4: Comprehensive Operations

2. The construct is defined as follows:

   a. **Comprehensive Operations**. The deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects.

   b. **Fires**. The physical means deliberately used to create or support the realization of physical effects as first order effects.

NOTE

Fires include lethal and non-lethal systems. They also include electronic counter-control measures of EW.

   c. **Influence Activities**. An activity designed to affect the character or behaviour of a person or a group as a first order effect.

NOTE

Influence activities affect understanding, perceptions and will with the aim of affecting behaviour in a desired manner.

3. Although a wide array of activities will create influences, influence activities are primarily realized through psychological operations (PSYOPS), public affairs (PA), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), deception and the posture, profile and presence of forces.

4. Fires and influence activities are planned in a comprehensive and complementary manner. For example, PSYOPS may be used to convince enemy conscripts to flee prior to an attack, and CIMIC projects may repair damages caused by offensive operations in order to maintain the support of affected populaces. In accordance with the manoeuvrist approach, fires, although creating first order effects on the physical plane, should be conducted with a view to the effects on the psychological plane—the resulting effects on will and cohesion. Likewise,

although influence activities may have first order effects on the psychological plane, they may have subsequent effects on the physical plane. For example, PSYOPS that convince conscripts to desert reduce the overall combat power of the enemy commander.

5. Many of the influence activities will be activities under the category of stability operations. They will seek to build lasting solutions to the root causes of conflict and crisis.

6. The balance that a commander will strike between fires and influence activities will depend upon the type of campaign, its guiding principles, the situation at hand and the desired effects. In campaigns that require the support of a population and the redress of grievances and civil strife, a large portion of capabilities will be dedicated to influence activities, likely in conjunction with other agencies.

SECTION 3
AN OVERVIEW OF INSURGENCIES AND COUNTER-INSURGENCIES

109. DEVELOPMENT OF AN INSURGENCY

Insurgencies are not a new phenomenon. For example, the Greek historian Herodotus chronicled an insurgency by the Scythians against the rule of the Persian warrior-king Darius in 512 B.C. which ultimately succeeded in forcing a Persian withdrawal. The forces of Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.) and the Mongols also each suffered significantly at the hands of insurgents. Similarly, terrorism has long been used as an effective tactic. An early example of this is the use of terrorism as "propaganda of the deed" by the Assassins in Persia in an effort to subvert the rule of the Seljuk Turks in the 11th and 12th centuries.

Sources: Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: the Guerilla in History *(New York, NY: Morrow, 1994); Brig'd (ret'd) Maurice Tugwell,* "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures," *PhD. Diss. (London: King's College, 1979) (with permission).*

1. At its most basic, an insurgency is an uprising or insurrection against an established form of authority, normally a government, occupying authority or social structure. Various situations may give rise to an insurgency, and a single insurgency may have several root and contributing causes. In general, insurgencies spring from dissatisfaction with a social structure or government policies. However, recent history has shown that criminal groups can foment a form of insurgency by destabilizing a government to create conditions favourable to the pursuit of criminal activity. This occurs in a number of ways, including the subversion of police and security forces, the control of territory and the intimidation of the populace.

2. Insurgencies develop in stages and often the government will only recognize the severity of the threat after violence has begun to occur on a regular basis. Ideally, the government will recognize a threat and act to preclude its development prior to the outbreak of widespread violence.

A recent example of early recognition of an insurgency was the Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which successfully halted a growing criminal insurgency. The government of the Solomon Islands, hampered by corruption at many levels, was no longer able to provide even basic services by the summer of 2003 and requested international assistance. RAMSI, led by Australia, was able to successfully dislocate, disrupt and disarm the major criminal groups, help reorganize the police forces and assist in the resumption of the provision of basic public services, all prior to the onset of major violence.

Source: Russell Glenn, COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon Islands *(Santa Monica: RAND, 2007).*

3. Insurgencies are a method used by disaffected groups or those whose best interests are served by destabilizing the existing government. By their very nature, insurgents quickly become involved with other destabilizing elements within a society such as criminal entities. Each exploits the other for their own benefits.

4. Each insurgency will have its own set of causes, aims and desired end-state. Some insurgencies will stem from a political, social and/or religious ideology that envisions an improved (even utopian) state of affairs. Other insurgencies will stem from unresolved real or perceived grievances, while others will be conducted by a particular group that simply wishes to gain power but cannot do so through legitimate means or conventional use of military power. Still others will stem from nationalist desires for independence or autonomy. In all cases, insurgencies are supported by propaganda that justifies the use of subversion and violence.

5. Insurgencies are more likely to occur in states where there are inherent racial, cultural, religious or ideological divisions that lead to a lack of national cohesion and weak, inefficient, unstable or unpopular governments. Additional factors, such as corruption and external agitation, may facilitate an insurgency.

6. In other words, many insurgencies will develop in failed or failing states where governments have failed to address or satisfy the basic needs of their populace. These needs will differ depending upon the region and culture involved, but in general will include the basic essentials of a stable life, responsible government, religious freedom and economic viability. It is from such fertile environments that insurgencies will often grow.

7. The aim or desired end-state of the insurgency may be quite extreme, such as the creation of a new state or social construct. Others may simply seek to seize power, expel a foreign power or acquire specific but limited political advantages or control. Whatever the aim, the insurgents themselves feel that their causes and aim justify the use of violence and subversion and even, in some cases, the use of terrorism against the civilian populace.

History holds several examples of Canadian involvement in insurgencies conducted on various scales with differing aims. Some examples are as follows:

- United Empire Loyalists and the American Revolution (~1774–1783)
- Fenian Raids (1866, 1870)
- Northwest Rebellion (1885)
- Siberia (1918–1919)
- Haiti (2004)
- Afghanistan campaign

8. The tactics used by insurgents will vary with each campaign and situation. They will certainly include violence or at the very least the threat of violence. Subversion and propaganda have traditionally been used to great effect. Insurgent capabilities in this regard have exponentially increased with the availability of sophisticated but inexpensive information technologies that enable the exploitation of mass media to convey their message, propaganda, threat and capabilities to a large audience. Insurgents seek support internally and externally, and they often conceal fund raising campaigns behind facades of charitable or political organizations. Dense urban terrain will be exploited in order to attack high value targets, inflict mass casualties and hide their own presence. Unfortunately, many insurgencies resort to the tactic of terrorism as a means to realize their operational and strategic end. Insurgents will also exploit the inherent weaknesses of the society under attack, particularly liberal democracies and states where religious or ideological tensions are high in order to support their operations. Their words and deeds will continually paint themselves as the victims of an unjust social or power structure, and their actions will often seek to provoke an overreaction from government forces which will thereby support their themes and messages of persecution and victim hood.

9. Insurgencies can cross international borders. Insurgents may establish bases in a sympathetic country or in states with weak governments. They may also have pan-national aims and therefore conduct their attacks in more than one geographic area in order to create results there or in other areas. During the Cold War, communist expansion followed this model, and some radical religious/cultural-based terrorist groups have recently undertaken similar measures.

10. Insurgencies seek to gain the support of a portion of the populace large enough to achieve their goals. In some cases, this will require support by the majority; in others, this may only require the support of a powerful portion of the populace (tribe, business class, ethnic minority). In all cases, an insurgency requires only the indifference of a populace to operate, to give it manoeuvre space that allows the development and expansion of an insurgency. As an insurgency grows, those who do not rally to the cause are intimidated into silence, killed or forced to flee. Insurgencies usually gain their greatest success amongst that segment of the population that is disaffected or disadvantaged—those who have gained the least from the current social organization. Even if the majority of the population fails to eventually rally to the side of the insurgents, the insurgents simply have to make defending the status quo too expensive or difficult for the security forces, the governments concerned and the general populace. An insurgency is, therefore, like all conflict: a battle of wills.

110. DEVELOPMENT AND CONDUCT OF A COIN CAMPAIGN

1. Operations conducted within a COIN campaign aim to defeat an insurgency through military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions. An overarching demand of counter-insurgency operations is that military forces play a key but supporting role in

the campaign. The military role is to create the security framework to permit the legal and political initiatives required for a long term solution to the root causes of grievances. Although combat may occur, the primary strategic centre of gravity is the civilian populace. Only by drawing the civilian population to the government side and therefore creating a hostile environment for the insurgents can an insurgency be defeated. In other words, the military plays but one part of a COIN campaign that will involve a wide variety of other government and non-government agencies. It is these other elements of power that will bring about the enduring solutions to the situation.

2. The overall effect sought in a counter-insurgency is not the death or capture of insurgents but, more importantly, the provision of security to the population and the reduction of popular support for the insurgency through reform. Although the military's role is limited, the manner in which it conducts its responsibilities will influence the overall environment and success in all facets of the campaign. For example, a heavy-handed response to insurgent activities will be exploited by the insurgents' propaganda and thereby undermine the trust of the local populace in the security forces.

3. A government facing an insurgency in its own territory is under direct threat and can therefore be expected to bear a higher risk and accept higher casualties than a coalition partner assisting it.

4. Although not specifically designed for such commitments, military forces have often been used to conduct COIN campaigns. This is generally due to the level of violence offered by the insurgents and the resulting requirement for large numbers of well-armed troops to protect high value targets, the populace and government and to engage and destroy the insurgents when necessary.

5. Although combat may be intense at the start of a COIN campaign, there is typically a lower prevalence of combat than expected in conventional major combat campaigns.[12] This combat occurs primarily at the small-unit level—i.e., section, platoon, or company—although larger organizations may sometimes be involved. The rate of resource consumption is also lower than in major combat, although the campaign as a whole is likely to last much longer, with several years being typical. Thus the overall resource requirement is usually higher. Certainly the political and moral commitment of the government and people supporting the COIN campaign in another nation must be prepared for a long-term commitment.

6. Insurgencies have ambiguous start-dates, and COIN campaigns have ambiguous end-dates. It is unlikely that the conflict will be suddenly ended with a major military victory against the insurgents, who will rarely offer the opportunity for decisive military engagement and are typically organized into small clandestine cells. Although there are examples of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies that have resulted in decisive military successes—e.g., Castro's Cuban revolution in the former case, and the defeat of the North West Rebellion in the latter case–the long-term solutions still require political and economic measures. In short, military forces do not defeat insurgencies; instead, they create the security conditions necessary for the political resolution of the conflict.

7. Insurgencies can only be effectively fought with consideration of diverse factors such as politics, economics, police capability, social structure, culture and psychology along with military

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[12] This is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Maoist model envisions a final phase of major conventional combat, and the insurgencies in China, Vietnam and Cuba involved significant conventional combat. Similarly, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) in Algeria attempted to build a conventional army with which to challenge French conventional military superiority.

power. Hence, any counter-insurgency must consist of a multi-pronged, multi-agency approach at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The causes and symptoms, such as the insurgents themselves and their popular support, must be addressed through comprehensive operations—through a combination of fires and their physical effects as well as influence activities and their psychological effects. It is the latter of these two, influence activities, that will create enduring solutions to a COIN campaign by addressing root causes.

8. The COIN campaign will be realized through a thematic lines of operation that group similar operational objectives together that build to the desired end-state. Some lines of operation may be lead by the military as a supported element. Other lines of operation will see the military in a supporting role with most activities conducted by other agencies. Here the supporting role will utilize unique military capabilities such as strategic lift, medical support, security provision, military training capabilities and/or intelligence collection, collation and analysis. Some lines of operation may be conducted by other agencies entirely within the overall security provided by police and military forces.

9. The multi-agency approach is termed the **comprehensive approach**.[13] It sees the military working in a unity of purpose and ideally in a unity of effort in order to create enduring solutions to the root causes of the insurgency and reach the desired operational end-state. In all cases, successful COIN requires this comprehensive approach facilitated through a unity of purpose.

10. The comprehensive approach may be illustrated by way of an example: while police and military are cooperating in the search for insurgent bases and are providing security to population centres and along lines of communication, international and non-governmental aid organizations (along with military support) may be developing physical infrastructure in disadvantaged urban areas. Concomitantly, the government, with international support, may be reforming election laws and political structures.

11. Conventional armies may not necessarily be routinely structured to conduct a COIN campaign. However, such campaigns are not the purview of special or elite military or para-military forces (although they may have roles to play as well). History has demonstrated that the most successful COIN operations have been conducted by ingenious, resourceful, non-doctrinaire conventional (even conscript) armies that have deployed with simply a guiding set of principles, developing their tactics as the situation became understood. Paramount to the success of the military portion of the campaign has been firm, clearly articulated political and strategic goals and the ability of officers to exercise command with freedom, flexibility and confidence down to the lowest levels, using ingenuity and resourcefulness to take the battle to the insurgents on one hand, whilst attempting to resolve the root causes on the other. Indeed, those attributes of a regimental system—confidence afforded the commander in remote situations, familiarity among comrades and across ranks and reliance on small unit actions—have proven most effective in COIN campaigns.[14]

12. The commitment of western democracies and alliances to the stabilization of failed or failing states and the desire to limit global effects of insurgencies in an era of weapons of mass destruction means that governments will deploy both military forces and civilian agencies together in order to address these threats to regional and global stability. Not only must

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[13] For more details regarding a comprehensive approach including guiding principles, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

[14] *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict—A Comparative Analysis,* edited by David Charters and Maurice Tugwell (Toronto: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989).

commanders understand the military's role in a COIN campaign, but they must be able to understand the key role played by other agencies and how all agencies work together in a unity of purpose to defeat insurgencies and their causes.

SECTION 4
CONTRASTS AND COMPETITION BETWEEN INSURGENCIES AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS[15]

111. GENERAL

1. Conventional wars and battles pit two relatively similar forces against one another with the winner being able to exercise political control over the other. The forces involved focus on military actions in similar timeframes and use comparable capabilities and methods to attempt to dominate the other. Although the constituent elements of each force's fighting power may be in different balance, there is a certain amount of symmetry within this competition.

2. This symmetry does not exist between an insurgency and counter-insurgency elements. The nature of the environment, aims of each force, relative demands and the elements of fighting power of each force—the moral, physical and intellectual—demand that the conduct of a COIN campaign be distinctly different from the conduct of the insurgency itself.

112. INITIATIVE

1. Within an insurgency situation, the initiative at all levels lies with the insurgent. The insurgent will pick the moment at which to begin his campaign and at which moment to initiate the use of violence. At the tactical level, the insurgent will continuously be in a position to accept or decline engagement, and most tactical engagements will be a time and place of his choosing.

2. The insurgent's use of propaganda and other means to influence audiences—activities to create first order effects on the psychological plane—will often take an offensive nature that will seek to undermine the credibility of the government and COIN elements and increase his own legitimacy. Despite the lack of formal doctrine for information operations, the insurgent will have honed propaganda skills and will quickly master skills in the manipulation of international media. Knowing what activities and engagements will occur, the insurgent will have his propaganda and media messages ready for immediate implementation. Furthermore, the eagerness of international media to be obtain inside, exclusive stories will allow insurgents to control messages and present images and stories that support their narrative, their grievances and representation of victim hood.

3. Counter-insurgent forces will often be forced into a position of reaction. In realizing this, leaders must understand that insurgent forces will conduct activities, mostly atrocities, in the hope of provoking a heavy handed reaction from COIN forces that will ultimately undermine their own credibility and legitimacy.

4. Insightful political and military leaders will ideally foresee the development of an insurgency before the insurgencies gain significant support and/or resort to open violence. In such cases, they should, in addition to increasing intelligence collection and analysis, initiate

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[15] The basis for this section has been drawn from: David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praegar Security International, 2006), pp. 3-10.

actions that will address any legitimate grievances being exploited by the insurgent leadership and undertake measures to counter the insurgent narrative and ideology.

5. Attempts by government and COIN forces to seize the initiative must be carefully considered. The use of physical attacks must be viewed from the perspective of long term effects. Although physical attacks may result in short-term tactical success against an element of the insurgent forces, they may cause secondary and tertiary effects, such as the death of civilians or collateral damage, that hurt, perhaps irreparably, the long-term success of the campaign.

6. Initiative by COIN forces may seek to gain considerable success in terms of information operations, specifically influence activities.[16] The ability to undertake effective psychological operations amongst the local populace, the ability to quickly explain actions through public affairs means and the ability to use CIMIC and other resources to address grievances and other potential causes of the insurgency will seize a sense of moral initiative for the COIN forces and wrestle much of the initiative from the insurgent.

113. FOCUS ON POPULATION

1. Because of the political aims of an insurgency and the lack of material resources in comparison to the government forces, the insurgent will focus on gaining support of the population. He will attempt, by whatever means deemed effective, to dissociate and isolate the populace from the counterinsurgent and to gain its physical and moral support. As a minimum the insurgent will seek to break the will of the population to resist. Ideally, the insurgent will reach a point at which he can control the population through a combination of force and intimidation or the populace willingly submits to the insurgent. Eventually, this will result in success for the insurgent, for in the final equation, the exercise of political power depends upon the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at least, on its submissiveness.

2. The COIN forces and government agencies must actively work to counter the insurgent attempts to coerce or persuade the population. A careful analysis must be made of the population and its culture in order to comprehend its grievances, motivations and the ways in which the insurgent will target it and influence it. At the very least, the population must be protected from security threats. But this will not be enough for enduring success. The population must be persuaded to reject the insurgent narrative and ideology, which lends the insurgency credibility and justification.

3. In addition to the populace in the theatre of operations, the insurgent will attempt to undermine the support and will of the domestic populace of any nation contributing forces to the campaign, such as those in a coalition. This will be a strategic centre of gravity and must be considered in the planning by COIN forces and governments.

114. ROLE OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL LEAD

1. In a conventional conflict, military activities are foremost, and their planning and execution focuses on effects against the military forces of the other side. Politics takes a supporting role.

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[16] See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*. Within land operations, the concept of information operations has been refined to consist of influence activities only, that is, those activities that seek first order effects on the psychological plane.

2. The focus of insurgent and counterinsurgent actions on the populace and its support brings politics to the fore in a COIN campaign. The military will take, for the most part, a supporting role. Whilst the insurgent will be unencumbered by rules of engagement and the laws of war and will seek through any means to intimidate the populace and to exhaust its will, counterinsurgents must consider all their military actions in light of the secondary political and social effects, which will have the enduring influence in a successful campaign.

3. With the population and its support and will as a centre of gravity in the campaign, most actions become political. Thus, political action becomes foremost in the campaign to the point that politics or political action is an instrument of the campaign. It must be so, for only political action will address the circumstances that lead to the insurgency. The military may only be required to provide a security framework in which other agencies and government organizations may manoeuvre and work.

115. TRANSITION TO CONFLICT AND CAMPAIGN DURATION

1. During an insurgency, the transition from peace to open conflict will be gradual when compared to the sudden eruption of high levels of violence in a conventional war. The insurgent will generally have no desire for a quick transition to open levels of conflict. He will wish to build up resources and to shape the environment through propaganda and other activities in order to eventually justify the use of violence. He will wish to avoid an early reaction by government counterinsurgent forces that could undermine preparations. Additionally, the insurgent will hope to gain significant strength and influence before the population realizes the true danger posed.

2. Once initiated, an insurgency will be a protracted affair. It will take time to build up forces and resources, to gain support from the populace, to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the counterinsurgent forces and to defeat them, either militarily or through a lack of support by the population. Additionally, the lack of a localized, obvious target against which to apply combat power will preclude a rapid defeat of the insurgent's forces.

3. This works to the insurgent's advantage, as a protracted conflict will serve to wear down the will of the populace to resist and the will of the domestic populations of any forces contributing to the COIN campaign. The insurgent must simply continue to sow disorder and insecurity, whilst the COIN forces and government must fight to provide security and maintain the commitment of the populace.

4. The only means to quickly end an insurgency is to come to a political resolution that resolves motivating grievances and eliminates the vast majority of public support for the insurgent.

116. RELATIVE COSTS

1. Simply put, an insurgency is cheap, a COIN campaign is expensive. It takes little for the insurgent to sow disorder, undermine the credibility of the government and attack the will of the population. Disorder will create insecurity and economic disruption and thus hardship for the population.

2. Government and COIN forces have the responsibility to counter this disorder. Failure to do so will loose the support of the population. Security measures to prevent disorder are hugely expensive in terms of resources, particularly manpower. Routes must be secured, vital points protected and damaged infrastructure rebuilt. This responsibility to provide security to a populace creates an incredibly high ratio of forces to insurgents, as many as 20 to one or

higher.[17] However, failure to provide security will force the populace to seek it from elsewhere, perhaps the insurgents themselves.

3. Paradoxically, security measures themselves that seek to protect the populace also tend to frustrate the populace and may inadvertently undermine their support. They cost the public inconveniences and invasions of privacy. Thus, they must be applied carefully with the aim of limiting disruption to the local populace. Additionally, the necessity of such security measures must be carefully explained to the public, and they must be reduced at the earliest opportunity. Ideally, they are conducted by a nation's regular constabulary forces. Where this is not possible and military forces must provide the security, they should be passed to constabulary forces as the security situation improves and the latter's capabilities increase.

4. For counterinsurgent forces, particularly those from supporting third nations, the cost in manpower from deaths may have an exponential effect. Although the relative cost in manpower from deaths will be relatively low compared to losses typical of major combat, the political costs will be high in terms of undermining national will.

5. The relative costs in an insurgency situation allow and encourages the insurgent to conduct a protracted campaign. This fact must be clearly articulated to all populations supporting the COIN campaign.

117. FLUIDITY AND RIGIDITY

1. An insurgent has few if any responsibilities. He may hide amongst the populace and represent himself as part of it. His line of operations are therefore fluid, and his capabilities and activities will ebb and flow over time. Insurgents have no rules of engagement and no expectations of moral limits to the application of their combat power. They may use whatever means, including overt propaganda, to influence and intimidate populations.

2. COIN forces on the other have rigid limits to the conduct of operations. They have onerous responsibilities to secure the populace and their infrastructure. They must abide by rules of engagement and conduct activities with a view to maintaining their legitimacy and the moral high ground. They must carefully coordinate the activities of a wide range of agencies. Furthermore, COIN forces must refrain from using any forms of propaganda and must ensure that their PSYOPS and public affairs activities portray only truthful messages in order to maintain credibility and avoid being irrevocably discredited in the eyes of the populace.

118. IDEOLOGY

1. At the basis of an insurgency is a narrative that contains an idea and founding cause for the insurgency. This core idea becomes formalized as an ideology. It is a highly motivational tool that exploits grievances, culture and beliefs in order to further the insurgent aims and justify their actions.

2. Although the ideology and narrative may be powerful motivators for the insurgent core and for new recruits, they will unlikely attract and hold the vast majority of a populace who simply seek the basic requirements of security and well-being. In the long run, it may be the side that provides the best security and standard of living that wins the support of the populace.

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[17] There is generally an upper limit to this ratio. Once pervasive security is required beyond the ordinary capabilities of a constabulary, subsequent increases in insurgent numbers do not require an equal increase in counterinsurgent forces.

3. It is unlikely that the counterinsurgent forces will have a central ideology as a rallying point. However, two key issues must be kept in mind. Regardless of the ideology touted by the insurgents, COIN operations must be conducted in keeping with the cultural and societal norms of the theatre population. Not to do so will undermine the credibility of, and support for, the COIN forces.[18] Secondly, the influence activities of COIN forces must seek to solve legitimate grievances from which the narrative and ideology draw strength, advertise those solutions and indicate and exploit inconsistencies in the ideology, particularly any false attempt by the insurgents to claim a moral superiority.

119. ENDURING IRREGULAR NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY

Insurgencies can, in the end, only be quelled with a political solution. Lahcen Daoudi, the leader of a moderate Islamist North African political party noted that, "if you let a cat into the house, you can caress it. If you leave it in the mountains, it becomes savage." In essence, this articulates that if the host nation political leadership engages in some political dialogue with potential or existing insurgent elements, there is a reasonable chance that the legitimate grievances underlying the insurgent cause can be addressed in a non-violent manner and progress made towards an enduring solution.

Moderate Islamist PJD Party poised to win parliamentary control, The Globe and Mail, 19 May 2007, p. A18.

1. Throughout the life of an insurgency, the insurgent will likely remain unconventional. Even if the insurgent comes to the point of mustering regular formations, he will continue to exploit his flexibility of population support, guerrilla tactics and lack of rules of engagement. He will not surrender this advantage.

2. COIN forces for their part must avoid becoming frustrated by the irregular nature of insurgent forces. Indeed, the insurgent will seek to exploit such frustration in order to cause the COIN forces to over-react and create undesired effects amongst a populace.

3. The only true means of turning an insurgent into a conventional force is to engage the insurgent and bring him into the conventional political process.

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[18] Having said this, the idea of cultural respect or sensitivity cannot allow the practice of moral relativism. The sanction of obvious morally wrong practices by local security forces and government leaders will only exacerbate the security situation, undermine credibility and fuel support for the insurgents, particularly if they claim moral superiority.

CHAPTER 2
DESCRIBING AN INSURGENCY

SECTION 1
UNDERSTANDING AN INSURGENCY

201. INTRODUCTION

1. In order to successfully combat an insurgency, it is vital to understand the term, why they occur and the various forms that they may take. Additionally, it is just as important to understand the particular situation and culture in which an insurgency occurs. Without comprehension of the causes and characteristics unique to each insurgency, there will be little hope of successfully countering it.

2. As discussed in Chapter 1, an insurgency may be described as follows: "a competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change."[19] In addition to the characteristic of violence, or at least the threat of violence, insurgencies usually share a number of other characteristics, including propaganda, subversion and links to criminal activities and organizations.

3. Rarely will insurgents seek to, or believe that they can, defeat a government and its conventional military forces through military pressure alone. Instead, they seek to outlast the will of the other side and to influence and persuade the mass of the population to either support their aims or to at least cease supporting the established government or recognized authority.

202. CAUSES OF AN INSURGENCY

1. An insurgency may spring from many causes; however, the classic insurgency usually begins with the perception of oppression due to political, societal and economic grievances. When these perceptions become sufficiently emotive, leaders may emerge who are able to organize violent protest or resistance and influence people to risk imprisonment and even death in order to combat the established order.

2. It must be remembered by those at all levels of command that at the root of most insurgencies are legitimate grievances. Indeed, a certain amount of empathy may be justified in dealing with insurgents. These grievances will often be of a political, social, historic and/or economic nature, and therefore their enduring resolution will require more than the application of military capabilities: they will demand the involvement of other agencies in a **comprehensive approach**. The failure to resolve these grievances will likely lead to support for an insurgency. Thus, commanders at all levels, particularly the strategic and operational, must understand that a successful outcome to a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign will demand upon achieving enduring solutions to the grievances at the root of the insurgency.

203. THE AIM OF AN INSURGENCY

1. An insurgency will aim to gain the advantage of power within a given political context in order to realize socio-economic, cultural, religious and geographic goals or some combination of these. It seeks to realize a change or re-order to the extant political structure and/or relationships.

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[19] Definition as developed by a counter-insurgency study group during United States Marine Corps (USMC) JOINT URBAN WARRIOR 2005.

2. In terms of overarching concepts, it is a competition between two political options. This is, however, a simplification of insurgencies as they develop within a society. There will always be root causes that drive individuals, groups and their leaders to take up arms to seek change. Whilst a core leadership may share the same grievances, they will exploit a wide array of local injustices or grievances in order to recruit a wide body of support.

3. By their very nature of being illegal, secretive and disadvantaged, insurgencies will become quickly tied to other groups and irregular activities within a society. Not only will insurgencies undertake criminal activities to raise funds and disrupt society, they may well be infiltrated and/or exploited by criminal groups who see the numbers and military power of an insurgent force as a means of meeting criminal objectives. Additionally, social and religious leaders will see the insurgency as a means of spreading their own ideologies, with which the ordinary follower of the insurgency may have little knowledge or may not support.

4. All of these complicating factors must not be allowed to mask the fact insurgencies and their supporters have political and social grievances, perceived but often real, at their root. They may be national, regional or local grievances or a combination thereof. Leaders at all levels must understand this and the fact that an insurgency will only be solved through enduring solutions to those grievances.

204. COMPETITIVE ELEMENTS OVER POPULATIONS—STRATEGIC CENTRES OF GRAVITY

1. Within a society, there exists an inter-related trilogy, consisting of the government, its military and its population. Each element of the trilogy affects the other elements. During an insurgency, a competition occurs over control of and support from the population. This can be represented in the figure below. Both the established, legitimate, recognized government and the insurgent leadership, offering an alternate form of government or political arrangement, compete for the support of the populace or at least control over it.

2. In influencing the populace, the insurgent elements have the advantage of being able to directly influence the populace through its guerrilla or military forces. Due to the lack of requirement to follow any law of armed conflict, the guerrilla forces can directly target and intimidate the populace. The government's military forces will ideally follow the law of armed conflict and can only indirectly influence the populace in a positive manner. They can best serve the populace by providing security and by being seen as a legitimate, lawful and moral military force supporting the rule of law and good governance. The government must provide the long-term solutions to any cause of the insurgency in order to gain and maintain the support of the populace.

3. In such a situation of insurgency, the populace is a strategic centre of gravity. Success is impossible without the support of the populace or at least the willingness to combat the insurgency.




Figure 2-1: Competition over the Populace as a Strategic Centre of Gravity[20]

4. In accordance with the elements of campaign planning, lines of operation must be developed that approach this centre of gravity. Those elements of the populace that support the COIN campaign must be treated as a friendly centre of gravity and thus defended. Those elements of the populace that are neutral or support the insurgency must be engaged and convinced to support the COIN campaign.

5. Should the government combating the insurgency receive support from another nation (or coalition), then another populace—that of the contributing nation(s)—becomes a strategic centre of gravity. There will be added competition to influence the will of the domestic population of the supporting nation(s). Those fighting the insurgency will wish to maintain support amongst the domestic populations for what will likely be a lengthy campaign. The insurgents will seek to undermine the will of the domestic population of the supporting nation(s) and in turn force a withdrawal of those nations from the campaign. The insurgents will do this through directly targeting the forces of the contributing nation(s) or even the domestic populace(s) themselves in order to undermine a significant proportion of national will. In order to counter this threat to the domestic population's will, the supporting government(s) must work to explain the legitimacy of, and requirement for, the COIN campaign. This competition is represented in figure 2-2.

[20] This construct was adopted from a briefing by LtGen P.K. Van Riper, USMC ret'd during the USMC JOINT URBAN WARRIOR EXERCISE 2005 given to the COIN study group.




Figure 2-2: Competition over the Strategic Centres of Gravity—Populations

6. Whilst this model has best application to traditional forms of state government combating an insurgency, it must be applied with some flexibility to various situations. In many of the remote regions of the world where insurgencies occur, elements of the populace will be unlikely to recognize a central government authority beyond that of their own village or clan elder. Their support for the insurgency may wax and wane depending upon the situation at any given time. For example, they may take up arms against the government or coalition forces in order to avenge recent collateral damages or the death of a village member. Once their need for retribution is satisfied, they may no longer actively support the insurgency. Notwithstanding the complex nature of such circumstances, the model still indicates that the support of the overall populace will be a strategic centre of gravity vital for long term success of the campaign. Additionally, the insurgents, or at least the hardcore leadership, will continue to attack the will of any supporting nation's populace in order to force that nation from the campaign.

7. It is fundamental that **military and political leaders** understand that a key aim of the insurgency will be to attack the will of any population(s) supporting the counter-insurgency, both domestically and internationally.

205. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN INSURGENCY—UNIQUE AND LOCAL ASPECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

1. Each insurgency is unique and will therefore have its own set of characteristics. Although insurgencies may share similar characteristics, each will have exceptional features. For this reason, intelligence and planning templates suitable for major combat or conventional campaigns have reduced utility during a COIN campaign.

2. In conventional manoeuvre warfare, the known structure of military formations, evident pattern of troop concentration in specific terrain and known doctrine often give very good indication of intent. For example, the concentration of army-level bridging assets in a mechanized division's area of responsibility fronting on a river, with two armoured divisions moving into assembly areas, are very good indications of a deliberate assault river crossing. Contrasting to this, an insurgent movement may well organize and initiate activities using a cellular structure within which the cells do not conform to a pattern amongst or within themselves. Their combat indicators of forthcoming action will differ greatly throughout the organization and will continually alter. Nonetheless, although much more complex, the intent of

insurgents based on structures and planned actions can be determined. For example, sustained observation may reveal certain cells linked with specific activities such as information operations, kidnapping or bank robbery. As a security measure, insurgents may alter or transform cells for specific operations in a random manner.

3. The one key attribute that distinguishes insurgency from most other forms of conflict is the insurgent's aim of forcing political change. Not all followers of an insurgency will necessarily adhere to or even comprehend the political agenda of the insurgency. A good number of participants may simply join through family, clan or other social links. Others may simply join to seek retribution for other grievances on a personal level. Therefore, even the motivations and ideology of insurgents will be difficult to view in a monolithic or holistic sense. The characteristics of an insurgency will vary at the local level and must be viewed and assessed from this context.

4. Although there will be no escaping the need to address the root causes and legitimate grievances of the overarching insurgency, much can be gained through operations and activities at the local level. These must firstly avoid driving more individuals to resort to violence (e.g., the avoidance of collateral damages in offensive activities) and secondly address local concerns and grievances that will influence local leaderships and their groups to at least not support the insurgency but ideally support the established authority.

5. In order to understand the context of the insurgency, intelligence collection and assessment must include all elements of the environment and the commander's specific battlespace rather than just a focus on the insurgent forces themselves. The establishment of a broad knowledge base will include understanding of the political, military, economic, social (including religion), informational and infrastructure (PMESII systems) aspects of the environment. Historical and cultural aspects of environment must be understood, for they influence all the aspects and local power structures. This knowledge base will allow the commander to better understand the context, power structures, influences and motivations of the insurgency as well as how best to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the insurgency and its goals.

206. TRANSITIONAL NATURE OF INSURGENCIES

1. Insurgencies are more likely to occur in states with inherent social boundaries, whose racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences disrupt national cohesion. Insurgencies thrive in states lacking efficient, stable or popular governments, conditions that are aggravated by economic weakness, corruption or foreign agitation. Although various insurgency models exist, few insurgencies fit neatly into any rigid classification such as rural or urban, Leninist or Maoist. Instead, effective insurgents will take previous campaigns' lessons and adapt them to their own particular needs. For example, in the 1990s, Hamas profited by the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO's) loss due to Arafat's alignment with Saddam Hussein and his relatively moderate policies toward Israel. The Saudis cut off money to the PLO, which caused them to lose influence. While not lessening its anti-Israel stance, Hamas avoided supporting the Iraqi dictator. Palestinians began looking to Hamas for leadership. By the end of the 1990s, Hamas was carrying out most of the terror activity in Israel. Israeli sources claimed that in the 16 months before May 2002, Hamas received $135 million (US) from Saudi Arabia to meet expenses.[21]

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[21] Loretta Napoleoni, *Terror Incorporated Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), pp. 72-73 *passim.*

207. ASSESSING THE INSURGENCY

1. Examining the complete range of characteristics will assist a commander and staff in predicting the insurgents' campaign plan. Previous experience and historical research may provide valuable guidance, however, the key to an appropriate response remains an objective military estimate. Essentially, to support operational planning, the estimate will identify the insurgency's causes, the extent of its internal and external support—including the basis of the insurgents' appeal to the target population—the motivation and depth of local commitment and the likely weapons and tactics COIN forces may face.

208. FORMS OF AN INSURGENCY

1. As established above, it is vital to military success for commanders and staffs to fully understand the nature of the insurgency. To this end, six main forms of insurgency have been defined, which are listed in Figure 2-3:

FORM	DESCRIPTION	COMMENT
Anarchist	Intent is to destroy the system. There are normally no plans to replace any form of government with another system. The most potentially dangerous form of insurrection is that of the anarchist group which sets out to eliminate all political structures and the social fabric associated with them.	Being very secretive, such groups remain small and lacking public support. Given the rising threat of terrorism based on weapons of mass destruction, their potential destructiveness to society cannot be overlooked.[22]
Egalitarian	Seeks to impose centrally controlled structures and institutions by mobilizing the people (masses) to provide equality in the distribution of all state resources.	This has been seen recently in two variants: Communist (Malaya, Vietnam) and contained in Ba'athist ideology.
Traditionalist	Seeks to revert back to national/original values rooted in the previous, often mythologized, history of the region.	This type of insurgency often incites similar movements elsewhere. Seen recently as Islamic Jihad (Egypt) or Hezbollah (Lebanon).
Separatist	Seeks to remove themselves, and the area in which they live, from the control of the remainder of the state.	The form of political system adopted by successful insurgents varies enormously. Amongst the examples are the Tamils (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.
Reformist	This form of insurgency is similar to the separatist type but more moderate, in that insurgent groups fight for political, economic or social reforms and possibly some form of autonomy, without dramatically altering the political status quo.	Some insurgencies in Central and South America that have sought reforms to corrupt governments.

Figure 2-3: Forms of an Insurgency

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[22] For example, The US Senate Nuclear Proliferation Survey assesses a 70 percent chance of nuclear/radiological terrorism within the decade. Online http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf. Accessed 16 July 2005.

SECTION 2
SCOPE, CONTEXT AND LIMITATIONS OF AN INSURGENCY

209. INSURGENT STRATEGIES

1. Insurgent leaders are generally well informed, astute and will probably study the lessons of previous campaigns of insurgency. Globally, because popular insurgent strategies continue to provide inspiration and assistance to diverse groups, the professional development of intelligence and operations staff should include study in this area. The study and analysis of an insurgent's strategic approach has practical application, including the production of doctrinal COIN guidance. Five broad strategic approaches are suggested below, the elements of which may be combined by the insurgents:

a. **Conspiratorial Strategy**. The oldest and least complicated of the strategies features small cells attempting to release the energy of a disaffected society, generating a “spontaneous” uprising by means of bold armed action. Designed to operate in an urban environment where information may be quickly passed and key installations exist, this was the strategy used by the Bolsheviks in 1917. Typically, key points are seized before a decisive strike is made against the governing regime. In its modern variant, insurgents seek to garner control over and exploit media coverage.

b. **Protracted Popular War**. This Maoist strategy sees three “phases”: strategic defence (organization), strategic equilibrium (guerrilla warfare), and strategic offensive (open battle) culminating in the seizure of political power. Its tactics involve a mix of political activity, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, with the former always predominating. Most applicable in rural, peasant-based environments where government control is weak or non-existent, this strategy assumes that the cause will attract ever-increasing numbers of supporters, allowing the insurgent to expand outwardly from base areas. Favourable terrain in which to hide and trade for time is essential for a protracted campaign, and therefore urbanization may provide a suitable space to foster such insurrections.

c. **Urban Insurgency**. In its pure form, this strategy involves the application of organized crime and terrorism in a systematic and ruthless manner as a catalyst for political change. The urban environment provides a dense populace for exploitation and intimidation. This strategy, more than the others, aims to provoke a repressive military response that will alienate a volatile mass of the urban poor and move them to revolt. It relies primarily upon ruthless terror tactics augmented by media manipulation to generate an air of panic, erode the morale of the politicians, the administrators and the judiciary and the police and the army with the aim of inducing a climate of collapse. The insurgency anticipates that the government will then capitulate or be provoked into adopting repressive measures and, above all, causing bloodshed. Against such repression, the insurgent appears as the peoples' protector.

d. **Military Focus**. Also known as the *foco* theory, this strategy places political action second to military victory, assuming the population will flock to the winning side. Ascribed to the Cuban leadership (Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara), this strategy works only when the government is weak, discredited and lacks reliable, effective, armed forces. Conventional military operations are not the only option undertaken within this strategy. When a sharp asymmetric balance of military force favours the establishment forces, immediate action may

occur in the form of terrorism or guerrilla warfare. It should be noted that other types of insurgent groups will initiate their campaign with a well-publicized military success so as to gain popular support but then undertake a different, more political, strategy.

e. **Liberation Strategy**. Whilst many insurgencies may be focused on national aims and the creation of a new state, some insurgencies may simply aim at the expulsion of what is viewed as an occupying authority or nation(s). In peace support or stabilizing operations conducted by a coalition, even with an internationally sanctioned mandate, a disaffected element (often one that has lost power) may resort to an insurgency strategy in order to disrupt the efforts to stabilize or cement the new political order.

2. It must be remembered that insurgencies will adopt a number of strategies in order to achieve their aims. They will combine the concepts listed above in order to best meet the demands of the situation and to progress their goals.

210. BASIC TENETS OF AN INSURGENCY

1. All successful insurgents adhere to certain basic tenets. Naturally, such principles must be applied rationally within the existing social and political circumstances when assessing an insurgency. These tenets are:

a. a suitable cause;

b. leadership;

c. popular support;

d. organization and actors; and

e. a narrative.

211. MOTIVATING CENTRAL CAUSE

1. In most insurgencies there will be legitimate grievances that may result in a central, motivating cause to the insurgency or may be exploited by the insurgent leaders so that a lack of grievance resolution supports the cited cause. As mentioned previously, the definition of "the cause" is crucial as a rallying point. The cause must appeal to all levels, from supporting the philosophic ideals of the strategic leadership to the tactical motivation of the rank and file. The cause is articulated in the motivating idea and resulting narrative (see below). The sooner that legitimate grievances are addressed by the authorities, the better will be the ability to influence the populace to not support the insurgency.

212. LEADERSHIP

1. An insurrection often gives rise to a charismatic leader, who inspires followers, converts the uncommitted and commands the respect or fear of those who normally support the government. Often throughout history, such leaders have become cult figures whose very name becomes a rallying point. Examples include Lenin, General Franco and Che Guevara. They may even become moral centres of gravity.

2. Insurgencies require leaders able to determine political/strategic aims as well as the enabling tactics. While a strong leader is required in the early stages of an insurgency, when it is necessary to enforce one's leadership against contending rivals or if the cause seems weak or divisive, when the cause is sound, the leader need not be so charismatic.

3. The value to removing or killing an insurgent leader must be carefully considered. The costs involved and the undesired secondary effects (collateral damages, etc.) may outweigh the tactical and operational advantages gained. Indeed, a powerful and charismatic leader open to a negotiated settlement may be of more value alive, in terms of reaching an enduring end-state.

213. POPULAR SUPPORT

1. The cause and the leader must appeal to as wide an audience as possible. Those who are uncommitted or hostile to the cause must be persuaded or coerced to join the cause. Some may have to be killed to persuade the others. Popular support is important from a political point of view and essential to the provision of intelligence, logistics and to support a protective security screen around the insurgents' clandestine organization. The need to garner a decisive level of popular support, or at least pervasive acquiescence, is necessary for eventual success.

214. ORGANIZATION AND ACTORS

1. Insurgent groups often possess a cellular organization that both enhances force protection and enables decentralized command and control. The cellular organization will limit the numbers of personnel who know the actual names and locations of key actors of the insurgency but still allows directives to be carried out. Thus if one or even multiple cells are compromised, the threat to the overall organization is limited. The cell structure will extend to all of the active supporters of an insurgency, including facilitators outside of the actual geographic region where the insurgency is occurring. Although the cell structure is a very old method of organization, modern information technologies increase its effectiveness by facilitating networking and enhancing command and control in high risk environments.

2. Within an insurgent organization, the **primary classes** of actors are the top leaders, lieutenants, foot soldiers and recruiters.[23] **Ancillary classes** of actors include external suppliers and facilitators, financiers, heads of supportive states, supportive population segments and sources of moral and religious support.[24] The most important of these are the committed actors and the sympathizers that may reside in either the primary or ancillary classes of actors.[25]

3. Alongside the primary and ancillary actors are people who play a more ephemeral or transient role. There is much evidence from recent conflicts, including Iraq and Afghanistan, that insurgent and terrorist groups have paid, non-ideologically committed civilians to support operations. In particular, this has included substantial remuneration for such things as sniping, placing improvised explosive devices and other booby traps, launching rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and conducting suicide attacks. Insurgent groups will exploit unemployed or disaffected members of the populace by offering remuneration that may in fact represent the only viable means of supporting families. As well, the old maxim of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" will likely hold true in any conflict where multiple, disparate actors are involved, particularly in societies where tribal affiliations are stronger than any national identity. The support of all of these actors is transitory because of the lack of ideological ties to the

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[23] Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), p. 13-15, figure 3.3.

[24] *Loc cit.*

[25] Fred Burton, "The Psychological Battlefield," *Stratfor Intelligence Report*, 10 August 2005. http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/print.php?storyId=253467. Accessed 13 June 2006.

insurgency. As such they represent an ideal target for influence activities to dissuade behaviour at odds with host nation government and campaign objectives.

4. Many, particularly the younger members, will join an insurgency out of peer pressure, a willingness to gain a sense of belonging or a sense of adventure. Insurgents will actively recruit based on these desires. The popularity of such choices is increased when unemployment rates are high. Again, such non-ideologically committed individuals are key targets for influence activities that seek to dissuade support for the insurgency.

215. NARRATIVE

1. At the basis of an insurgency is a narrative that contains an idea and founding cause for the insurgency. It motivates the primary and ancillary actors and allows the idea to be formalized as an ideology. The narrative will be a plausible story that illustrates real or perceived historical or extant injustices and grievances. The narrative will present a vision, mission, strategy and goals that purport to resolve and redress those injustices. It is a highly motivational tool that exploits grievances, culture and beliefs in order to further the insurgent aims.

2. In combination with actions, the narrative is used to attract devotees and supporters.[26] The narrative will justify insurgent actions and may advocate for the use of violence to achieve political goals and eventually justify actions, even atrocities. Furthermore, it will be used to paint the existing authority and power structures as the logical result of the injustices that are described through the narrative. Similar to propaganda, most narratives will possess, at the very least, a kernel of truth but may also include substantial amounts of mythology and may illustrate a utopian ideal as an ultimate goal. The narrative may be published as a manifesto, religious edict or in some other form, or it may simply be passed verbally.

3. Narratives underpin much of human thought. Narratives (or stories) influence the ability to recall and understand history, motivate people to act, temper emotional reactions to events, cue certain heuristics and biases, structure problem-solving capabilities and ultimately perhaps even constitute individual identity.[27] Narratives form not only the basis of insurgent organizations but also of terrorist groups, national identities, culture, society and a host of other things to which humans often cling in order to develop feelings of inclusiveness and identity.[28]

4. Sub-narratives also form a substantial part of the overall narrative. This is true for all individuals and groups. A further broad example is religion. All religions possess substantial narratives and, indeed, the devotion of followers is predicated on faith in what is in essence a story and, for branches and sects, the belief in sub-narratives that are offshoots of the primary story. A narrative is not necessarily untrue, but neither can it be unquestioningly accepted as completely factual.

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[26] Brigadier (ret'd) Maurice Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measure," PhD. Diss. (London: King's College, University of London, March 1979), p.307. Brigadier Tugwell, who continues to hold complete copyright on his dissertation, graciously granted permission to quote from his work during a telephone conversation on 13 February 2007.

[27] William Casebeer and James Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 'Counter-Narrative Strategy,'" *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, No.3, March 2005 (Monterey CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict, US Naval Postgraduate School). http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/mar/casebeerMar05.pdf Accessed November 2006.

[28] Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. xiii.

Narratives exist in all situations and cultures. For example, Canadian narratives and sub-narratives include, true or not, such notions as hockey as Canada's national sport, Canada as a nation of peacekeepers, and the dollar "loonie" coin embedded in the ice at the Salt Lake City Olympics.

5. The power of the narrative cannot be underestimated. Information operations (influence activities) must work to counter the insurgent narrative and its supporting propaganda. Countering the narrative will require the symbiotic use of words and deeds that seek to redress the grievances exploited by the insurgent narrative while promoting the desired narrative of the host-nation government and coalition.

216. CONTEXT OF AN INSURGENCY

1. Beyond the five basic tenets listed above, it is essential for a COIN campaign to consider and comprehend the insurgency's context. Circumstances will often dictate what an insurgent can and cannot do. For example, several uprisings that slavishly copied revolts in Russia or Cuba were dismal failures. The Spartacist revolts in Germany (1919) and Che Guevarra's attempts in Bolivia (1967) failed given that ideologically based campaign plans did not fit the socio-political context of either environment. Nonetheless, a population that is dissatisfied with its conditions in general and holds the perception of a weak government can provide fertile soil for a skilled insurrectionary leader with a popular cause and competent organizational support.

2. A well led and organized insurrection may, if the government commands a wide measure of support and can rely on its security forces, devolve into a protracted competition of attrition. Such an attrition campaign may still succeed if the insurgency can gradually erode the will of the government's supporters at home and persuade public opinion amongst its foreign allies that the government's cause is hopeless or too expensive to support.

217. FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSURGENCY

1. The factors affecting an insurgency can be as important as the tenets of the insurgency itself and will contribute significantly to the end results if carefully applied. The factors are:

a. **Protracted War**. Although a weak government may fall quite quickly to a well-organized rebellion, or even overnight to a coup d'état, a strong government may only be defeated by a war of attrition. Time is on the side of the insurgent. In a rural-based insurgency, the territory supports a gradual occupation of a country, as demonstrated by Mao Tse-tung in China. While the urban guerrilla's operating environment is not so permissive, its inability to occupy territory can be partially overcome by establishing "no-go" areas within cities. Here the strategy is based not on an outright overall military victory but upon creating war-weariness, emphasizing economic privation and demonstrating the inability of the government to provide security.

b. **Choice of Terrain**. Given the relative weakness, in relation to the government's standing army, an insurgent force is compelled to make best use of terrain. Without the ability to seize and hold ground or to quickly achieve victory, space and time became weapons rather than goals for the insurgent.[29] As such, insurgents utilize the terrain to their advantage. This terrain will include populations in which to take cover. They will make best strategic use of space and attack their enemy in their rear or echelon areas.

...the guerrilla's greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants." To turn this defeat into a victory, the counter-insurgent must recognize that "this total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerrilla's weak point.

Source: Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of COIN *(New York: Praeger, 1964), cited in Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning COIN Warfare,"* Parameters *(Spring 2004), pp. 18-19.*

c. **Intelligence**. The insurgency threat picture is vastly more complicated than most other forms of conflict given the wide range of elements, influences and factors involved in an insurgency. Unlike conventional warfare, where mass fires and manoeuvre may potentially substitute for comprehensive intelligence and planning, neither the insurgency nor COIN can afford that luxury. For the insurgent, the best source of intelligence is a sympathiser working for the government, preferably in security-related employment. The media may also contribute to the insurgent's information-gathering process.

d. **Establishment of an Alternative Society**. The aim of imposing an alternative view of society is common to all insurgent organizations. These viewpoints may be motivated by nationalist, religious or political beliefs. While nationalism presents an emotive call of patriotism to replace a government portrayed as ruling against the country's interests, religious viewpoints promote a remoulding of society along religious, dogmatic lines. Political motivations, regardless of the supporting ideologies, are enhanced by a simple desire for power. Support for these alternative perspectives will not be solely internal, as external support may be received from sympathetic nations.

e. **External Support**. Insurgencies are seldom successful at obtaining their goals without external assistance. As such, outside support of both foreign populations and governments is enlisted for the insurgency. Sympathetic governments may assist the insurgent openly, through providing diplomatic support, or clandestinely, by supplying weapons and training assistance. Even if a government is unwilling to lend support to the insurgents, groups may appeal directly to the foreign populace, notably ex-patriot communities, through the use of propaganda aimed to appeal to popular sentiment. The resulting sympathetic population may pressure their home government, engage in protests or sign petitions, all increasing the insurgent support base. The insurgent can then use these overseas actions as propaganda to increase local support. Sympathetic external populations often also prove to be a good source of financial support.

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[29] John Shy and Thomas W Collier, "Revolutionary War," *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Peter Paret, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pg. 839.

f. **Concurrent Activity**. The leadership will attempt to wage the insurgency on political, economic, propaganda and military fronts simultaneously. This ability to simultaneously conduct its range of activities enhances the effectiveness of the insurgents' overall operations, thus creating a synergy. This has the additional effect of heightening the public's perception of its cohesion and capability. As such, the insurgency that looks and acts like a competent parallel state, increases its ability to become the state.

218. WEAKNESSES AND ASPECTS OF INSURGENT VULNERABILITY

1. There are usually many potential weak points within an insurgency. These are particularly apparent in the early days of a campaign, when the insurgency is vulnerable to some form of pre-emption, dislocation and disruption by COIN forces:

a. **Secrecy**. Any group planning to use force and violence to prosecute its aims must adopt a secretive, conspiratorial approach to its planning and actions. While such discretion may add a degree of glamour and attractiveness to potential recruits, this secrecy can quickly become counterproductive. Adverse implications include affecting the necessary freedom of action, lowering confidence in similar insurgent groups and readily lead to serious misunderstanding within the organization. Consequently, a balance must be struck between a too secretive and clandestine approach to insurgency actions and the need to avoid undue attention from the authorities or rival groups. Some insurgencies have attempted to minimize this difficulty by creating a more public, political arm. For example, there is the Irish Republican Army's (IRA's) associated political arm, Sinn Fein.

b. **Gaining Support**. Gaining popular support for the cause can be a difficult and sensitive stage in the evolution of an insurgency. If the publicly accepted reason for rising against the government has appeal, it would seem that the insurgency would therefore thrive. Unfortunately, various groupings and factions may hold varying opinions, requiring different techniques, including possible compromises and/or intimidation, to gain their support. Indifference, antipathy and likely fear of government reprisal also have to be overcome. Publicity dramatically improves the prospect of gaining popular support, as even bad publicity can advertise that a group is resisting, consequently expanding recruitment.

c. **Secure Operating Base**. Insurgents require a secure base from which to operate. Selecting a location distant from activity centres may be potentially more secure for the insurgents but may also put them out of touch with the population and make them vulnerable to isolation. Alternatively, close proximity likely eases the security force tasks of surveillance, infiltration and destruction. Establishing an operating base in a border region can often provide temporary, or perhaps permanent, headquarters beyond the reach and authority of the state.

d. **Funding**. All insurgencies require some degree of funding in order to acquire the staples of conflict: weapons, ammunition, food and medicines. Lack of sufficient funds can limit the scope of an insurgency, inhibiting its prospects for success. Accordingly, state authorities must utilize this weakness to their advantage, aiming to dismantle the insurgents' funding mechanisms. Lacking a friendly nation or individuals to back the insurgency, funding can be found in criminal activities such as narcotics trafficking, robberies and extortion. While the illegal drug trade in particular has proven to be a more enduring source of income than

bank robberies, it brings the movement into contact with unreliable, vulnerable groups who can attract undue attention from the authorities. Insurgencies will attempt to gain income from low-profile, high turn-over criminal sources such as movie and music pirating. External support may also have a political price affecting the overall aim of an insurgency.

e. **The Problem of Changing Aims**. Changing aims is not a substantial problem at an insurgency's onset but has a potentially damaging effect once an insurgency has been operational for some time. Indeed, changing aims is common when an insurgency is still coalescing. Initial operations may change the outlook of a number of insurgents, with some questioning the price of the overall aim particularly if security force successes spread doubt about the cause or the insurgency's leadership. A seemingly generous compromise offered by the state to the insurgents could prove divisive; forcing insurgent leaders to apply ruthless measures to ensure that unity and secrecy are preserved. Changing aims can be further problematic given the aforementioned secrecy, which may spark misunderstanding and suspicion throughout the insurgency.

f. **Setting the Pace**. Controlling the pace and timing of operations is vital to the success of any campaign. Given that insurgents can control the start of operations and have some measure of control over subsequent activity, it is surprising to note that many insurgencies have failed to capitalize on opportunities or have allowed the pace of events and scope of activities to be dictated by the state authorities. Once momentum is lost, the strategic initiative returns to the state, leaving the insurgency exposed.

g. **Informers**. While informers have sometimes been infiltrated into insurgent cells, it is far more common to achieve success by persuading the insurgent to become an informer. This is someone already in the organization, or is a link between clandestine cells and their public accomplices, such as the couriers or suppliers. There is nothing more demoralizing to the insurgents than to fear that one of their trusted comrades is giving information to the government. Insurgent leaders will try to pre-empt the recruitment of informers by ruthless exemplary punishments.

h. **Lack of Moral Authority**. Given its use of violence and the fact that an insurgency will normally be related to and involved with criminal elements, its leadership will be vulnerable to attacks on its moral authority and claimed superiority. Its susceptibility to this will depend upon the culture in which the insurgency occurs. This lack of moral authority must be pointed out to the supporting and neutral populace. Furthermore, to exploit this weakness, COIN forces must not only conduct their campaign from a standpoint of moral superiority, in terms of conduct and application of the law of armed conflict, but must advertize this fact through public affairs and psychological operations. This will help to undermine the insurgency and its supporting narrative.

SECTION 3
INSURGENT METHODS AND END-STATES

219. INSURGENT TACTICS

1. The deliberate promotion of adverse publicity against government agencies and security forces is essential and complementary. This aspect has proven more effective with the growing trend towards political groups using civil liberties and human rights to lower the tolerance of the

public for harsher COIN measures. The insurgents' claim to legitimacy is based on their declared ability to improve the position of the oppressed. The essentially violent nature of insurgencies moves in two concurrent complementary paths, one destructive and the other constructive, as follows:

a. Destructive actions are clearly aimed at overthrowing the established order and creating a climate of collapse in the states' authority. Destructive activities include subversion, sabotage of the economic framework, terrorism and guerrilla activity and large-scale combat operations.

b. The constructive effort, meanwhile, aims at creating an organization to subsequently replace the established order at a suitable moment.

2. **Subversion**. Subversive activity attempts to undermine the political, economic and military strength of a state without resorting to the use of force by the insurgent. Such activity may provoke violent countermeasures, to be denounced as an overreaction by the authorities, thus discrediting the government. As such, subversion probably poses the most difficult and dangerous threat to a government engaged in a COIN campaign. Subversion takes many forms, such as penetrating existing political parties and organizations and developing front organizations that can have the appearance of challenging and defying the authority of government. An insurgency will seek to win supporters within the government, especially the security elements, in order to discern future plans and possibly any other economic and financial information. These types of information are all useful for an insurgency to exploit as required, particularly in the early days of an insurrection.

3. **Insurgent Information Operations**. Propaganda is a key element of subversion. It includes publishing information detrimental to the government or security forces and the spreading of rumours, whether true or false, designed to undermine trust and confidence in the government.

4. **Passive Resistance**. Depending upon the society in which the insurgency is operating, passive resistance may be a useful tactic. It is more effective in liberal societies, given an authoritarian regime's ability to crush such open dissent. Examples of passive resistance include withdrawing labour from public services, obstructing the law or sit-ins in public places. These measures to gain political change do not alone indicate an insurgency, which by definition uses violence to acquire change. However, insurgent leaders will encourage passive measures on behalf of the larger population in order to undermine the authority of the government and disrupt civil society through agitation. They may also seek to provoke violence during public demonstrations in hopes of causing an overreaction by the government forces and creating another claim to injustice and a sense of alienation and frustration amongst the populace.

5. **Sabotage**. Sabotage is disruptive activity that furthers the insurgents' interests. It may be active or passive.

a. Active sabotage sees insurgents set out to disrupt important services, functions or industrial processes by violent means. Targets may be selected at random for political or economic impact, or they may fit into a wider tactical plan with the aim of increasing general confusion and tying down troops in the static defence of installations. Suitable targets include bridges, roads, telephone lines or dispersed military logistics sites. Targets whose destruction might cause mass unemployment and thereby lose the goodwill of the people are in general avoided.

b. Passive sabotage is generally aimed at causing disorder and disruption by deliberate error, contrived accident, absenteeism or strikes. The target can be industry, public services, supplies or troops, where action is usually planned on a wide scale through political front organizations. Data sabotage is facilitated by the universality of computers in government, business and industrial control systems. These can be carried out through cyber attack or by having an insurgent or sympathizer physically damage the system.

6. **The Tactic of Terrorism**. Terrorism is a tactic. Despite the attention that it receives, terrorism is a tactical level undertaking; however, one that is normally used to influence the situation at the operational and strategic levels. It may be used by individuals, groups or states as part of a larger operational objective and strategy to intimidate and coerce governments, societies or elements of each. Terrorist actions call attention to the perpetrators and their causes and may help them win support of potential sympathizers. Terrorism is used to strike at civilian targets which normally have limited means of self-defence.[30] The more spectacular or outrageous the action, the louder it speaks. Terrorist attacks seek to undermine the legitimacy of the indigenous government and security forces by demonstrating their inability to counter the threat and prevent attacks. Thus, the key effect of terrorist attacks is psychological, in that they seek to shape the perceptions of various audiences, locally, regionally and internationally. The physical damages caused are simply the means of sending their message. Through the resulting psychological impact, terrorist attacks seek to force policy changes or specific actions by the effected governments. For example, at a tactical and operational level, they may seek to cause an over-reaction by local security forces, thereby giving testimony to claims of discrimination and bias against the perpetrating group. At the operational and strategic levels they may seek to force a nation to withdraw its forces from a coalition campaign. Terror tactics may include assassinations, bombings, hostage-takings, kidnappings, hijackings and sabotage. The method chosen will try to exploit a perceived weakness within the adversary or to attack what was thought to be a strength in order to heighten the psychological effect. Terror tactics evolve with new technology and the availability of weapon systems, and seek to exploit globalization, often through international criminal organizations. The speed of global communications has supported and enhanced the messages that the perpetrators send through their use of terror. These changes have served to strengthen the traditional network-based cell structures favoured by organizations that use terror. This in turn reduces the efficacy of certain traditional countermeasures, such as leadership targeting, and makes penetration more difficult. In short, recent developments in the nature of global communications have made terror a cheaper and more effective tool than in the past.[31]

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[30] Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolutionary to Apocalypse*, 2nd ed., Revised. Washington DC: Potomac, 2005. p. 33.

[31] Allan Castle, *Trans-national Organized Crime and International Security*, University of British Columbia Institute of International Relations Working Paper No. 19, November 1997.

Terrorism is a tactic that may be used by a number of irregular threats including insurgents. The importance of terrorist acts is not in the act itself, but in the message that it sends to various audiences. It is fundamental to the propaganda campaigns of many insurgent groups. One expert on insurgent propaganda, retired British Brigadier and academic Maurice Tugwell noted the following regarding the messages that terrorist acts can transmit to various audiences:

"The nineteenth century anarchist Bakunin coined the phrase, 'Propaganda of the deed' to describe an act, usually of terrorist violence, committed more for its indirect effect upon public opinion than for any direct benefit arising from the act itself. Mr. Paul Wilkinson has suggested that "the terrorist by his act of violence is telling the world, 'We are here. Look what we can do. Heed us or there is worse to come.' We may comment that this message is the one intended for 'enemies' and that the same act is telling 'neutrals' and 'friends' other things. To 'neutrals' it may say: 'We are here. See how the weak oppose the oppressors. Obviously our cause has justice on its side. Support us.' And to 'friends' it may impart this message: 'We are here. Look how the mighty forces of the oppression fade before our blows. There is no cause to fear them. Victory will be ours. Join.'"

Every enemy action, even a seemingly irrational one such as a terrorist bombing of a crowded market, is conveying a message, often at the strategic level, to various audiences and is part of a larger propaganda campaign.

Source: Brigadier (ret'd) Maurice Arthur John Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures," Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, London: King's College, University of London, March 1979, p. 22.

Insurgents who employ terrorism will justify its use in a number of ways. Among other ways, terrorist acts will be justified as legitimate by portraying them as altruistic because the act is supposedly for a greater good and that it is the only weapon available given the enemy's superior military capabilities. Historically terrorists have sought to distinguish themselves from common criminals because of adherence to and support for what they believe to be a legitimate cause and that those who die committing such acts are martyrs who'll be remembered for their sacrifice. These justifications have been used by groups throughout history, including Irish nationalists, Jewish settlers desiring the creation of a Jewish state, Sri Lankan separatists, and extremist Islamists of both the Sunni and Shia sects.

Source: Bruce Hoffman *Inside Terrorism*, rev. ed. NY: Columbia University Press, 2006; Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 1964, 2006; Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd ed, rev., Washington D.C.: Potomac, 2005.

7. **Fund Raising**. The insurgents' operating budget for weapons, medicines, political bribes and other requirements will be substantial. An indicator of a developing insurgency should therefore include fund-raising efforts. In the early stages, this will probably be covert and criminal, such as bank robbery. Subsequently, the political organization within the insurgency will take on the task of extracting aid from well-intentioned, charitable and philanthropic organizations and from sympathizers abroad. More violent methods may include, the extorting of ransom from individuals (kidnapping) or from governments (hijacking) and perhaps the enforced levying of taxes on intimidated sections of the population. Finally, as has been

demonstrated by the PLO and the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC), a mature insurgency can develop a parallel socioeconomic order, which may attain a level of political legitimacy greater than that enjoyed by the legal government in the eyes of the local populace.

Some criminal organizations blur the line between lawbreaking and insurgency. For example, the Cali drug cartel funds an insurgency in Colombia through narco-terrorism that has spin-off economic benefits to the local growers of the coca plants. The sowing of this general disorder helps allow freedom to operate for the drug cartel.

Source: Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks *(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005). See especially Chapter 2 "The Macroeconomics of Terror," pp. 13–29 and Chapter 3 "The Privatization of Terror," pp. 31–48. Napoleoni examines and catalogues the methods and effects of various insurgent movements' linkages, if not outright involvement, with narcotics trade and other forms of parallel socioeconomic structure and activity.*

8. **Weapons and Equipment**. Insurgents tend to use basic weapons whose essentials have not changed very much since the 1940s. Beyond simple availability, selection criteria are based upon compactness, lethality and simple operating procedures. The following should be noted:

a. Personal weapons are principally pistols, carbines, rifles and weapons with a high rate of fire. In recent times, weapons and bombs have been miniaturized, explosives harder to detect and more lethal, accompanied by a dramatic increase in improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

b. Insurgents generally have access to a complete range of combat support weapons. Sniper rifles utilizing armour-piercing ammunition are being seen more frequently. Improvised mortars are easy to make, although they are usually inaccurate and unreliable. Most require some form of "flat bed" for transportation. Acquisition of military mortars and ammunition significantly increase the range and lethality of such weapons. Rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)-type anti-armour weapons proliferate. Portable air defence missiles pose a significant threat. The mere possession of air defence weapons, particularly man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), by an insurgent group will disrupt the government use of helicopters.

c. Explosives in various forms are the favoured weapons of insurgents. Military mines, both anti-personnel and anti-tank, are frequently utilized by insurgents. They have the dual purpose of hampering COIN forces' efforts while terrifying the local population. Insurgency forces are increasingly using IEDs. The effectiveness of these weapons is well known, and expertise in their manufacture and handling is often of a high order. Sophisticated initiating devices, anti-lifting mechanisms and innovative tactical placement (including secondary IEDs) are becoming common. Furthermore, any incident, bomb or hoax, can be used as a bait to kill security forces and disposal specialists. Recently, the suicide bomber has emerged as a particularly effective weapon. The suicide bomber is in effect a precision weapon that also demonstrates the degree of the insurgent's commitment.

d. Sophisticated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons will likely remain beyond the capability of insurgent groups. Since the release of Sarin gas in Tokyo subway in 1995, the potential for insurgents to use crude

CBRN devices must be considered. Such a capability is to be expected only in an insurgent group already employing terrorist tactics.

220. INSURGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT

1. Rural insurgencies continue as the allocation of land, water or other scarce mineral resources continues to provide a real or perceived grievance, particularly in areas where there is a burgeoning population and a malevolent government. Insurgent bases will be established in remote areas, often in difficult terrain (mountains, jungles, forest, etc.), from which attacks may be launched over as wide an area as possible to disperse scarce security resources. These actions may be mistaken for banditry. Under the pretext of protection against such banditry, isolated villages will be prepared for defence, including the discreet clearance of fields of fire. Other indications that a campaign is developing include hoarding supplies, training and arming of village "self-defence" groups and increased evidence of local intimidation and coercion.

2. In its early stages, a rural insurgency relies upon small bands assembling for a limited attack, probably against a remote and inadequately guarded target. As the movement grows to the stage where it can command significant support from the local population, so its objectives will become more ambitious and larger forces will be necessary. The relative strength of insurgent bands will always place them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the security forces, and they will seek to avoid a pitched battle. Their tactics are therefore based on mobility and surprise, generally using ambushes and explosives.

3. Rural populations are vulnerable to terrorism and intimidation, and very quickly a feeling of insecurity can spread throughout a whole region. Such intimidation is common within rural insurgencies because of the population's relative physical isolation from the protective security forces and the government's presence.

4. Ambush is the most widely used insurgent tactic. It is particularly effective against road movement, especially when the ground makes it difficult for the government forces to move off the road and take cover. In addition to sniping and massed fires ambushes, there is a growing trend in ambushes featuring IEDs and suicide bombing.

221. INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

1. With the degree of urbanization increasing globally, encountering urban insurgencies will likely expand. Urban populations are vulnerable, providing relatively small insurgent forces with the opportunity to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity sufficient to discredit the government.

2. In the urban environment, insurgents do not normally plan to occupy and control territory, although they may seize small areas for a limited time to establish a presence from which they can subsequently receive support. Lacking the ability to occupy territory on a significant scale, insurgents will aim to make the government's position untenable by engendering a state of war-weariness, frustration and anger against government emergency measures. Under such conditions, the people may rally to any organization or leader who offers stability.

3. Cities and towns provide great scope for insurgencies. The concentration of a large population in a relatively small area provides cover for the insurgents, although they may find support only in certain areas. Additionally, the needs of a great city, related to the complexity of urban living, could find a city brought to its knees through the interruption of power supplies, non-collection of rubbish or the cutting off of water.

4. For these reasons, the urban insurgent can operate more boldly than his rural counterpart, and his tactics reflect this. Intimidating the local population, as seen in rural insurgencies, also occurs in urban environments. In this setting, population density facilitates the insurgents' audacity, as they are able to readily disappear amongst the populace. However, this too is a double-edged sword, for population density may also be used to advantage by the COIN forces in the recruitment and placement of agents and in the stealthy infiltration of patrols.

5. The ready availability of large numbers of people in urban areas enables insurgents to engineer demonstrations and assemble crowds with relative ease. The emotions of the demonstrators can then be readily manipulated, often in an effort to provoke an overreaction by security forces. Women and children may be purposely included in a demonstration because they lend a certain legitimacy to the event, are easier to gain sympathy from observers and may help create an enormous propaganda victory if the insurgents succeed in provoking a government overreaction that causes civilian casualties.

6. Countering an insurgency in an urban area offers a number of challenges to the COIN forces, particularly given the density and complexities of an urban environment. However, if a city is an "urban jungle," then it too consists of a number of villages or local areas. Each urban area may be divided into almost self-contained sections. Few individuals live throughout an entire city; instead they live, work, socialize and worship in the same local area, often within walking distance. The terrain analysis and knowledge base established by intelligence assessment should work to identify the urban delineations and their internal power structures.

222. INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS

1. Given the political aims and secretive nature of insurgency, communicating is critical. Contact amongst the insurgents is accomplished through small, surreptitious groups or cells. Insurgents make extensive use of secure methods, such as dead-letter drops or coded graffiti. In addition to the methods below, they will also use political literature such as manifestos, magazines, posters and circulars communicate. Today, modern mass communications facilitate the task of the insurrectionary leader and supporting cadres. They can gain secure communications within their organization and stage broad appeals to the mass audience provided by the public. Therefore, a modern military seeking to defend its parent or foster society must be prepared to exploit modern media and deny its use to an opponent. Currently, insurgents are known to employ modern communications as follows:

a. **Cellular Telephone and Hand Held Radios**. The mobile phone and similar devices have become ubiquitous in the developing world. Insurgents use them for communication and deception. Veiled speech and false information are used to compensate for and even exploit the open nature of these types of systems.

b. **Radio**. Radio is an increasingly used component of control as well as a means of passing information or propaganda. Underground radio stations may disseminate propaganda or order crowds out for demonstrations. They may also use radio frequencies to detonate bombs.

c. **Television**. Almost every insurgent group has used television directly to promote their cause or indirectly, ensuring that incidents are newsworthy enough to be reported on television. It is no coincidence that the steep rise in terrorist and insurgent action has taken place at the same time as the growth in television. The distribution of video tapes also enormously enhances an insurgent cause, as seen by the linkage between certain media outlets and terrorist organizations.

d. **Media**. Coded messages may be included in newspaper advertisements, articles in magazines or on posters or circulars to convey instructions to cells, perhaps in conjunction with the dead letter box system. Such messages may be used to pass information when time is not essential for the execution of an operation or to inform an insurgent of the time and date a pre-planned attack or incident is to be staged.

e. **Internet**. The World Wide Web is being used increasingly within insurgencies. Not only can it be used for propaganda purposes but also as a tool to pass along terrorist and insurgent techniques and procedures. Insurgents are increasingly publishing their versions of events in order to attract support and show their strength, often through video clips of attacks on security forces or killings of kidnapped government supporters. Such websites thus become a primary source of intelligence, as analysts seek indicators of insurgent morale, noms-de-guerre, various factions and their motivators or ideologies, which may then be useful for negotiations or PSYOPS targeting.

SECTION 4
CONCLUSION—A MEDICAL METAPHOR FOR AN INSURGENCY AND COIN

1. An insurgency may be compared to a communicable disease. The insurgent ideology and its popular support are spread through a population by exposure to the equivalent of risk factors: the exploitation of legitimate grievances, propaganda and the insurgent narrative. Agents for the spread of the "disease" are memes—behavioural practices passed on by imitation. Many individuals, especially young people, are not necessarily drawn to an insurgency out of ideological commitment but rather through social and cultural associations between family members and friends.

2. A communicable disease is countered through a holistic and systematic approach involving a wide range of means: changes to behaviour and the environment, such as the reduction of risk factors; isolation and quarantine; inoculation; and, treatment of the clinically infected.




Figure 2-4: An Insurgency Spread as a Communicable Disease[32]

3. Just as a communicable disease may be treated in a number of ways, we can extend the metaphor to illustrate how a COIN strategy may be applied to resolve an insurgency:

[32] This construct was adopted from a briefing by LtGen P.K. Van Riper, USMC ret'd during the USMC JOINT URBAN WARRIOR EXERCISE 2005 given to the COIN study group.

a. **Changes to Behaviour and Environment**. Just as the spread of a disease may be curtailed through changes to behaviour and the environment and the removal of risk factors, the same idea may be applied to stop the spread of an insurgency. Grievances and circumstances that fuelled the insurgency's start and that continue to lend it credence and support must be resolved.

b. **Isolation and Quarantine**. Just as those who are infected with a disease are often quarantined, COIN forces and policies must seek to separate insurgents from the populace. This will firstly cut off support from the populace, but more importantly, will help preclude the "infection" of others and thus an increase to the insurgency membership. The insurgents must be isolated both physically and cognitively from the populace. In the latter sense, this will rely upon defensive information operations and attacks against insurgent communication and propaganda means.

c. **Inoculation**. Those not infected with a disease are inoculated. Likewise, whilst legitimate grievances are being resolved, information operations will be needed to counter the ideological infection of the populace with the narrative and justification for the insurgency.

d. **Treatment**. Those who have been infected by a communicable disease undergo treatment. In the case of those supporting an insurgency, a number of means may be required. Ideally, influence activities (information operations) may be used to persuade and dissuade insurgents and their supporters to pursue peaceful and legitimate means to resolve their grievances. It may even be possible to convert some insurgents to support the military forces of the COIN forces. In other cases, committed insurgents unwilling to surrender may have to be captured, killed or marginalized to the point that they are ineffective.

4. In order to properly and effectively counter an insurgency, one must truly understand the motivations, aims, strategies and context of the insurgency. Moreover, one must understand the culture in which the insurgency is occurring. This is vital, for the overall goal of the COIN campaign is to solve root causes and to convince the vast majority of the populace to support a legitimate process and to reject the insurgency. This can only be done within the context of the culture at hand.

5. The solution to an insurgency is a political one, which will require a comprehensive approach incorporating a wide variety of agencies with the military in a supporting role. This is reflected in the philosophy and principles that frame the conduct of a COIN campaign.

CHAPTER 3
COIN PRINCIPLES

The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of force.

—General Sir Frank Kitson, reflecting upon his experiences from campaigns in Kenya, Malaya, Oman and Cyprus.

301. INTRODUCTION

1. No insurgency has been defeated solely by military means. Successful conduct of counter-insurgency (COIN) requires a harmonized approach using political, social, economic, psychological, informational and military measures to restore or establish the authority of a legitimate government and address the root causes of the insurgency. The root causes will be political, social and economic in nature and therefore require agencies and elements of power other than the military to resolve.

2. Within this harmonized effort, military force will play a supporting role. The fundamental maxim of all COIN is that a strategic centre of gravity is the populace of the threatened state or region. Without the moral support of the people, no COIN campaign can succeed. Similarly, no insurgency can succeed without at least the tacit acceptance of the populace. Insurgents will also seek to attack the will of nations contributing coalition forces and other elements of power and capabilities to combat the insurgency. These domestic populations and their will to support a long-term commitment must be considered strategic centres of gravity in the campaign. Operations at all levels must be conducted with these centres to gravity in mind.

SECTION 1
COUNTER-INSURGENCY PHILOSOPHY

1. As in all campaigns, the application of military capabilities in a COIN campaign is guided by doctrine, which consists of a philosophy, guiding principles and tested practices and procedures. A COIN campaign is conducted using the same overarching philosophies that guide the application of fighting power in other campaigns:

a. a comprehensive approach that uses military capabilities in conjunction with other elements of power to create enduring outcomes;

b. adherence to the Principles of War;

c. a war-fighting ethos;

d. a manoeuvrist approach;

e. mission command; and

f. an ethical application of combat power.

2. Specific to the conduct of a COIN campaign is a philosophy that reflects the centres of gravity that are generally common to any COIN campaign. The overarching philosophy of a COIN campaign is encompassed by the following:

a. An insurgency is a **political problem** that requires elements of power other than the military to create an enduring solution and outcome. The military therefore plays a supporting role.

b. A successful COIN campaign requires the **support of the populace**. Thus all military activities must be conducted with a view to gaining and maintaining the support of the local populace and, to this end, creating and maintaining **the legitimacy of the campaign**. This must be understood at all levels of command, including the lowest tactical levels.[33]

SECTION 2
PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY

302. GENERAL

1. From the overarching philosophy, certain principles may be developed in order to guide the military and other agencies in the conduct of a COIN campaign. These principles are based on history and theory and draw on the experiences of friend and foe alike. It must, however, be remembered that principles are guidelines only and must be tempered by a realistic estimate of the situation and an appraisal of the variables and potential responses. Like all principles, they should be applied pragmatically and with common sense to suit the circumstances peculiar to each campaign. The assessment of the situation will indicate where application of a principle may not be possible (at least temporarily), where they may conflict or where there is overlap. As with the principles of war, they must be balanced with one another, and all operations must be examined against them. Part of the art of command will be to balance competing demands, consider options and develop the best course of action possible, adhering as closely as possible to the principles and the overarching philosophy. Plans and their implementation must be tailor-made for the context in which they are to be implemented. Underpinning the principles are the assumptions of minimum necessary force and legitimacy of all actions.

2. Although the military plays a supporting role in a COIN campaign, the failure of commanders to properly apply the principles could easily and directly lead to failure of the entire campaign.

3. In any campaign, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) will routinely be modified in order to meet the situation at hand. Particularly in a COIN campaign, where the adversary will be adaptive, cunning and resourceful, this will be a continual process.

4. Principles offer the civil leadership and the heads of all agencies, including the military commander, both a start point and useful guideposts. The COIN principles offered herein are arranged in a logical sequence and provide a government and military commanders with a general pattern on which to base and review strategy and operational plans.

5. The principles for the conduct of a COIN campaign are:

a. effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim;

b. promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies (including government machinery);

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[33] The overarching nature of this concept and the need for it to be understood at all levels of command, like mission command, raises the need to gain popular support to the level of a guiding philosophy rather than have it as a constituent principle.

c. understand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the wider environment;

d. exploit intelligence and information;

e. separate the insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength, including addressing their grievances, real and perceived;

f. neutralize the insurgent;

g. sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period; and

h. conduct longer-term, post-insurgency planning.

303. EFFECT POLITICAL PRIMACY IN THE PURSUIT OF A STRATEGIC AIM

1. Insurgencies are a political problem that cannot be countered solely by military means. Although an insurgency may be slow in becoming apparent, once it is identified, the host government and its international supporters must decide upon a strategy to stop, neutralize and reverse any effects of the insurgency. This must include an effective, pro-active response to any violence and intimidation generated by the insurgents. Apart from immediate short-term actions, many of which will be taken with the advice of the military force commander, the government must formulate a long-term political plan—backed by political, economic and social programmes—with the aim of addressing legitimate root grievances and legitimacy for the insurgency. The military role will be to provide a security framework that creates conditions conducive to implementing these programmes. That is, the military security and neutralization of the insurgent violence will provide manoeuvre space for other agencies required for enduring solutions. A COIN plan involving the police, military, locally raised militias and coalition security forces will implement this security framework.[34] Ideally, the security framework will be lead by host nation police and military forces in order to provide additional legitimacy for the government.

2. Political primacy underpins COIN as it legitimizes strategic, operational and tactical actions. All actions follow the political lead and support its strategic aim. Within a COIN campaign, the specific strategy determines which instrument of power (diplomatic, military, economic or social) is the focus of effort, and which agency may have the lead at operational and tactical levels. This will change over time as the COIN operation and situation evolve.

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[34] Security forces include military, coalition military forces, national police, local police and locally recruited support forces.

Ensuring a Public Perspective in a COIN Campaign

Not only is it imperative that the military takes a supporting role to the other COIN players during the execution of the campaign, it is also necessary that the fundamental of minimum force be followed. Aggressive offensive actions should be viewed as a necessary, but secondary, aspect to the campaign with only short-term value. The longer-term influence aspects of the military's engagement, particularly in conjunction with other agencies, that lead to enduring solutions of the crisis must be highlighted to both indigenous and domestic audiences. This serves two purposes. Firstly it demonstrates to the indigenous population that COIN forces are not there to destroy their lives and property but rather to assist them in securing the basics of life and enhancing their quality of life. This in turn garners their active support for the campaign. Secondly, it illustrates to domestic populations of contributing nations within a coalition that their sacrifice of treasure and lives are worthwhile in that measures are being actively pursued to resolve underlying grievances and create enduring stability. This is particularly important when the domestic populations hold an inaccurate viewpoint focusing on the use of force only. In order for this perspective to be better balanced, efforts must be made to advertise the use of strategic-level advisory teams and other means used to build lasting capacity within a developing nation. Such was the case with the former Canadian commander of the Afghanistan Strategic Advisory Team engaging a wide variety of audiences upon his return from theatre. Such publicity, locally and domestic, may help protect two strategic centres of gravity.

304. PROMOTE UNITY OF PURPOSE TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIES—CONTROL AND COORDINATION

1. The COIN effort requires a comprehensive approach involving a wide range of agencies seeking to resolve the causes of the insurgency. This should be a number of agencies and elements of power united by common objectives and end-state, thus a unity of purpose and ideally a unity of effort will be achieved. This concept of a unity of effort may be implemented through a variety of structures that promote various levels of common command, control and/or coordination.

2. Many of these agencies have different philosophies, modus operandi and methods. Unity of command across this array of national, government and non-government organizations and agencies will be impractical. Although unity of effort is most desirable, it too may not be achievable. Unity of purpose, however, must be achieved, and all agencies must agree to work towards a common purpose and end-state. This will require close coordination, often led or facilitated by local military commanders.

3. Within a national approach (i.e., that of the threatened nation or that of a coalition contributing nation) and within a coalition, one person will ideally be granted responsibility for the direction of the campaign and authority over all government agencies involved in the effort. This will ideally allow differences of opinion between agencies to be resolved by an impartial director and centralized coordination in order to exploit in a complementary and mutually supporting fashion the strengths of each contributing agency. While this single individual could be a military commander, control will likely be vested in a politician, diplomat or civil servant. In any case, the individual will be working to strict government guidelines and overall control. Ideally, the single commander will lead a joint command and control structure.

4. **Single Command System**: Unity of purpose and effort is facilitated by organizing the COIN campaign under a single commander, or committee director. While the person so

designated may be civilian or military, it is critical that responsibility for overall direction is vested in one headquarters. The commander will bring together both military and non-military elements of power in a single command structure. Advisors will be made available from all of the relevant participating elements, such as the civil service, international organizations, police and military. The commander will oversee a staff system established to ensure that all plans and actions are conducted towards a common goal.

5. **The Committee System**: Operational-level committees are formed, again, mirroring the strategic-level command. These committees will conduct joint planning in order to ensure that the representative subordinate elements execute such plans in a manner keeping with the overarching campaign plan. The actual committee structure and representation will vary between insurgencies and indeed will likely change as the conflict evolves. As a minimum, representatives will include the host nation political and civil authorities, host-nation military and security authorities, political and civil troop-contributing representatives, troop-contributing military commanders and select staff, intelligence, security-contributing representatives and probably international organizations' representatives.

6. Trust is a key factor in making such an organization functional. This is often difficult to establish across differing organizational cultures. For example, the military requirement for security and expertise in applied violence is potentially the antithesis of humanitarian non-governmental organizations' (NGOs') neutral transparency and abhorrence of things military. The committee director and all members must continually strive to maintain mutual openness and confidence. A key component of this will be clearly communicating the purpose and reasoning behind military operations, within the bounds of operational security (OPSEC) considerations.

7. **Role of Personalities**: Given the inter-agency aspect of COIN operations and the need for the military to work hand-in-hand with its civilian and police partners (many of whom will have little understanding[35] of military organization or command structures) the role of individual personalities becomes magnified. Any system of control and coordination must be able to adapt to the personalities of those involved. Military commanders must select their liaison officers and committee members with care, exploiting those who can achieve progress through a balance of charisma, persuasion and graceful force of personality. Commanders must be able to realize that they themselves may not be the most suitable individuals to conduct daily face-to-face operations and coordination with their civilian counterparts and therefore must select the most suitable representative. This must be balanced with the message that the commander's own personal presence will send at any given time.

8. **Assistance to Allies and Foreign Powers**: When a military provides assistance to a foreign state, the forces assigned may necessarily be subordinate to that government in order to preserve the host nation's sovereignty and the government's credibility in the eyes of its populace. At the very least, the leadership role of the indigenous government must be highlighted. In such cases, assisting forces will likely be obliged to adopt the coordination system of the host nation.

9. **Government Planning and Military Support—Assessment and Estimate of the Situation and Military Advisors**. When the government is determining which of its objectives can best be attained with the help of the armed forces, the military commanders and advisers

[35] Experience has shown that some government political leaders, civil administrators and staff of NGOs will not only have lack an understanding of how the military functions and operates but will have significant misconceptions and even hold hostilities towards the military, and thus may be reluctant to cooperate.

will be able to explain the forces' capabilities and limitations in the context of the particular crisis. An analysis of the situation should reveal the areas in which the supported government and the insurgents are most vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are likely to be spread over the entire political, economic, social and security spectrum. The aim will be to identify those government vulnerabilities that are best suited to military defensive action and those vulnerabilities of the insurgents that are most susceptible to offensive military action. The military will likely be able to assist in certain areas of stability activities, such as reconstruction and governance, but the capability limitations of the military and the perceptions of military involvement in these areas must be fully assessed and clearly articulated to political leaders. Throughout the planning of a COIN campaign, the supporting role of the military must be emphasized, and the concept that insurgencies require enduring political solutions must be stressed.

10. **Allocation of Priorities**. The coordinated national plan that emerges from the above estimate should address the political, economic, social and security spectrum and seek enduring solutions to the insurgency causes. Determining the type of insurgency faced will highlight two priorities: identification of physical and moral centres of gravity for the insurgents, and identification of the government actions that will achieve meaningful results. Some of these results, or at least the actions leading to them, should be achieved quickly so as to demonstrate resolution. Others, such as re-building of an economic infrastructure, will take a long time to achieve, but it will often be these actions that lead to enduring success. The national priorities need to be addressed at this stage of the planning process. Once the overarching priorities are identified, other allocations of tasks and resources will be identified, to include:

a. Roles and responsibilities between government departments and military offices in order to avoid duplication of effort, gaps and potential conflict.

b. Priority of action between the social, economic, military and civil administration fields.

c. Priorities within each field of activity (social, economic, military and civil administration). Just as the military will apportion efforts across the operational functions (command, sense, act, shield, sustain), so too must the civil, police and other authorities set priorities across their own organizations and capabilities.

11. **Campaign Design and Operational Planning**. Once the strategic priorities and objectives have been identified, campaign design and operational planning may begin. The military will work in conjunction with the host nation and the other elements of power and agencies involved. Operational objectives will be identified and grouped along thematic lines of operation leading to the operational end-state. It will be vital that the military conducts the campaign design in cooperation with the other elements of power involved in order the truly realize a unity of purpose and effort across all agencies.

305. UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF THE INSURGENCY, INCLUDING THE WIDER ENVIRONMENT

1. The various inter-related dynamics of an insurgency will present profound intellectual challenges for commanders and staff. In order to understand the context of the insurgency, its causes and motivations, a broad knowledge base must be created in order to understand it and the environment in which it has grown. This will require an assessment of all the various elements within the environment: political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), informational and infrastructure. It will also demand an understanding of the various, often competing, power structures present in the society and insurgency itself.

2. Given the large number of variables at work, it may very well be impossible to predict the secondary and tertiary effects of specific actions. Still, effort must be expended to understand these variables and dynamics at hand and how best to tackle them.

3. The dynamics of an insurgency may include:

a. cause—what makes the insurgency attractive to the uncommitted;

b. central idea (the narrative) of the insurgency—this may be an ideology or religious ideal that also identifies a strategic end-state;

c. aims of the insurgency—long term, short term, advertised and hidden;

d. organization and capabilities—leaders, cadre, combatants, support base and political wings;

e. external support—moral, physical and conceptual;

f. methodology—strategies and tactics; and

g. the wider environment—political, economic, sociological and technical.

4. For every dynamic within an insurgency, the lines of operation within the campaign plan must anticipate and counter the evolving dynamics of the insurgency.

306. EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION—THE OVERARCHING IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. Intelligence is the key enabler that will allow the insurgency, its causes, its motivations, its power structures and its weaknesses and vulnerabilities on both the physical and psychological planes to be understood. It will thus support the creation of an effective and legitimate campaign plan. Such intelligence will demand a multi-faceted assessment and analysis capability that will examine the entire environment and its influences, well beyond the mere military capabilities of the insurgents.

2. Combating an insurgency requires a sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT) network that includes not only local sources of intelligence but also a detailed collection plan that incorporates all sources, from the soldiers who patrol daily to the agents of influence within a society. A sophisticated, well-guided network is essential to develop a complete picture of the strengths and weaknesses of an insurgency.

3. Information and intelligence must be exploited in a systematic and thorough manner. All individuals concerned—civilians, commanders and soldiers of all ranks—must understand the overriding importance of intelligence in actively defeating an insurgency and in gaining the support of the populace. Intelligence will support direct military action against insurgents, guide influence activities and psychological effects to attack the root causes of the insurgency, create enduring solutions of standing grievances and allow for success to be measured. All-source intelligence is the key enabler required to defeat an insurgency.

4. **Operational-Level Application—Local Knowledge**. Knowledge of the country—its ethnic composition, culture, religions and schisms, the political scene and party leaders, the clandestine political organizations and their undercover armed groups, the influence of neighbouring states and the economy—will provide the essential backdrop to understanding the insurgency. However, such a knowledge base takes time to build. It is essential to do so because the development of actionable intelligence relies on an ability to discern patterns of change in behaviour. The host nation police and its intelligence service should be the prime agencies for providing background intelligence at the start of a mission so that a baseline of

local conditions can be established. Creation of a baseline understanding and its growth into a broad knowledge base allows developing trends and changes in specific areas to be identified and encouraged, if positive, or halted if negative. In all cases, the best source of intelligence comes from members of an insurgent group who have been detained or convinced to switch loyalties.

All operations must be intelligence driven. This produces two benefits: first, it minimizes disruption to the general population by focusing on specific targets, allows refined risk assessment and avoids collateral damages; and second, it creates a snowball effect, as each targeted operation inevitably produces more intelligence.

Since the summer of 2003 US forces in Iraq had been searching for and trying to eliminate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of 'al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.' Al-Zarqawi was personally responsible for innumerable suicide and roadside bombings, and assassinations.

In February of 2006 US forces had gleaned intelligence from a captured insurgent detailing a number of safehouses and residences in the Iraqi town of Yusufiya. This intelligence was used to launch a number of raids in mid-April that captured more insurgents and uncovered more intelligence. These operations had two effects: it uncovered a videotape of al Zarqawi fumbling with a C9 (M249) light machine gun, which was broadcast worldwide by the US in a counter-propaganda effort aimed at demonstrating the incompetence of al Zarqawi and his immediate associates. The second effect was more important. After weeks of interrogation by specially-trained intelligence personnel, the captured insurgents revealed enough information to create a detailed mapping of al-Zarqawi's organization's mid-level leadership. This breakthrough allowed a number of targeted raids on 13, 14, and 17 May by SOF that killed a number of insurgents and produced more physical intelligence.

Finally, at the beginning of June 2006 interrogators were able to produce intelligence detailing the security precautions taken by Sheikh al-Rahman, a close advisor to al-Zarqawi. Combined with electronic intelligence, this enabled US forces to identify the location of a meeting between al-Rahman and al-Zarqawi. Using this intelligence, al-Zarqawi was targeted and killed by aircraft-launched PGMs on 7 June 2006.

The deliberate, patient exploitation of intelligence guided and shaped an effective series of operations that produced tangible results, resulting in a weakened and less operationally effective adversary.

Source: Mark Bowden, "The Ploy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Volume 299, No.4, May 2007, Washington DC: The Atlantic Monthly, pp.54-68.

5. **Tactical-Level Application**. Without accurate intelligence, the security forces are reduced to conducting blind and ineffective operations, which often provoke a negative reaction amongst the population. The ensuing negative media reporting can undermine domestic and international support for the mission and benefit the insurgency. Furthermore, troops conducting routine framework patrolling tend to loose their focus and motivation, with the result often being the conduct of patrolling for the sake of patrolling itself. Tactical intelligence requirements should be pushed down to the lowest levels, and all sources, specialist and routine framework patrols alike, should be given specific informational requirements to gather. Furthermore, specialists wherever possible, should be pushed down to the lower (sub-unit) tactical levels so that they may remain responsive to their intelligence requirements while

fulfilling those of the units and formations. Every soldier is a source of information collection and must come to understand the human and geographic terrain, including the operational methodology of the enemy. Standing information requirements should be pushed down to the lowest levels in order to focus routine operations such as security patrols and to allow the requirements to be applied pervasively. In the end, each successful operation becomes an intelligence windfall and parlays into a stronger intelligence picture.

6. The tactical-level application of information and intelligence will allow large named areas of interest (NAIs) to be reduced to point NAIs and eventually to target areas of interest (TAIs) for subsequent precision strikes. For example, HUMINT reports may indicate a gang and their suspected weapons cache are located in a neighbourhood containing 20,000 occupants. Patrols and other sources, through specific tasks and stated information requirements, may reduce this area NAI to a specific city block or house. This will eventually become a TAI that can be passed to operations staff and commanders for subsequent action—in this case, a cordon and search activity.

7. The same can be said regarding information exploitation for psychological effects. For example, HUMINT reports or interrogations may indicate that an insurgency is recruiting members from a particular suburban region. Further examination and collection regarding this area may reveal that it is an ethnic enclave with high unemployment. Hence, this area may become a TAI for the application of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and other influence activity capabilities in order to stimulate development of this enclave. Follow-up patrols can, in time, gauge the public reaction to such measures. In short, intelligence drives and focuses tactical operations, limits collateral damage and assists in measuring success.

8. **The Intelligence Organization**. It should be expected that intelligence organizations in COIN campaigns will have to grow considerably compared to those in conventional operations, which focus merely on a conventional enemy. Ideally, the intelligence organization should start expanding in lock step with the insurgents' developing threat. Inevitably, however, there is an interval before the expanded organization becomes effective. Such expansion should reflect the need to understand the various elements of the environment that influence the campaign's outcome, such as cultural and economic aspects.

307. SEPARATE THE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR PHYSICAL AND MORAL SOURCES OF STRENGTH

1. **Two Facets of Isolation**. One of the primary operational objectives of the COIN campaign is the physical and moral isolation of the insurgents from the sources of physical resources and the population. Without the support, both physical and moral, of the population, an insurgency will likely be unable to survive. Additionally, it is important to work to eliminate the sources of funding and material support that sustain insurgent operations that come from both internal and external sources. All agencies involved in the COIN operation must understand this and work within their own fields to this end. Both elements must be addressed:

   a. **Physical Separation**. Insurgents must be separated from their physical support, which includes recruits, finances and material resources that may be originating from within the host nation or from external sources.

   b. **Moral Separation**. Insurgents must be undermined intellectually and morally and any justification for their moral support by a population removed. A narrative will form the foundation of insurgent propaganda and guide their actions. This narrative will highlight real or perceived grievances and provide a vision and strategic end-state as an alternative to the existing government or society. The

narrative will also provide moral justification for the insurgency and attempt to capture the moral high ground from the government. Thus, undermining the insurgency's narrative is critical to influencing the population to support the government. To this end, a legal, viable alternative to the insurgency must be offered by the COIN campaign. The insurgency must be deprived of any claim to moral superiority.

308. PHYSICAL SEPARATION

1. **Establish a Firm Base**. The first requirement may be to secure the base areas essential to the survival and functioning of the government and state. These normally include the capital, key points of entry, vital installations such as public infrastructure and reinforcing those areas that are loyal to the government. The provision of security in these vital areas encourages their inhabitants to rally behind the government.

2. **Expand Secure Areas**. Once established, security forces expand outward from the secure areas in a campaign akin to the spreading of an oil slick. As each area is consolidated, loyal local forces could be raised to secure the area to release mobile regular troops to secure the next area while the host state's civil administration and police re-establish themselves in the recently liberated territory and gain, through social development, the support of the populace. This is a proven approach to combating an insurgency.

The *tache d'huile,* or "oil spot," technique of counter-insurgency was first formalized by French General Hubert Lyautey in the first decade of the 20th century. The premise of the technique is the provision of a security umbrella or framework at the local level concomitant to furnishing social services such as schools, health care and government administration. Lyautey's aim was to physically and psychologically separate the insurgent from the population and to slowly expand government control by using "the army not as an instrument of repression but as a positive social force." Support for the government would come with tangible improvements in the local populace's well-being. Versions of this technique have been applied by, among others, the French in Morocco and Algeria, the US Marines in Vietnam and the US Army on southern Luzon during the 1899–1902 Philippine War (even though the term *tache d'huile* had yet to be coined).

Source: Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The guerrilla in history *(New York: Morrow, 1994), pp. 150–157.*

3. **Integration of Security Forces**. The most effective way of expanding a COIN campaign's affect and achieving physical separation of the insurgents is by having security forces living amongst the population. History has proven that isolating security forces in fortified strongholds is ineffective, allows insurgent infiltration and serves to separate the counter-insurgents from the population, all of which is the reverse effect of that actually being sought. For this "oil spot" or "ink spot" method to work as intended, the security forces must live and interact intimately with the population and its established authority and government. Not only does this create strong personal bonds between the people and the military, it enhances the intelligence network and creates a hostile environment for the insurgents. This method is not without risk. Indeed, risks may have to be taken in force protection in terms the relative exposure of the soldiers is increased. This will also involve a political risk in terms of the potential for higher casualties. Such risks must be carefully explained to soldiers and domestic populations alike. In order to mitigate such risks, a certain level of security is necessary before such a tactic can be employed. In the final analysis, it is imperative for a successful campaign

that the security forces build confidence in the population, and it is unlikely that this can be achieved from behind fortified walls.

4. **Eliminate the Insurgent Subversive and Support System**. The security forces' operations must focus on eliminating the insurgents' subversive and support organizations. This is an essential prerequisite to defeating any active insurgent group for the following reasons:

a. The subversive organization controls the population, denies the government popular support, spreads propaganda unchecked and prevents witnesses from providing information.

b. Without such action, the insurgents continue to receive supplies, recruits and information regarding the security forces and can continue to disrupt development and stability even if the majority of their moral support has been eliminated.

c. Once the subversive organization is destroyed or dislocated, the insurgents are forced to operate more openly and thus expose themselves to deliberate military actions and arrest.

d. Subversive elements arrested are the best sources of information on the insurgent organization. These elements must be carefully handled, according to legal constraints, by specialist staff skilled in extracting detailed intelligence.

5. **Methods of Physical Separation**. A thoughtful combination of methods by all agencies involved is needed to separate the insurgents from their subversive and supporting constructs:

a. Intelligence should aim at the identification of support cells, quarter-master functionaries, subversive cells and propagandists. This information should come in good part from civilian police sources, but where police forces lack a physical presence in a remote geographical area, the void may be filled with elements of Special Forces assigned specific information requirements.

b. The provision of security for the populace, the overt supporters and informers. This is best done proactively through the use of anonymous tip telephone lines, specialist handling of sources and low-level security measures (such as face masks) to hide the identity of informers working with security forces.

c. The gradual spread of government and security force control over areas.

d. Curfews and searches of individuals thought to be supporting insurgents.

e. Patrols, ambushes and vehicle checkpoints (the latter best done at low levels for short intervals on likely routes).

f. Interdiction operations against the entry of external supplies.

g. Closing national borders or imposing control measures over them.

h. International diplomacy to staunch the flow of external fiscal, human and material support for the insurgency. This may require government legal action in a number of nations, particularly those contributing troops to an insurgency. Certainly, evidence collected in a theatre of operations indicating the sources of external funding and resources should be advertised widely to support government action that will staunch this support.

309. INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL SEPARATION

1. **General**. Undermining the narrative of the insurgents and removing grievances, justification and causes of the insurgency is critical to enduring end-states. Indeed, such action will be decisive in the campaign.

a. Addressing this facet primarily involves dealing with the **real and perceived grievances** that help to intellectually draw supporters and recruits to outwardly or tacitly support the insurgents. Just as insurgent propaganda involves both words and deeds, providing an alternative to the insurgent narrative requires both words and actions. Therefore, not only does the campaign plan and its intent need to be broadcast, it must be constantly reinforced, updated and supported by real action that creates a sense of normalcy and improves the day-to-day lives of the populace.

b. A legal, viable alternative to the insurgency must be offered to members of the insurgency, their supporters and the uncommitted in the population. Hand-in-hand with this is the fact that the conditions that permit the spread of the insurgency, and its justification in the eyes of many, must be addressed and resolved with long-term solutions that are well publicized through information operations.

c. Broadly speaking, this will often involve the reform of government and government institutions and policies, and alternatives to the idealized vision of society that insurgent propaganda will advertise. The insurgency must be deprived of any claim to moral superiority.

d. In general, the concept of separating the insurgent in a moral or intellectual sense has been termed "winning the hearts and minds." More accurately, this should be considered winning the minds and hearts of the population. Specifically, planned influence activities must be conducted to affect the understanding and perceptions (i.e., the mind) of the target audiences in order to affect their will (heart) and ultimately their behaviour in a desired manner.

2. **Reforming the Host Nation Government and Institutions**. In many cases, the government under attack from an insurgency requires some type of reform in order to solidify its legitimacy, win and maintain the support of its own populace and gain international support.

a. This may include the reform of unjust policies such as inequitable distribution of land. Government actions within a moral context—such as observance of the law, discrete use of force, the provision of public services, and equitable distribution of benefits realized through social and economic development—will help to produce a favourable climate domestically and internationally. In other words, the government must learn to envision and provide an equitable social contract with its populace.

b. Internationally, it is critical that the host nation government make real and sustained efforts at any needed reforms for responsible and representative government. The publics of supporting nations in a coalition will likely demand a high standard of human rights, rule of law and good governance. Maintaining this support is dependent partly on the efforts of the host nation to reform weak institutions and develop internationally recognized legitimacy.

3. **Domestic and International Diplomacy**. Diplomacy must play a central role in the intellectual and moral separation of the insurgents from the population. This involves both diplomacy within the affected state and internationally.

a. Domestically, it is important that the host nation government negotiate with disaffected groups to develop a sense of inclusion and ownership of the political process. Broadening the base of stakeholders in a political process is critical to increasing participation in the legitimate process. With regards to insurgents, undoubtedly there will be die-hards that refuse to support anything but absolute achievement of the stated goals. For these, the only options are capture, death or to be made so irrelevant that they wield no influence or threat. However, the vast majority of most insurgent groups are normally composed of less highly motivated people who simply want to achieve a better life. Domestic diplomacy is critical in trying to bring this group to the government side and, although their trust will be difficult to gain, it is imperative that efforts to do so are made. It is highly unlikely that a permanent solution can be achieved otherwise.

b. Internationally, diplomatic efforts aimed at cutting moral support from countries that share ideological, cultural or religious links to an insurgency can play an important part in countering the narrative underpinning insurgent propaganda. This may simply involve greater support to a state that demonstrates the compatibility of religion and democracy or a successful example of settling long-standing grievances with government reforms. In other cases, this may involve encouraging governments to enforce legal constraints on religious leaders advocating violence or the support of extremist propaganda.

4. **Holding the Moral High Ground**. Insurgent narrative and propaganda will provide a moral justification for the existence of the insurgency and for any violent acts committed. The struggle to intellectually and morally separate the insurgents from the populace hinges on the government being seen as morally superior to the insurgents and the alternative society being offered by the insurgency. This involves establishing and ascribing to the rule of law. Host nation governments and institutions may require detailed assistance in achieving this concept in both practice and in the eyes of their populace. To this end, commanders and even their soldiers must understand the need to help ensure the supported government remains legitimate and acts accordingly. Where possible, they must assist in the raising of standards of conduct, from the local level upwards. Violations must be reported to the military and civil chains-of-command and addressed accordingly. Coalition forces involved in the campaign must, as part of the solution, set the example for the host nation government were necessary. In short, the insurgency must be deprived of any claim to moral superiority.

5. **Apply Power Discriminately to Influence Human Will**. Force must be applied discriminately throughout a COIN campaign to avoid alienating the population through civilian casualties or unnecessary damage to property. At times, short-term tactical success may have to be forsaken in order to meet the long-term operational objectives of the campaign and maintain the support of the populace.

a. Minimum use of force should guide the actions of the security forces. This maxim must be reinforced at all stages of the campaign and at all levels of command.

b. Furthermore, the exercise of power by any of the agencies involved in a campaign must be conducted with legitimacy, within the rule of law and without prejudice to any one group within the affected population.

c. Additionally, disruption to normal civic life must be limited to the greatest extent possible. This principle must be applied at the operational and tactical levels. For example, the imposition of curfews should be as limited in time and scope as possible in order to avoid disruption to the lives of the majority of the populace, who are always at risk of becoming fatigued by security measures. Likewise, the conduct of a cordon and search in private homes may require forced entry into locked rooms. If the owners cannot locate keys, even when breaching tools are produced, then the door should, whenever possible, be removed from its hinges. If nothing is found (as will often be the case), the door can then be replaced without damage. This in turns limits embarrassment for the security forces, and the extra effort taken to avoid damages to private property is, to a certain extent, appreciated by the populace. It in turn helps gain and maintain their support and counter the propaganda undoubtedly spread by the insurgents regarding the security forces and their methods.

310. NEUTRALIZE THE INSURGENT

1. The security forces of the government or coalition will have a significant role in the selective destruction, disruption and dislodgment of insurgents. Confidence, trust and freedom of action, without the need to refer routine and anticipated operations that will exploit often fleeting opportunities back to a higher level(s) of command, must be afforded tactical commanders (particularly down to sub-unit level) if they are to be successful in striking the insurgent and dislocating him from his power base.

2. It will be highly unlikely, if not impossible, to destroy the entire insurgent movement. Part of the neutralization of the insurgent will be to neutralize his presence in affected areas. A critical aspect of successful military COIN is command initiative and action at the lowest tactical level that involves the junior commander (platoon and section level) leading small patrols[36] into the insurgents' area of operations. The aim should be to defeat the insurgent on "home ground" using adequate force, but no more than is absolutely necessary. Proportionality must be the measure applied when employing force.

3. All military tactical actions must be conducted in harmony with the other actions taken to neutralize and defeat the insurgency: amelioration of the causes, reformation of the government and development of local security forces (if necessary), information operations (to explain the military actions) and social development. Without this multi-pronged approach, killing insurgents simply becomes a form of attrition warfare and may encourage more converts to the insurgency. Indeed, this point may be exacerbated by socio-cultural codes of conduct that demand retribution for the death of a relative regardless of cause or justification.

311. SUSTAIN COMMITMENT TO EXPEND POLITICAL CAPITAL AND RESOURCES OVER A LONG PERIOD

1. Insurgency and counter-insurgency, like all forms of warfare, are protracted contests of will. Insurgents understand that they do not have to win a decisive battle but have to make the campaign too expensive and demanding (in terms of time, resources, financial and political capital) for the government, the populace and/or the government's external supporters, some of whom may be supplying troops to stabilize and support the state. Not only must the

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[36] The required size of the patrol will depend upon a number of factors considered in the estimate and planning process, including threat, insurgent tactics, distance to be covered and tasks of the patrol.

commitment of the local populace be sustained, but the populations of any supporting nations must be convinced to remain committed to the COIN. These are strategic centres of gravity within the campaign.

2. A sustained commitment to the COIN is underpinned by unity of purpose across a wide range of disparate elements and organizations involved in the campaign, that is, through the comprehensive approach to the campaign. Information operations will have to work towards this aim. Furthermore, realistic measures of success will have to be decided and promulgated so that complementary lines of operation and successive operational objectives may be fully identified, broadened and exploited.

312. CONDUCT LONGER-TERM POST-INSURGENCY PLANNING

1. The requirement for post-insurgency security and development probably holds the key to effectively applying all of the other principles. Merely providing for the military defeat of insurgents does not in any way end the government requirement to make suitable, longer-term plans to address the perceived and real grievances that enabled the rise of an insurgency in the first instance.

2. The plans and requirements to address these grievances must be communicated to the populace of the host nation, the international public and the populaces of nations contributing resources and manpower to the campaign. This will allow the COIN campaign to develop the long-term legitimacy required to sustain what will undoubtedly be a lengthy and complex effort.

3. The announcement of bold government initiatives to be started after the insurgency has been defeated, or at least significantly neutralized, can have a real and significant effect on winning the moral support of the population. Such initiatives should be designed at the same time as the comprehensive strategic plans are being prepared to defeat the insurgency. The timing of any statement about longer term plans could be of crucial importance and should be handled in a sensitive and controlled manner by the state authorities in concert with the overall information operations plan. It is critical that the announcement of government reform initiatives coincide with actual deeds. Failure to coordinate the words and actions of a strategy will increase disenchantment with the government, both domestically and internationally.

In the British Dhofar campaign (1970-1975), the end of insurgent activity occurred in December 1975, but the authorities had to work relentlessly for several more years to achieve continued support from the population before the causes of the insurgency had been fully rectified. As with subduing a fire, the flames have to be out and the embers cold before it can be considered fully extinguished.

SECTION 3
FACTORS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF COIN

313. POPULAR SUPPORT

1. **Insurgent Aims**. An insurgency aims to discredit the government, its legitimacy and its policies. It will have spent much time preparing the ground for insurgency with propaganda, using real and contrived discontents. When it considers that the government and/or its supporting authorities (e.g., support from an external nation) have been sufficiently undermined and that a significant part of the population has been alienated from authority, the insurgency will use coercion and terror to reinforce its propaganda campaign.

2. **A Competition for Loyalty: Minds and Hearts**. A government must convince its population that it can offer a better solution, better government and a better life than the opposing insurgents in order to influence the minds and win the hearts of the population. This will be a focal point for the information operations campaign. Just as an insurgency needs the sympathy or the acquiescence of a sizeable percentage of the population to survive and to overthrow the government, so the government needs the people's support to appear legitimate in its eyes and to obtain information leading to the arrest or capture of the terrorists. Violence, or the threat of it, is aimed at the citizen's fears for his family and freedom to earn a wage to feed them. Whoever can guarantee citizens security can often command their allegiance. An insurgency is a competition between government and insurgent for the individual's loyalty. Unless the government can offer reasonable protection, individuals are unlikely to risk their own or their families' lives by volunteering information, and the security forces will meet passive resistance from the populace as a whole in addition to the active resistance of the insurgents.

3. **Government Protection**. Protection of the civilian population will require restrictions and measures (searches, checkpoints, curfews, etc.) that will disrupt normal lives and frustrate the local populations. Their frustration will increase with time. Insurgents will seek to misrepresent necessary inconveniences as harsh and oppressive. Consequently, the government and its security forces must anticipate a possible hostile public reaction to such security measures and prepare arguments to rebut insurgent propaganda in order to keep the initiative in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.

4. **Involving the Local Population in the Campaign**. Even in situations in which the local authorities and host nation police forces require significant reform, much effort should be made to include them, within the dictates of force protection and OPSEC, in the campaign. Including them will build their confidence, encourage higher standards and raise their profile in the eyes of the local communities. Likewise, local populations should be made to feel that they have a vital part to play in countering the insurgency and leading to its conclusion. Such confidence-building measures may even extend to having remote communities raise their own local defence forces. The trust the community initially places in its protectors is repaid by the trust the government shows in them by allowing them to bear arms in a common cause.

5. **Countering Insurgent Propaganda**. Insurgent propaganda must be monitored and addressed by a deliberate and multi-faceted information operations campaign, that is, through the use of influence activities. However, as much authority as possible must be pushed down to the tactical levels in order that information operations at that level are able to be executed in a timely and effective manner. Broad themes developed at the strategic and operational levels must be tailored to the specifics of a local target audience at the tactical level in order to address the specific issues at the local level. Canadian and coalition soldiers must be aware of the key role that they play in countering insurgent propaganda, which, at the very least, will paint them as foreign, oppressive occupiers. Their friendly (but professional) disposition, tone and decorum while patrolling amongst the local population, their ability to relate to the populace, and the discriminate use of force will quickly undermine that propaganda.

314. AVOIDANCE OF MORAL RELATIVISM

1. **Moral relativism** is the doctrine that morality exists in relation to culture, society or historical context and that there is **no absolute right and wrong**. Moral relativism assumes that morals are not universal and therefore confuses culture and morality. When working in another society, there is a natural tendency to practise moral relativism and thus accept immoral practices by members of an indigenous population and attribute them to immutable local customs and cultural values.

2. Such an assumption and the ensuing practice are wrong. Moral is defined as "concerned with the principles of right and wrong behaviour."[37] Value, as in cultural value, is defined as "the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something."[38] Because morals are concerned with **principles, they can be considered universal**. Values are culturally specific, and the values and social constructs assumed by a culture will vary to extreme degrees from those of other cultures. Values may change, but only over very long periods of time. Both morals and cultural values are distinct from individual or social practices, although all are related.

3. The practice of moral relativism in COIN, as in all campaigns, should be avoided because it creates a substantial risk of alienating the population and undermining support for the campaign. This can occur in two ways:

   a. Firstly, moral relativism can sanction corrupt or otherwise illegal actions of people in authority. This, in turn, will undermine their authority, legitimacy, credibility and moral superiority along with that of the campaign in the eyes of indigenous and international populations. Moral relativism must be avoided when dealing with any individual or group, be they government officials and members of the host nation security services or criminal elements, tribal authority figures, business people, and members of the insurgency itself. The effects of moral relativism are even greater when the sanctioned violations clearly undermine good governance and the legitimacy, moral superiority and effectiveness of those authorities fighting the insurgency. Thus moral relativism and its attribution of immoral behaviour to simply extend local values and culture is counter productive as it de-legitimizes the host nation government, the COIN campaign itself and the forces conducting it.[39]

   b. Secondly, the illegal or immoral activities may have been one of the root causes to instability in the society in the first place. By permitting, effectively sanctioning, such behaviour as extortion by armed policemen at checkpoints, the commanders will only forestall the long-term improvement of the society.

4. In avoiding the practice of moral relativism and ensuring acceptable standards of conduct from public officials and society itself, commanders must use a degree of common sense and judgement. For example, armed police extorting money from civilians at a checkpoint is different from a school teacher who charges parents a stipend per child in light of poor or non-existent wages from a developing government.

5. Although it may be considered a social or cultural norm, by virtue of its ubiquity, corruption and criminal activity cannot simply be dismissed as a cultural or moral norm and indeed may have aggravated the root causes of an insurgency. The insistence that government officials and other authority figures follow moral standards may require individual and societal changes but unlikely changes to cultural values. Societal change is acceptable and may indeed be necessary for the successful conclusion of the COIN campaign. Additionally, if the improvement of the host nation populace's well-being is a primary goal of COIN, moral relativism, with regards to permitting criminal activity and excusing a failure to fulfil the government's social contract, cannot be accepted as a legitimate or beneficial practice.

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[37] From *The Oxford Dictionary of English, 10th ed. Revised*, Oxford University Press, 1999, edited by Judy Pearsall, p. 925.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 1584.

[39] At its worst, moral relativism in such cases may be considered racist for it assumes an indigenous population is not capable of morally correct standards of behaviour. Again, this attitude will not garner support from the local populace.

6. In trying to improve a society facing an insurgency, it must be realized that a reduction in corruption and criminal activity will not occur instantaneously but rather over a period of time. Forces conducting a COIN campaign must expect and insist upon the moral conduct of host nation authority figures and security forces. This may become part of the long-term security sector reform and governance development.

Ensuring Police Professional Conduct: Haiti, 2004

In conducting low-level COIN operations against the criminal-based insurgency in Haiti in early 2004, Canadian troops conducted a number of cordon and search operations against gang headquarters and gathering places, most of which contained brothels. It quickly became obvious that members of the Haitian national police routinely frequented such establishments, thereby associating with gang members and exhibiting anti-social behaviours. Some headquarters staff dismissed this issue as simply part of the Haitian culture. Not only does this view disregard the lack of legitimacy of the local authorities, but it assumes either that there is no moral yardstick that can be applied or that the local populace is not capable of higher standards. Such conduct by local authorities certainly undermined their legitimacy and trustworthiness in the eyes of the local populace. Throughout the operation, the tactical-level commanders, from section commander upwards, continued to insist on high standards from the local constabulary and reported violations to the upper echelons of their chain-of-command.

Source: After-action reports from I Coy, 2 RCR, OPERATION HALO.

315. AVOIDANCE OF CULTURAL ABSOLUTISM

1. It is possible to assume that one's societal and **cultural values** and norms are universal and equivalent to morals. Thus, one may attempt to impose social constructs unsuited to the culture and society in which a campaign is being conducted. This is a form of cultural absolutism.

2. Such an assumption and situation risks creating or exacerbating the perception that foreigners are trying to impose values and beliefs at odds with those of the indigenous population. Confusing what is morally universal (e.g., the right to education or responsible government) with what is specific to a culture and society (e.g., secular democracy) and attempting to apply it in another culture can lead to the creation of the perception that one is seeking to impose cultural rather than societal change and will thus undermine the authority of a campaign and its acceptance by an indigenous population. While this perception may exist within the host nation population regardless, the practice of cultural absolutism is more likely to generate feelings of ill will or cultural imperialism than would otherwise be the case.

3. For example, while responsible governance is considered a universal human right,[40] it must be recognized that there can be many forms of responsible government. Thus, secular democracy as practised in Western nations may not be directly transferable to a culture that does not necessarily ascribe to the notion of the separation of religion and politics. However, this does not mean that forms of responsible, participatory government that incorporate religion

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[40] The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 18 through 21, declare freedom of opinion, expression, peaceful assembly and association and participatory government as universal rights. These are all fundamental tenets of democracy but may be inherent in other forms of representative, responsible government not considered purely democratic in the Western sense.

into the political process should be dismissed as illegitimate if they do not violate the basic principles of responsible government. Another example may be found in education development. If the desires of a village council is for a CIMIC team to coordinate and provide for the construction of a religious school rather than a secular school, this request should be granted. It is not for the military commander to decide what type of education is offered. Instead, the aim is to facilitate education in general, keeping in mind that development is incremental and long-term. In this case, providing for a religious school at the local level may allow parents and village leaders to moderate instruction at the school and avoid radicalized teachings practised elsewhere.

4. Insurgent propaganda, particularly from a point of moral superiority, will exploit the practice of cultural absolutism by coalition forces, usually by claiming that grievances and injustices are being perpetuated and that the fundamental, traditional culture is being attacked.

5. In order to avoid such situations and perceptions, commanders and those planning a campaign must understand the traditional tenets of the culture and society in which they will operate. They must understand how their words and actions will be viewed and interpreted. They must attempt to effect individual and societal change where necessary for a successful outcome, whilst adhering to the cultural and traditional arrangements and avoiding assumptions of cultural absolutism. A campaign may require changes to a society, but they must occur with the culture arrangements of the environment.

6. It should be noted that the domestic populations of nations contributing troops to a campaign may not comprehend the importance of working within cultural constructs and expect social developments to reflect their own society's concept of development and progress. The importance of working within a cultural construct reflective of the environment at hand may have to be explained carefully to domestic audiences.

316. POLITICAL AWARENESS

1. Commanders at all levels and individual soldiers must be aware of the consequences of any action they may take. This is especially important should an unexpected opportunity present itself to create a tactical success or in a sudden emergency when there is no time to seek advice or direction from higher authority. Those with an understanding of the socio-cultural and political nuances at the local level will be better able to assess the likely effect of their actions on the local populace and to make correct decisions that will reinforce the larger goals and objectives of the campaign. They must be ready to sacrifice short-term tactical success in order to support the principles of a COIN campaign and the operational objectives specific to the campaign.

2. All ranks must be briefed on the aims of both the COIN campaign and those of the insurgency and trained to recognize themes and messages in enemy propaganda along with the need to avoid feeding those propaganda messages. An understanding of the issues at stake ensures that soldiers know how to reinforce the COIN effort and objectives. Furthermore, commanders and soldiers must be made to understand that success in COIN is not necessarily synonymous with physical destruction of insurgents and that achieving tactical success must not take precedence over the longer-term operational and strategic goals.

317. ACTING WITHIN THE LAW

1. Even though terrorists and insurgents use lawless and violent methods, the government and security force response must be constrained by adherence to the rule of law. Operating outside the law will only fuel discontent and the insurgent propaganda machine. If the

government and its security forces lose the moral high ground, and thus legitimacy and credibility, the people have no incentive to support them. The host nation security forces must act within domestic law, while coalition forces must operate within the bounds of both international and national law as well as within the bounds of accepted international norms, which may not be formally stated but nonetheless exist. In many nations, the police and local military will require close supervision in order to ensure that they and their actions fall within these parameters. Leaders at all levels must not be reluctant to voice their concerns with respect to the conduct of local security forces, both on the spot and in their reports to their chains-of-command.

318. MINIMUM NECESSARY FORCE

1. No more force may be used than is necessary to achieve an aim. The amount used must be reasonable and it must not be punitive. Once the aim is achieved, no more force should be used.

2. The need to use minimum force is not to be confused with deploying the minimum number of troops. The appearance of a force large enough to contain a situation at the right psychological moment may convince insurgents and other adversaries or dissidents that the authorities are well prepared and determined to deal with lawlessness.

3. As in all operations, commanders remain morally responsible to ensure that all ranks can apply their rules of engagement robustly and with confidence. In doing so, commanders and soldiers alike must recognize the need to limit collateral damages and to only engage clearly identified threats. Insurgents will undoubtedly attack from the shelter and screen of civilian populations, and soldiers must ensure that they clearly identify the threat before engaging with deadly force. This must be a key aspect of training.

4. Furthermore, insurgents will execute atrocities with the specific aim of causing an overreaction from the security forces that will later be used in propaganda to undermine the credibility of COIN forces and to enhance the insurgent's narrative. This should be kept in mind by commanders when planning.

SECTION 4
CONCLUSION

1. The principles and considerations articulated above are only intended to provide guidance and are not meant to be read as hard-and-fast rules. They are doctrinal principles based on the overarching philosophy; they are not dogma and should be applied with flexibility and common sense. All forms of warfare evolve, particularly during times of conflict, and insurgency and counter-insurgency are not exceptions to this fact. However, the principles listed and described represent the distillation of the facts of history and provide a reasonable guide for the commander to comprehend a complex operational situation and develop plans that will reinforce and complement the necessary political solution to the conflict.

CHAPTER 4
STRATEGIC-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

... the first requirement for the successful conduct of a COIN campaign is for the government to set up a sound framework within which it can take place.

—General Sir Frank Kitson

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

1. In its widest context, an insurrection will be politically motivated. Therefore, the overarching strategy to defeat the insurrection must be political. While military activities will act to form part of this strategy, they only encompass one arm of a multi-faceted campaign that uses a comprehensive approach incorporating all elements of power in a unity of purpose. The amount of emphasis placed the military's role will be dictated by the strength of the insurgent forces and their tactics, techniques and procedures. Strategic and operational considerations are fundamentally different for counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns than for conventional campaigns. They require closer cooperation with ongoing diplomatic activities and more consideration of the overarching political objectives at lower operational and tactical levels of command. Usually this involves the selective use of force, as opposed to maximum firepower and destruction, in conjunction with humanitarian and diplomatic activities. Therefore, closer and more extensive coordination between the military and other governmental and non-governmental agencies is required. Nonetheless, whether or not an insurgency develops to the point at which there is major combat, as with the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army in 1947 or the Afghan Northern Alliance in 2002, the outcome of a COIN campaign will be profound.

SECTION 2
THE GOVERNMENT CONCEPT

401. THE SETTING

1. Alliances and global security arrangements enhance the security environment through reducing the threat of attack against Canada while increasing the likelihood of support from other nations. Also the willingness to contribute to allies, both regionally and on a global level has been seen as effective in containing potentially unstable situations. As such, working with other nations is an essential element of our foreign and defence policies. Here, the military has a proven role in maintaining international policies and relationships.

2. The government of the day decides on participation in international deployments on a case-by-case basis. Considerations affecting the decision making process include Canadian interests and costs, risks to military personnel, probability of success, specificity of objectives and mission duration as well as existing commitments.

3. It is possible that a national government, an international organization or other lead nation faced with an insurgent threat will request assistance from Canada. In the event of the Government of Canada agreeing to such a request, the Canadian military may deploy a force to conduct COIN operations. Such a deployment may be a unilateral action or part of a multinational coalition under the United Nations (UN) or other lead-nation or coalition arrangements.

4. In considering requesting Canadian military assistance, a national government or the UN is likely to delay such a request in the hope that the existing situation will improve so that

outside assistance will not be necessary. It should be expected, therefore, that any insurgency will be well established by the time Canadian troops are committed.

5. Even before a firm commitment is made by the Canadian government, and most certainly immediately following any public announcement, military leaders must work to ensure that the enablers and conditions needed to help ensure campaign success will be provided. As stated earlier, a COIN campaign requires a comprehensive approach, with the military working in support of other agencies in order to address the root causes of the insurgency. The involvement of other government departments and other agencies in the campaign planning, training and deployment to the campaign and their long-term commitment to the campaign will be essential for success. Given the military's unique understanding of COIN campaigns and the principles by which they should be conducted, commanders must be prepared to take a lead in encouraging the government to set these conditions for success in the campaign.

402. THE PRIMACY OF HOST NATION POLICIES

1. A COIN campaign must be conducted in accordance with an agreed, pervasively applied national policy of the host nation (HN) and indigenous government. They must take the lead in the campaign. In the case of a failed, failing or re-established state, an interim government mandate and its military campaign must be in accordance with any mandate issued by the international organization sponsoring the overall campaign and coalition.

2. In situations in which the indigenous government is nascent and only developing, it must be mentored and brought to the fore in the public eye to the greatest extent possible. This will give legitimacy to the campaign and to the indigenous government, and, ideally, a sense of pride and ownership amongst the populace. Furthermore, even a nascent government will be able to provide advice to coalition leadership regarding the perceptions and attitudes of its own population and their view of coalition actions.

3. All actions and restrictions arising from strategic policy affecting the nation, its population and resources must be carefully explained to the populace. Similarly, the operations of the security forces must be seen to stem from national policy.

403. THE PRIMACY OF LAW

1. The legal framework within which COIN operations may be conducted will almost certainly change from situation to situation, but the primacy of the law cannot be usurped by military action. Where the national or mandated government maintains control of the country or parts of the country, it should determine the policy and priorities for COIN operations and the restoration of legitimate government.

2. If martial law or emergency powers are enacted, these measures should be temporary in nature and their purpose must be clearly explained to the people of the host nation. Such a decision must be made carefully, for it will be readily exploited by insurgent propaganda as an example of the unjust policies of the government.

3. These facts dictate that the highest level of government develop and distribute a strategic message which pervades down to the lowest tactical level. Furthermore, restoration of legal normalcy is a decisive factor.

SECTION 3
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, the ultimate objective will be achieved by a combination of complementary objectives under the overall direction of the highest civilian authority. These objectives, which will address the root causes of the insurgency, will be achieved through:

a. political policy that will develop responsible governance, a competent civil service and politically subordinate security forces;

b. economic policy that will create enduring and pervasive wealth to meet basic needs and expectations;

c. social programmes that seek to develop current and future generations; and

d. security operations that create a framework in which other elements of power may operate and foster the development of indigenous forces to assume and fulfil their own security requirements.

2. In a COIN campaign, strategic centres of gravity will be segments of the population (generally the majority) and their support for the campaign. There will be a competition over the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the broad mass of indigenous people.[41] The domestic populations of troop contributing nations and their will to support a long-term campaign will also be a strategic centre of gravity, which the insurgents will try to influence, mainly through attacking their will by inflicting a heavy cost on the coalition forces. Other strategic centres of gravity may be individuals or groups who are moral centres of gravity.

3. The identification of centres of gravity becomes more complex at lower levels of command, where subordinate commanders must deal with regional, sub regional and local political, economic, social and military issues and influences. All activities, regardless of the level at which they are conducted, must work to support the strategic and operational objectives through the identified centres of gravity.

4. Although centres of gravity remain vital considerations in campaign and operational planning, they cannot be the sole focus. Campaigns must focus on the strategic and operational objectives that must be reached or created in order to realize the desired end-state. These objectives will be reached through, or at least in relation to, the identified centres of gravity. Given the nature of counter-insurgencies, this will in many cases be conducted on the psychological plane vice only the physical plane of physical attack and defence.

5. In certain situations, the insurgency itself may have become complex enough to be considered as a combination of groups of insurgencies, perhaps with shifting alliances and varying degrees of competition within and amongst groups. The insurgency in Iraq during 2004–2005 is an example of this. Although planning will require perhaps greater complexity and detail, plans should continue to apply the guiding principles for COIN campaigns.

6. In a campaign in a foreign country, the objectives of the Canadian military will be influenced by the policies of the host nation, the Government of Canada and the capabilities and limitations of any coalition partners, be they military or other elements of power. The overall aim is to create a situation in which the coalition military is no longer needed and the indigenous security forces can provide a reasonable level of security, other agencies are capable of

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[41] COIN forces will need to gain and maintain the support of the broad mass of the indigenous populace. For their part, insurgents only need to intimidate or exhaust the will of the local populace to resist the insurgency.

operating securely and can eventually pass development and aid issues to international and/or indigenous agencies, and Canadian involvement may be withdrawn in the confidence of an enduring solution.

SECTION 4
THRESHOLD CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONSIDERATIONS

1. It is vital the political and military leaders recognize the development of an insurgency whilst it is still in its early stages. During this threshold period, key decisions will be made that will either alleviate the crisis and pre-empt the insurgency or worsen and inflame the situation. Ideally, the effects of decisions and actions will be carefully considered before they are implemented.

2. As a political and social situation deteriorates and an insurgency develops, the host nation government may face a series of threshold circumstances. These will manifest in a manner difficult to recognize, as a range of seemingly unrelated events such as politically motivated strikes within key industries or demonstrations with potentially subversive political undertones. Recognizing these actions as insurgent activity may be difficult because many of these incidents occur with no subversive intent in normal times and no threat of violence. Indeed, any related violence may be dismissed by some as simply criminal activity and an attempt made to disassociate it from any political motivation.

3. Although one must be careful not to assume an insurgency exists where it does not, the dismissal of a nascent insurgency as mere criminal behaviour is the surest way of fuelling it. Such dismissal adds to the insurgent's narrative of subjugation and overall legitimacy and provides political leaders with an excuse to ignore the root causes of the discontent underpinning any growth in the insurgency.

4. In dealing with a developing insurgency, all restrictive measures—curfews and restrictions on movement, or in an extreme case, detention without trial—place a strain on democracy, and any decision to introduce them must not be made lightly. Insurgent incidents often bring a public demand for extreme measures as the populace seeks security. Simultaneously, the insurgent, through his actions, intends for the government, military and security forces to respond in a repressive manner. This must be avoided at all costs, as an ill-considered response will heighten the effectiveness of the insurgent campaign.

5. The government may conclude that a combination of selective legislation and small-scale, precision security force operations would stand a good chance of nipping the insurgency in the bud. In practice, however, crossing that threshold is seldom easy, as sensitivity to potential domestic and international repercussions firmly inclines a government towards the deferment of painful decisions.

6. During this threshold period, the government will monitor the situation in the strategic environment. If it deteriorates, relevant departments and ministries, such as National Defence and Foreign Affairs in Canada, will begin contingency planning. This will include informing the respective ministers of possible capabilities, options and restrictions within the context of the insurgency's perceived causes and objectives. From this initial planning, a strategic directive should be prepared,[42] setting out the government's policy and objectives as the basis for campaign design and a basis for the comprehensive approach to engage with political, military, economic and social issues. The government should begin to bring together the military with

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[42] B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations,* dated 2000-12-18. See Chapter 3 "The Campaign Plan," especially Section 1 "Campaign Design," article 301," The Strategic Environment," pg. 3-1.

the other elements of power and national and international organizations needed to resolve the crisis and conduct a successful campaign.

7. Although such a scenario is likely to develop gradually as the seriousness of the threat becomes obvious, there are a number of issues that would be particularly beneficial to military planners, should the government give them early consideration. These include, but are not limited to, formulating a long-term political aim, integrating and expanding the requisite intelligence and security services and establishing a multi-agency framework for the planning and conduct of security and other operations requiring civil, police and military cooperation. Naturally, such efforts would be expanded should the situation continue to deteriorate.

SECTION 5
MILITARY COMMITMENT

1. Guided by the national strategic directive, the Canadian military will develop a military strategy and campaign plan, which is a subset of national strategy. The degree of preparation enabled by this military strategy and campaign plan during this early stage will determine the ease of deployment and subsequent operations for Canadian troops. The earlier that liaison is established between the Canadian Forces, government agencies, coalition and local forces, and the more integrated the planning that has taken place beforehand, the smoother the deployment will be.

2. In the simplest of terms, the aim of military intervention is to restore the situation to the point at which the host nation police and security forces are able to maintain law and order. At the same time, the military will provide the security framework within which other agencies may be able to operate in order to restore essential services and help develop indigenous government capacity. Initially, the security situation may be such that the military must assume additional roles such as the re-establishment of essential services and emergency humanitarian relief. As the security situation improves, these responsibilities should be assumed by other organizations better suited to undertaking them. Concurrent with this must the hand-over of security responsibilities to local authorities, ideally with a police lead. This will show progress, lend legitimacy to the campaign and government and restore a sense of normalcy in the society. A training and mentoring role may have to be adopted in order to develop the capability of the local security forces to assume these responsibilities.

3. There is always the risk that a deploying military force will replace rather than supplement local security forces. This situation must be avoided in the interests of maintaining the military in a supporting relationship with government, police and other agencies, both indigenous and international. This will lend legitimacy and support to both the campaign and the local forces themselves. It will be vital that a local face be given to any operation whenever possible. Additionally, this will help preserve the security forces' morale and their standing with the population they will have to serve upon the return to normalcy.

4. When acting within a coalition force, it will remain important to coordinate activities with the local authorities. This will avoid the image of occupation and ensure that an understanding of indigenous needs is gained and that planned operations and their effects are considered from a suitable cultural perspective.

5. When operating in support of a friendly government, the military must be seen to operate clearly in support of the civil power and not in isolation from it. This can be accomplished more readily if the local security forces are incorporated into military planning whenever possible, and the civil government is seen to be implementing those aspects of policy, planning and control which closely affect military operations.

SECTION 6
THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES

1. The strategic end-state should describe the withdrawal of all government agencies from the campaign, whilst the operational end-state will describe the conditions leading to the withdrawal of military forces.

2. The withdrawal phase of military disengagement may prove problematic. Whilst no government or military aspires to a protracted conflict, history provides scant few examples of short-lived counter-insurgencies. There is always the potential that public antipathy, manifest in widespread opposition to a deployment and demands for withdrawal, could form a strategic challenge to the government and the military to maintain the morale of the public and of military elements deployed and in training to deploy. The key element in achieving these objectives is a strategic public affairs programme.

3. Potentially, a domestic or international settlement may allow for a swift troop withdrawal. Nevertheless, the history of COIN indicates a greater probability for a prolonged struggle of the attrition of national will.

4. Because it is a political struggle on both the physical and psychological planes, a COIN campaign takes years to succeed and to reach a point at which the military commitment may hand-over to indigenous security forces and a normal force presence occur. Often the host nation government will only regain control of its disaffected territory area by area over time. This will necessitate a prolonged military withdrawal phase. This fact should be articulated at the start of the strategic planning process, and the campaign plan must anticipate it and reflect it.

ANNEX A
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONDUCT OF A COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

4A01. INTRODUCTION

1. Before any unit or component of the Canadian Forces (CF) may deploy on operations, commanders at all levels need to understand the legal foundation for the particular mission or operation to be undertaken. Generally, there are two legal regimes that govern the deployment of the CF on missions or operations outside Canada, including, for the purpose of this manual, counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. The first regime is the body of national, or domestic, law that provides the foundation for embarking on COIN operations. The second regime includes that large body of international law that governs the conduct of the CF during the execution of a COIN operation in another sovereign state.

4A02. NATIONAL, OR DOMESTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION

1. There are two sources of authority in national, or domestic, law that provide the legal foundation for the CF to engage in operations. The first source can be found in the *National Defence Act* (NDA). Sections 31 to 34 set out the authority of the government to place members of the CF on active service, either for the defence of Canada or the consequence of any action taken by Canada under the UN Charter, NATO treaty or other regional agreements. Those sections of the NDA also provide that all members of the Regular Force are liable to perform any lawful duty, and that members of the Reserve Force may be liable for lawful duty when called out by regulations (i.e., Class B or C reserve service). In addition, Part III of the NDA sets out the Code of Service Discipline. CF members on COIN operations are always subject to the Canadian military justice system.

2. The second source of authority within the national legal regime is the general authority of the government to engage in military activity under the rubric of crown prerogative. Crown prerogative is a residual royal power that is currently vested in the Governor-in-Council (i.e., the governor general of Canada acting on behalf of the cabinet) and provides the authority for the cabinet to order military deployments, engage in international expeditions, enter into international treaties and declare war without the constitutional requirement to refer the matter to Parliament.

4A03. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FOUNDATION

1. The second regime that provides a legal foundation for operations abroad is set out in international law. Under international law, Canada may engage in overseas operations in any of four possible sources of authority. The first source consists of the authority to conduct operations on the territory of another state by the request or consent of the host state. For the purpose of COIN campaigns, requesting states may ask Canada to provide military assistance in the form of equipment or training (e.g., Congo in the 1960s, Sierra Leone, Sudan) or humanitarian assistance to the host nation (e.g., Rwanda).

2. The second source of authority is found in the UN Charter. Each of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the charter contain specific authority to conduct a spectrum of operations with UN approval, and in the case of Chapter VIII, by regional arrangement. In the majority of cases, Canada will only engage in operations that are approved by the UN or under internationally recognized regional arrangements (e.g., International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]). Historically, Canada has not unilaterally engaged in expeditionary operations in another sovereign state.

3. A third source of authority is founded on the inherent right to self-defence, either collectively or in defence of Canadian sovereignty. Both of these legal authorities to engage in military operations are unlikely in a COIN situation, mainly due to the level of threat and slow-to-evolve nature of insurgencies. While unlikely, it is possible that a nation that is a member of a regional arrangement will request the assistance of another member nation to combat an insurgency (e.g., Australian assistance to the UK COIN operations in Malaya).

4. A fourth and recently developing source of authority to engage in international missions can be found in the principle of humanitarian intervention. While not universally accepted, humanitarian intervention provides that a state may intervene in the internal affairs of another state on the conditions that there is widespread humanitarian distress, the host nation is unwilling or unable to deal effectively with the crisis, and the existing international organs have failed to act. Humanitarian intervention must be limited in time and scope, and the intervening force must withdraw once the situation is stabilized.

4A04. LAWFUL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN A COIN CAMPAIGN

1. Once the government has decided to engage in COIN operation under one or more of the authorities explained above, the law of armed conflict governs the conduct of the CF during the mission. It is well settled in COIN doctrine that maintaining the confidence of the legitimate government and the citizens of the country suffering the insurgency is crucial to continued military and governmental success. To that end, the conduct of the CF must be above reproach when engaging in operations against the insurgents. Any real or perceived breach of the law of armed conflict will undermine the legitimacy of the COIN campaign and those forces conducting it. History has shown that once the citizens have lost the confidence of the military forces engaged in COIN operations, their sympathies and support will be transferred to the insurgents.

2. There is a robust international and domestic legal regime controlling the conduct of CF units and members on operations. Apart from the protections offered by the domestic law of the host nation, international law sets out the standard of conduct in non-international conflicts. The CF will always conduct operations within the parameters of international law. For COIN operations, Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the Geneva Conventions provides protection to victims of non-international armed conflict by applying the humanitarian principles found in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions to non-international conflicts.

3. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions is the absolute minimum standard of treatment, and it states that persons not taking part in hostilities must be treated humanely and without discrimination. Specifically, they must not be subject to violence to life or person, being taken as hostages, subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment. If charged with a crime, they must be afforded the judicial protections commonly guaranteed by civilized nations. Finally, if wounded or sick, they must be collected and cared for. The standard of treatment afforded by this article also applies to those insurgents, irrespective of their status under international law, who have been captured, surrendered or rendered *hors de combat* by wounds or sickness.

4. In addition, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has stressed direction to the CF to the effect that all persons detained by units or individuals of the CF must be accorded the standard of treatment provided by the 3rd Geneva Convention,[43] i.e., the standard of treatment afforded to a prisoner of war. Because CF personnel will treat all captured individuals as prisoner of war irrespective of subsequent determination of their status, using labels such as "unlawful

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[43] B-GG-005-004/AF-005 *Use of Force in CF Operations*, dated 2001-06-01.

combatants," "detainees" or "personnel under custody" to identify captured insurgents are irrelevant for the CF members involved with the capture, handling or treatment of detained insurgents.

5. The greatest leadership challenge in COIN operations is maintaining the moral high ground and the rule of law by resisting the provocations of the insurgents. History has shown that overreaction to insurgent provocation has led to breaches of the law of armed conflict, which in turn have provided valuable propaganda material to the insurgents, the loss of citizen support and ultimately mission failure. To avoid such a situation, commanders and units must be well disciplined, well trained and comfortable and confident with the rules of engagement.

6. While the legal foundation of the COIN operation may vary from situation to situation, the primacy of the rule of law must never be displaced. CF personnel must conduct operations within the accepted international norms of warfare and the Code of Service Discipline, irrespective of the type of operation.

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CHAPTER 5
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY

If the long-term political objective is not first in the mind of all participants, there will be a tendency to adopt short-term, ad hoc measures in response to insurgent or terrorist activity.

—Sir Robert Thompson

SECTION 1
JOINT AND COMBINED ASPECTS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY

501. INTRODUCTION

1. The planning and conduct of counter-insurgency (COIN) at the operational level requires a realization by commanders and political leaders alike that the campaign requires a wide range of actors and elements of power and cannot involve the military alone. Indeed, in most areas of activity, or lines of operation, the military will have a supporting role to other elements of power and international organizations.

2. Despite this supporting role, military commanders will likely take the lead in campaign planning, including the incorporation of other elements of power into the campaign plan. This may occur within a formal command structure, within a cooperative, consensual arrangement or within a combination of arrangements. Regardless, the approach to the campaign must be comprehensive, addressing the root causes of insurgency.

502. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

1. The demands of a COIN campaign call for the application of a comprehensive approach that sees the military working in conjunction with other agencies and elements of power to address the root, systemic causes of a crisis (including an insurgency) and to produce enduring outcomes in the campaign. The comprehensive approach is defined as "The application of commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular environment. Note: The comprehensive approach brings together all the elements of power and other agencies needed to create enduring solutions to a campaign."[44]

2. Many of the root causes of an insurgency cannot be addressed by military forces and require the application of international organizations (IOs) and other agencies and elements of power. The military must neutralize the insurgents through pre-emption, disruption and dislocation and create freedom of manoeuvre for these other agencies. Indeed, once the security situation has improved and can be maintained by indigenous forces, the military may even withdraw whilst these other agencies remain.

3. The campaign plan must reflect this comprehensive approach. Each line of operation will group together similar and related operational objectives and will likely involve a number of agencies. In many lines of operation, the military will have a supporting role. At times, such as in a line of operation dealing with security issues, the military may be the lead agency supported by other elements of power.[45]

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[44] Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.

[45] For more details regarding the comprehensive approach, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

4. Working with a comprehensive approach will require a unifying theme, manifested in a common end-state, a unity of purpose and, ideally, a unity of effort across all agencies. Much of this approach will be realized at the lower operational and tactical levels through military forces working hand-in-hand with other agencies.

503. COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. Military units tend to be trained, organized and equipped for combating conventional threats that are similar to themselves in terms of aims, structures and doctrine. A COIN campaign necessitates a somewhat different emphasis. Many activities conducted by military forces will seek to build confidence within a local populace and to convince them to support the campaign vice the insurgents. Thus the military will conduct influence activities. These will be activities that have first-order psychological effects in order to affect the understanding and perceptions (i.e., the minds) of the populace and even the insurgents themselves and to ultimately affect their will and behaviour (i.e., their hearts).

2. These influence activities may be short-term psychological operations and public affairs or longer-term civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) related undertakings. Many stability operations, such as the construction of infrastructure or the training of indigenous forces, may be considered part of influence activities.

3. Influence activities are combined with fires—physical activities with first order physical effects—to form the concept of comprehensive operations: the deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects. The campaign theme, together with the situation at hand, will dictate the balance that is struck between fires and influence. They are planned and conducted in a synchronized and complementary manner and coordinated through manoeuvre and battlespace management (see Chapter 1 and Figure 1-4).

4. Together, fires and influence create effects on the physical and psychological planes respectively and should be planned to support operational objectives. Many of these influences will be conducted with or through other agencies that are best suited to meet humanitarian and governance demands, thus realizing a comprehensive approach (see Figure 5-1).




Figure 5-1: The Comprehensive Approach and Comprehensive Operations

5. The application of fires to neutralize the insurgents will ideally be done with indigenous forces in order to develop their capabilities and to enhance the legitimacy of the campaign. In conducting the engagement of the insurgents, commanders must come to appreciate and avoid undesired effects. The creation of collateral damage and civilian casualties, for example, will do much to undermine the operational objectives and overall legitimacy of the COIN campaign and will greatly detract from influencing minds and hearts. Thus planning must be done with this in mind.

6. Planning of tactical-level activities must always be done in order to support the stated operational objectives. The combination of fires and influence will support the neutralization of the insurgent and the separation of him from his sources of strength. Fires and other physical activities will separate the insurgent from his physical support, whilst influence activities, through public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and other capabilities, will separate him from his moral support and ideally neutralize his influence on indigenous and other populaces.

7. COIN will be conducted through a joint and combined command intimately linked with civilian political activities and other agencies. The shift in emphasis from the destruction of enemy manoeuvre forces to a balance between fires and influence requires greater awareness of intelligence, information and the socio-cultural milieu of the area of operation. In order to gauge how influence messages will be perceived and understood and thus create the desired effect, commanders must come to understand the overall environment, its systems and its overall culture.

8. Commanders must consistently emphasize the minimum use of force rather than maximum firepower, with consideration of both primary and secondary effects, in order to maintain legitimacy and avoid providing material for insurgent propaganda. All of these factors will require a greater degree of cooperation and unity of effort across all agencies from all participating countries, with a more diverse range of civilian and security force actors to deal with than is customary to many within the military.

9. Structurally, organizations at the operational level will mirror those civil and military arrangements created at the strategic level, thus ensuring continued joint and combined integrity throughout the various levels of command. Military leaders at the operational level will

continue to ensure that military efforts remain subordinate to political-civil constraints and requirements. This will hold true regardless of the shifting effort and emphasis as the insurgency evolves.

10. At the operational level and below, the comprehensive approach, with its integration of multiple agencies to create enduring solutions to the insurgency, may be realized and implemented through the creation of civil-military transition teams.[46] These teams or groupings combine military and other agencies to undertake a wide variety of tasks that focus on reconstruction, governance and development. They may include a range of government departments and international organizations supported by the military. Their overall tasks will include essential services, sustainable development, infrastructure and governance development. The military's role may be wide ranging, particularly in the early stages, but as a minimum will likely include security, escort, liaison duties as well as the provision of expertise in fields such as engineering.

11. These teams should be considered manoeuvre elements not in terms of combining firepower and movement but in terms of psychologically out-manoeuvring the insurgents to dislocate the insurgents and create lasting stability. They bring a customizable, multi-faceted capability to the campaign, which will create effects in support of operational objectives. They may work along a single line of operation or along a number of lines of operation.

504. COMMAND SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES[47]

1. The command and control structures adopted for a COIN campaign should include the wide variety of agencies and elements of power needed to successfully prosecute the campaign. These may be formal or informal arrangements. In either case, they must be based on a unity of purpose and common end-state and include the various elements of power needed to address the causes and aggravating factors of the insurgency.

505. SINGLE COMMANDER SYSTEM[48]

1. In a single command construct, the chairman or director of the coordinated effort is in overall command of the campaign. In this system, policy and executive authority are vested in a single commander, usually a military officer, with senior civil service, police and subordinate military commanders as advisers. The system requires a perceptive and charismatic (team building) commander. Whether military or civilian, the commander will be acting on behalf of the government and will have a variety of military and civilian advisers. The executive authority of

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[46] Civil-military transition team is defined as: "An organization designed to integrate and coordinate interagency and multidisciplinary efforts within a given geographic region. Note: Its purpose is to develop capacity in local agencies and institutions in order to promote long-term stability. It may be referred to as a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in some theatres" (submitted to the Army Terminology Panel, September 2007). The use of (PRTs) during the campaign in Afghanistan is an example of civil-military transition teams.

[47] "This section and the concept of single and committee command structures are based in part on the work of General Sir Frank Kitson. See: Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber and Faber, 1977: *passim.*"

[48] A recent example of a single command system can be found in the Australian command construct used in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), initiated in 2003. In this case, a civil servant/diplomat led the mission with the military and police elements subordinate to him in a single command structure even though the military contributed the majority of the forces deployed. It is important to note, however, that the style of command used was highly cooperative in nature. See: Russell Glenn, COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon Islands, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007).

the commander must be well understood by all subordinate commanders, be they civil or military.

2. A single command system will best suit a single nation's contribution to a campaign (even as part of a larger coalition) or that of a closely knit coalition.

3. Although a single command system may exist, there will be important contributors to the campaign that will not come under this command system. These may be international agencies, private volunteer organizations, private business and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Ideally, they will share a unity of purpose and close coordination will be a common practice.

4. Within a nation's campaign contribution, a single command system should allow the application of a comprehensive approach at all levels of command, with an appropriate mix of military and civil elements of power at various levels of command (see Figure 5-2, which is a theoretical example only).




Figure 5-2: Example of a Possible Single Command System

506. COMMITTEE SYSTEM

1. It may not be possible, particularly when dealing with a coalition, to form a single command system across different civilian and military agencies. In such a case, committees may be formed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to coordinate all COIN objectives and activities across all elements of power and lines of operation.

2. A committee lead, normally the civil administration, provides the chairman of the highest-level committee, thus linking joint forces and other elements of power. Subordinate committees may be formed to group together similar elements of power between international and indigenous powers.

3. The organization of committees may reflect **thematic lines of operation** in the campaign plan. Committees are replicated at each level—national regional and local—as appropriate.


4. The police and the military provide members to the various security operations committees at each level—national, regional and local—in the administrative and command hierarchy. These must include elements of indigenous forces, particularly if they are mature and reliable. The ability of indigenous forces, both police and military, to provide intelligence and situational awareness cannot be underestimated.

5. Other elements of power, such as judiciary reform institutions and infrastructure development organizations, may form their own cooperative committees with indigenous input or leadership at national, regional and local levels in order to coordinate and harmonize actions. Military forces may also be represented at these non-military committees in order to coordinate support (e.g., engineer expertise, security and transport) and provide situational awareness.

6. Decisions are made jointly and implemented by the chairman and members through their own civil service, police and military command. At various levels, the committees may also include lead administrators from various NGOs and international bodies providing support to the operation (such as the UN special envoy, United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] coordinator, etc.). The structure of the committees must be flexible and altered to suit the circumstances at hand. A national police command and civilian intelligence agencies, both indigenous and foreign, may be able to support.

7. While the committees at various levels will guide and coordinate operations, military commanders at all levels must be prepared to exploit fleeting opportunities in order to do damage to the insurgency movement. In simple terms, time may not exist to refer potential military actions back to a committee. Any military action taken, however, must be fully in concert with the overall strategy of the COIN operation, use the minimal force necessary, support the campaign objectives and avoid undesired effects that will undermine the legitimacy of the campaign.

8. Under a committee system, arrangements will become fairly ad hoc and change over time. Nations contributing to a coalition will determine the level of commitment and the levels and regions in which they will participate, be it a military commitment, a civilian commitment or a combination thereof.



Notes:

1. Structure is representative only. Actual structure will depend upon the situation and environment.
2. The committees may be designed to relect potential lines of operation.
3. Subordinate Committees are replicated at regional and local levels.
4. In a supporting coalition situation, committees will blend indigenous and coalition elements, along with elements of international organisations such as the UN, EU, World Bank, etc.

Figure 5-3: Example of a Committee System for a COIN Campaign

SECTION 2
THE PLANNING OF THE COIN CAMPAIGN

507. OPERATIONAL CAMPAIGN PLANNING

1. The COIN principles identified for the successful conduct of operations, as detailed in Chapter 3, must be clearly understood. They form the backdrop to the campaign plan and continue to be applied through all levels of command and integrated into daily operations. Developing the military aspects of a COIN plan depends on many factors but typically involves the securing of a firm base from which to operate. Once this base is established, military forces should then seize the initiative in separating the insurgent from the supporting population in order to support the government's subsequent activities.

2. The nature of a COIN campaign and the demand to use a comprehensive approach calls for all elements of power needed in the campaign to be involved, to the greatest extent possible, in the development of the campaign plan.

508. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO CAMPAIGN PLANNING

1. An effects-based approach will be used in the development of the campaign plan.[49] The effects-based approach is defined as "a planning philosophy combined with specific processes that enable firstly, the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a comprehensive approach with other elements of power, and secondly, the realization of operational objectives."[50] In simple terms, an effects-based approach ensures that the military activities are integrated with those of other agencies and that military activities are directly linked to operational objectives—the results or effects of the activities directly contribute to operational objectives.

2. The campaign plan for a COIN campaign must span a considerable length of time in order to be realistic and address the systemic causes that led to the crisis. Once devised, the campaign plan is implemented through a series of operational plans that are constantly reviewed and issued on a continual basis. Assessment of the situation, the environment and campaign progress is continuous and informs subsequent iterations of the operational plan. Each successive operational plan adjusts operations to reflect the progress made in the campaign. This is illustrated in figure 5-4.

EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONAL DESIGN




Figure 5-4: Model of a Campaign Plan and Supporting Operational Plans

3. In dealing with an effects-based approach and specifically with a COIN campaign, the normal taxonomy used in campaign planning must be expanded.[51] The campaign plan must

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[49] For more details on the effects-based approach, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations.*

[50] Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.

[51] For the purposes of a military lexicon, effects are simply considered the results of activities. They may occur as first order effects on the physical or psychological plane or on both planes when second order effects are considered. For more details, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations.*

work towards a desired and well articulated operational end-state that supports the strategic end-state and objectives. Such an operational end-state should envisage the termination of all, or at least the majority of, military involvement in the campaign and a prevailing security situation that allows other elements of power to operate freely and is maintained by indigenous forces at a sustainable operating level. The campaign plan begins with an articulation of this operational end-state.

4. From this operational end-state, the commander and planning staff determine key centres of gravity, operational objectives that will support the end-state, supporting effects that will realize operational objectives and finally the activities (assigned through the operational plans) that will create those supporting effects. This is illustrated in the figure below.




Figure 5-5: Model for the Development of an Effects-Based Campaign Plan

5. The basic steps in completing such a campaign plan are as follows:

a. **Review the Situation**. The operating environment will be complex, and a wide range of factors—political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), informational and infrastructure—will need to be analyzed for their power structures and influences upon the successful outcome of the campaign. This will form **the broad knowledge base** that will inform the remainder of the operational and tactical planning process.

b. **Identify and Analyze the Problem**.

(1) The commander and staff conduct a mission analysis to establish both the mission and the operational end-state. Initial operational objectives may also be identified.

(2) The staff conducts a detailed evaluation of the factors, building upon the broad knowledge base. Based upon the operational end-state and objectives, centres of gravity may be identified. Other operational objectives and the supporting effects needed to create them may also be identified at this point.

(3) The commander and senior staff conduct analysis of the factors to discern the major building blocks of the campaign plan. They will select and analyze the **centre(s) of gravity** that dominate the situation along with their critical requirements and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, they will confirm the desired operational end-state. Based on the key centre(s) of gravity, the commander will determine the operational objectives needed to achieve the end-state. Analysis will occur throughout in order to confirm the validity of decisions. At this point, the commander should have identified coherent operational objectives focused on the operational end-state and addressing the key centre(s) of gravity. The commander will issue planning guidance to his staff.

c. **Frame the Campaign Plan and Initial Operational Plan (OPLAN).** With the building blocks decided, the campaign plan may be devised.

(1) For the campaign plan, operational objectives may be grouped into thematic lines of operation, which allow commanders and staff to visualize the progress and direction of the campaign. The lines of operation will indicate where the military has primacy and where it supports other instruments of power. Note that all lines of operation, regardless of the primary agency involved, move towards the operational end-state. Once this framework is established, commanders and staff may determine supporting effects or decisive points that create the operational objectives. Measures of effectiveness[52] are also determined. Commanders and staff must realize that many of the desired effects in a COIN campaign will take **extensive periods of time** to realize, for they relate to changes in understanding, perceptions and will mainly in relation to supporting a campaign.

(2) Whilst the campaign plan depicts the long-term process, the near-term requirements to commence the plan must be considered. Thus the campaign plan is initiated through an operational plan (OPLAN), which is updated and adjusted regularly to meet changes to the environment (see Figure 5-4). The commander and staff select the decisive points that are most relevant to the immediate situation and that must be achieved before others can be achieved. Selection and prioritization of decisive points will generate options, each of which will provide a potential framework for an OPLAN. Based on his intuition, the commander will select an option to decide which decisive points will be developed first. A broad, outline scheme of manoeuvre may be developed.

d. **Develop and Validate Courses of Action (CoAs).** The broad direction and scheme of manoeuvre issued by the commander must now be

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[52] Measure of effectiveness (MoE) is defined as "A criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected selected system behaviour or capabilities over time" (Army Terminology Panel, May 2006).

developed into detailed courses of action. The decisive points / supporting effects chosen for initial development will be analyzed to determine what activities are needed to create them. This is done by staff in collaboration with specialist advisors, such as cultural or political advisors, and subordinate headquarters. The activities may be arranged in different courses of action that will lead to the realization of the decisive points. Courses of action may be developed and compared in terms of activity, resources, time and space.

e. **Course of Action (CoA) Evaluation**. Each potential CoA is evaluated and compared using a number of means in order to determine the most feasible and likely of success. In doing so, the validity of selected decisive points may also be examined to determine if they are deliverable and realistic within the constraints of resources.

f. **Commander's Decision and Plan Development**. Once the CoAs for the OPLAN have been compared and assessed, the commander may select or develop the CoA most likely to be successful in terms of creating the required decisive points / supporting effects.

6. The extant taxonomy for campaign planning must be expanded beyond the concepts dealing with conventional forces linked to geographical features and become broader concepts in order to support the objectives and environmental issues relevant to a COIN campaign. The expansion of campaign planning taxonomy should incorporate the need to create operational objectives that involve more than simply military forces operating against other military forces:

a. **Lines of operation** should be considered as thematic groupings of operational objectives and their supporting effects. They connect and drive activities to meet operational objectives and ultimately the operational end-state in relation to identified centres of gravity.

b. **Centres of gravity** remain vital in the development of a campaign plan and will dictate the development of operational objectives.[53]

(1) Centres of gravity should be considered capabilities, based on groups or individuals, that can create effects. They may be physical, such as an enemy armoured reserve, or they may be moral, such as a charismatic religious leader. Centres of gravity will have characteristics and localities of importance but must be considered as a capability to be affected or influenced.

(2) Centres of gravity at the strategic and operational levels must be identified and considered in the development of the campaign plan.

(3) Generally, within a COIN campaign, strategic centres of gravity are populations and their support of the campaign. The population of the region or nation in question is a centre of gravity over which the insurgents and the COIN elements will fight for support. The domestic populations of any troop contributing nations will also be centres of gravity, which the insurgents will attempt to intimidate and convince not to support the campaign.

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[53] Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 defines a centre of gravity as "Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight."

(4) Operational objectives can be devised based on strategic and operational centres of gravity. If a population mass and its support is a key centre of gravity, then operational objectives will seek to create the conditions—a responsible government, sustainable infrastructure, etc.—that will gain and hold their support.

(5) At an operational level, centres of gravity may be regional governments and leaders whose competence and legitimacy in providing support and security to their populations will be vital. Other centres of gravity may be regional groups or tribes whose support withdrawn from an insurgency may be key to long-term success.

(6) In attacking or defending these centres of gravity, there will be a requirement for comprehensive operations—the synchronized combination of fires and influence activities. Influence activities through public affairs, PSYOPS, CIMIC and presence, profile and posture are particularly important in terms of convincing population-based centres of gravity to reject the insurgency and support the COIN campaign.[54]

c. **Operational objectives** will not necessarily be terrain-linked objectives but more in the nature of decisive conditions that have both physical and psychological dimensions. They may be military and security related, or they may be related to governance, civil institutions and infrastructure. Thus many operational objectives will be reached or created by other elements of power, with the military in a supporting role or providing security and perhaps, given an early security situation, initial work. Operational objectives are the key building blocks of the campaign.

d. **Decisive points** may be considered those **supporting effects**—results of activities—that build to the operational objectives. For example, if, based on a desired end-state, an operational objective is the creation of a competent, politically subordinate military force, a decisive point or supporting effect required for this objective may be the creation of a military training centre and professional NCO corps. This supporting effect can then be created by the assignment of tactical activities, in particular, those dealing with security sector reform (see Figure 5-5). Several decisive points or supporting effects will likely be required to achieve an objective.

e. **Activities** are tactical activities and tasks assigned in order to create supporting effects or decisive points that together will realize operational objectives. In this manner, tactical activities are not conducted out of hand or from a preconceived template but are directly related to operational objectives.

7. Once operational objectives have been identified, they may be grouped together in thematic lines of operation. The figures below indicate an example of lines of operation for a campaign.

[54] For more details with respect to influence activities, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

NOTE

These are examples only and should not be considered a template for a COIN campaign.

8. During the campaign planning process, it is vital that appropriate measures of effectiveness be determined in order to measure progress in creating supporting effects / decisive points and their related operational objectives.





Figure 5-6: Example of Lines of Operation for a Campaign Plan



OPERATIONAL END STATE

A lasting peace in which the threat of violence and civil war has been removed and Nation X has stable political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure, governance and regional leaders, providing prosperity and security for all of its people.

Figure 5-7: Example of Lines of Operations, Operational Objectives and Decisive Points / Supporting Effects

509. CAMPAIGN ASPECTS UNIQUE TO A COIN CAMPAIGN

1. Although the development and conduct of a COIN campaign at the operational level will follow the same general process as that for any other campaign, there are several aspects that warrant special consideration. These are reflective of the philosophy and principles unique to a COIN.

2. The importance of these unique aspects or factors cannot be overstated. Failure to understand and consider them will ignore the principles for COIN and thus potentially lead to campaign failure.

510. COLLABORATIVE PLANNING

1. By its vary nature a COIN campaign will require a **comprehensive approach** so that elements of power other than the military may address and solve the underlying causes of the insurgency and morally separate the insurgency from its legitimacy and support base. Thus, many lines of operation and operational objectives will not only involve other agencies, but those agencies may well be the lead element.

2. To this end, these other agencies—be they government departments, international organizations or NGOs entering into the campaign in a spirit of cooperation—should be involved in planning for the campaign. This will pose some challenges to agencies, including the military,

which are accustomed to working in isolation or working without a formal plan at the operational level. Military commanders may have to take the lead and carefully explain to other organizations the reasoning and process behind collaborative campaign planning. This will be necessary whether the campaign hierarchy is based on a single command system or a committee system.

3. In the early stages of the campaign, the security situation may be such that only the military forces are able to operate. In such cases, some lines of operation that would normally have a civilian agency lead may be assumed by the military in order to commence work, to develop legitimacy for the campaign and to garner public support through the demonstration of tangible progress. Restoration of essential services may be a case in point. In such cases, the military activities should be supportive of likely future work by other agencies. Collaborative planning before the deployment will help ensure this complementary aspect of activities.

511. OPERATIONAL CENTRE OF GRAVITY—INSURGENT SUPPORT

1. Strategically, a small number of centres of gravity will exist. Within the nation itself, these will likely be limited to the following possibilities:

  a. the bulk of the population, their support for the COIN campaign and their rejection of the insurgency;

  b. the host government (members and structures) and their perceived legitimacy amongst the populace, their capability and their physical and moral superiority to the insurgents; and/or

  c. any individual national leader who has pervasive influence across the nation as a moral centre of gravity.

2. Gaining the support of the population will require effective political action, a safe and secure environment and socioeconomic programmes that serve to substantively improve the day-to-day lives of the people.

3. Operational centres of gravity for insurgents will likely be various groups of individuals who support the insurgency. This may be a particular tribe or clan in a region known to forego recognition of a central government or one that has been marginalized by a central authority. Another operational centre of gravity may be an external supporter supplying resources to the insurgent forces.

4. Each centre of gravity will have to be analyzed in order to determine its critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities. These may be physical, moral or a combination. For example, a specific tribe supporting an insurgency may have done so out of historic marginalization by a central government. If assessed as an operational centre of gravity, it may be neutralized through a number of means: its grievances regarding political marginalization may be solved through political reform, its moderate leaders motivated and their images enhanced through PSYOPS, the tribe's tactical capabilities destroyed and hard line leadership either destroyed or marginalized to the point that they are no longer influential. Thus, a combination of fires and influence will be used to neutralize adversary centres of gravity.

5. It is from operational centres of gravity that the insurgents draw their freedom of action, physical strength and a portion of their will to fight. Although campaign planning must support the overarching effort against the insurgents' strategic centre of gravity, operational-level leadership must determine the relevant operational centres of gravity, analyze them and determine how best to neutralize them. Methods of neutralizing these centres of gravity may include destruction or disruption of insurgents' higher command and control structures, removal

of fear of reprisals amongst the general population or influence activities seeking popular support and legitimacy such as the provision of utilities and medical aid to society at large.

6. Analysis of operational centres of gravity will involve the same general process as any centre of gravity analysis; however, a greater emphasis must be placed upon centre of gravity capabilities and vulnerabilities on the psychological/moral plane, for the operational focus must be on influencing groups of people to reject the insurgency. Such an analysis will help inform the development of operational-level objectives and subsequent decisive points (supporting effects) and activities. This will require immense support from the intelligence community in terms of identifying and analyzing the various factors and influences in the environment in order to understand how best to engage, physically and psychologically, these centres of gravity and alter their behaviour in a manner desired.

7. Once this analysis is done, it will ultimately inform, shape and focus tactical-level activities and their links to operational-level objectives. In all cases, the indigenous population is the primary centre of gravity because no insurgency can survive amidst the hostile terrain of an unreceptive public. Other centres of gravity may include, but are not limited to, sources of financing, weapons and munitions, groups of supporters and their motivations and political conditions that fuel public grievances. Higher headquarters and national sources can provide valuable intelligence and information but will seldom be able to provide information of the requisite quality to conduct tactical operations. The operational planning process will therefore dedicate a significant amount of effort towards acquiring the information necessary to target the insurgents' centre of gravity.

512. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

1. Once the centres of gravity and their critical vulnerabilities and requirements have been identified and analyzed, operational objectives, lines of operation, decisive points (supporting effects) and activities to meet those decisive points may be determined. In short, the campaign plan may be developed.

2. Part of this process should include an analysis of the insurgent's own campaign plan. This will be part of the intelligence assessment. It should determine the insurgent's aims, intents and strategic and operational schemes of manoeuvre and thus should allow commanders to identify likely lines of operation and objectives for the insurgents. In turn, the COIN campaign's planned objectives, lines of operation, decisive points and activities should seek to counter **insurgent lines of operation** and pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the key pillars of the insurgent campaign plan. Some of those key pillars will be to target friendly centres of gravity. The commander must be aware of this fact and consider what actions may be required to counter-act these insurgent efforts.

3. Specifically, insurgents will try to capitalize on the role public opinion plays in democracies and will deliberately stage events and coordinate operations to undermine the will of domestic audiences of campaigning nations in order to cease their participation in the campaign. The domestic audiences of these nations and their support for the campaign are strategic centres of gravity that the insurgents will attack. Plans must be made and activities conducted to defend these centres of gravity. Part of this battle will consist of a proactive public affairs policy that seeks to highlight the legitimacy of the campaign to indigenous, domestic and international audiences and, above all, ensures that the domestic audience of a campaigning nation receives accurate and timely information regarding the campaign.

The support of the domestic public is critical to sustaining any COIN campaign the CF is tasked to undertake and is therefore a friendly centre of gravity. Technology now allows insurgents to more easily coordinate actions and effects and directly target the will of the public of coalition partners. Domestic public opinion can and will be targeted a number of ways, including media releases and interviews with Western media outlets, attacks timed and coordinated to coincide with specific events in coalition countries, and strategies aimed at causing rates of attrition unacceptable to coalition members. There are many historical and recent examples of insurgents targeting the will of an adversary's domestic public. General Vo Nguyen Giap specifically created a strategy that would target the will of the American public during the Vietnam War. More recently, the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004 likely altered national election outcomes and led to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. At both the operational and strategic levels planners must anticipate and plan to counter enemy lines of operation targeting friendly centres of gravity.

Sources: Michael Hennessy, *Strategy in Vietnam: the Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972*. Westport CT: Praeger, 1997, pp.128-129.

4. In short, the insurgents too will seek to influence key target audiences. Thus the commander must anticipate this with a combination of defensive and offensive information operations / influence activities. The former will seek to protect domestic populations, supportive indigenous groups and friendly forces from the insurgent propaganda and explain the nefarious motivations of his actions and atrocities. The latter—offensive influence activities—will seek to convince neutral or unsupportive target audiences to reject the insurgency and its aims.

5. All operational objectives, decisive points and related activities of the campaign plan should seek to undermine the physical and moral strength and legitimacy of the insurgents. Given that the successful outcome of a COIN campaign is linked to the psychological disposition of a population to support or reject an insurgency, destruction of the moral superiority and legitimacy of the insurgent must underpin all operational objectives, supporting effects and tactical activities. In doing so, the military will have a supporting role to other agencies and elements of power that can address social grievances, build campaign legitimacy and convince the populace to invest in and support the campaign.

6. The various lines of operation for a COIN campaign will depend upon the thematic groupings of the operational objectives. They may include such themes as security, governance and social and economic development, to name only some possibilities. These will be broad lines of operation containing a number of operational objectives and their related decisive points. For example, a governance line of operation may include objectives and decisive points in the area of economic and government development, the civil service, the judiciary and the penal system. A line of operation dealing with security may include objectives and decisive points regarding the military, paramilitary, constabulary, civil defence and border security, to name just a few possibilities (see Figure 5-8 below). Many of these will of course require elements of power other than the military to be successful. Thus, the campaign plan will incorporate a comprehensive approach.

7. Once the campaign plan has identified the operational objectives and required decisive points or supporting effects, then successive operational plans will assign the tactical activities needed to create the decisive points and subsequent objectives.

NOTE

Some decisive points may not be necessary depending upon the progress of a campaign.

THEMATIC LINES OF OPERATION							
Governance		**Security**		**Political Process**		**Reconstruction**	
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES							
Interim Governance Provided	**Self-Governance Established**	**Secure Environment Maintained**	**Self-Sustaining Security**	**Electoral Process Reformed**	**Elected Government Empowered**	**Key Restoration**	**Sustained Infrastructure Established**
DECISIVE POINTS/SUPPORTING EFFECTS							
Transitional government is established	Military control reformed	Provincial capitals secured	Militia B repatriated	Electoral process designed	Government structures reformed	Essential services re-established in all areas	Equitable control achieved
Provincial governments re-established	Police control reformed	Border crossings secured	Military training re-established	Ethnic leaders engaged	Political oversight of security institutions	Resource infrastructure secured	Accountability procedures in place
	Economic reforms for distribution	Militia B deterred	Police training re-established			Interim control of resources achieved	Enduring infrastructure re-built
		Militia B defeated if necessary					Sustained growth

Figure 5-8: Example of a Campaign Plan Showing Lines of Operation, Operational Objectives and Decisive Points / Supporting Effects

8. Once the campaign plan is developed, it must be revisited continuously, as insurgent activities and tertiary effects will cause decisive points and objectives to shift both in time and space. This shifting of decisive points and objectives may be addressed through the process of designing and issuing successive operational plans that seek to progress the campaign plan.

513. SUPPORTING AND TRANSITORY ROLE OF THE MILITARY

1. Throughout the COIN campaign, the military will generally have a supporting role. It will undertake actions to neutralize the insurgent—through pre-emption, disruption and dislocation—in order to allow manoeuvre space and freedom of action other elements of power need to bring a successful end to the campaign.

2. Depending upon the security situation in the early stages of a campaign, the military force may be the only element of power capable of working in the environment. Thus, it will be the supported force and will initiate action along as many lines of operation as possible. Much of this will be undertaken to neutralize the insurgent and seize the initiative but also to begin to

gain the understanding and support of the indigenous population. Thus the military can expect to undertake a combination of offensive, defensive and stability activities.

3. Offensive activities will seek to seize the initiative from the insurgent and pre-empt and disrupt his activities and influences. Defensive activities will seek to protect vital points, vulnerable elements of the population and the force itself. Stability activities will seek to disrupt the influence of the insurgent through area security and control, thereby establishing the conditions for other agencies to begin work and undertake initial reconstruction, governance and security sector reform (SSR) tasks in order to gain the support of the local populace.

4. As the security situation improves, the ability and requirement to conduct stability operations/activities will increase, and the military can expect to hand over some responsibilities to other agencies, be they police or civilian. It should also allow other lines of operation beyond the military's capability to commence. Ideally, as the security situation continues to improve, a greater proportion of the stability activities, including security and control, will be assumed by other agencies, be they foreign, international or indigenous. In the later case, this will also occur as indigenous capabilities are developed (see Figure 5-9).




Figure 5-9: Illustration of Transition of Stability Operations to Other Agencies

5. Early involvement of those other agencies in the campaign plan will ensure that initial military efforts in reconstruction, governance and security sector reform are done in accordance with long-term objectives. Although commanders cannot assume this transition too early in the campaign, the sooner it begins to occur, the greater will be the legitimacy of the campaign, for it should indicate an improvement to the security situation and government action to address the root social and/or economic causes of the crisis.

514. THE SUBORDINATE ROLE OF FIRES AND THEIR PHYSICAL EFFECTS

1. As discussed in earlier sections, the philosophy and principles of a COIN campaign demand that the enduring solutions to an insurgency will require campaigning elements to address the root and systemic causes of the insurgency and to not only physically neutralize the insurgent but to morally separate him from his support base and the population in general. Together, this will gain and hold the support of the mass of the populace and eventually cause the insurgency to wither.

2. To this end, offensive operations—fires and their physical effects—will only go so far. Regardless of how many successful engagements occur, it is highly unlikely that the insurgency will succumb in a permanent sense to attrition. Indeed, such attempts will likely drive more individuals to the insurgency and provide additional support for the insurgent's narrative and propaganda. This will be magnified in certain cultures that practise an eye-for-an-eye sense of retribution and justice.

3. The successful outcome of the campaign will require a greater emphasis on activities that influence a wide variety of target audiences, be they groups of individuals or key leaders who may be moral centres of gravity. The influence activities should seek to gain the support of the populace and will include in large measure stability activities that will solve the root economic/social causes of the insurgency, address political and civil development and enhance domestic services and security forces. Other influence activities, through PSYOPS and public affairs, should seek to pre-empt and dislocate that of the insurgents and protect the indigenous and domestic populations from insurgent propaganda. Properly conducted, these influence activities may even convince certain portions of the insurgent group to either convert to support the COIN campaign or at least enter a peaceful negotiation process.

4. Such influence activities will take extensive periods of time, even years, to produce tangible results. This will be a change for commanders accustomed to seeing the immediate results or effects of fires, who may demand immediate feedback considering the possibility of a relatively short period of time in theatre. However, acceptance of this subordination of fires and the realization that measures of effectiveness for influence activities take considerable time are essential for success in a COIN campaign.

5. In light of this then, the operational plans through which the long-term campaign plan is realized should not seek to resolve the campaign within a narrow time frame. Instead, they should analyze the current situation and environment and seek to make incremental progress towards the desired end-state that will set the conditions for the next operational plan to be issued.

6. The aim of military operations is to create a security framework that assists the host nation government and other agencies in re-asserting control throughout the country and in creating enduring solutions to the crisis. It is imperative that the civil administration be able to provide public goods and services in order that the people are given proof of the government's legitimacy and capability to govern. A security framework that pre-empts, dislocates and disrupts insurgent activity is a crucial enabler in achieving this imperative.

7. The military commander's task will not be as straightforward as is likely during conventional warfare. The operational planning process must take account of a wide range of political, economic, civil and security interests. This will ensure that the correct target audiences are engaged through the appropriate influence activities that also take into account cultural perspectives. These realities are reflected in the way in which operations are subject to the approval of the civil administration through the joint committee system or single command system. In most instances, the operational plan will aim to isolate and neutralize the insurgents

both morally and physically through simultaneously conducted and parallel political, social and military activities.

515. UNDERSTANDING EFFECTS OF ACTIVITIES AND THE COMPRESSION ACROSS LEVELS OF COMMAND

1. The nature of a COIN campaign sees the main effort focused on gaining and holding the support of the majority of the populace in contrast to them supporting the insurgent's will and end-state. Tactical activities, even at the lowest levels, in a COIN campaign generally occur amongst the populace for two reasons: they and their vital points must be secured against insurgent attack, and insurgents tend to hide and operate amongst the populace. Thus the effects of tactical activities are viewed and felt immediately by the very centre of gravity over which insurgents and counter-insurgents are fighting.

2. A result then is a compression across levels of command, in which tactical activities may have operational and strategic level effects. Thus the conduct of soldiers at a checkpoint, for example, may influence the perceptions of the whole populace with regard to the campaign and its legitimacy.

3. This compression across the levels of command must be understood at all rank levels. The need to consider and avoid undesired effects, such as collateral damages and civilian casualties, that will undermine campaign legitimacy and popular support must be considered in planning and avoided. At times, risks must be taken or short-term tactical success must be forsaken in order to avoid possible outcomes that will undermine support for the campaign.

516. WAR GAMING

1. Operational plans and their tactical activities must be war gamed in the same fashion as those for campaigns against conventional adversaries. However, the factors that must be considered in such COIN war gaming are more extensive and complicated.

2. Planning and subsequent war gaming must consider the political, military, economic, social (including religious and cultural), information and infrastructure related systems[55] in the environment along with the influence that each system will have on the outcome of the operation and campaign. Power structures and influential individual leaders must be identified and considered in the war gaming. Additionally, other agencies and their reactions to operational plans and activities must be considered.

3. To this end, war gaming will be fairly complicated, with staff and, ideally, experts and advisors considering the planned activities from the viewpoint of these various environmental systems and gauging their respective reactions. Such reactions must be informed by the cultural perspective of the environment or group under consideration. For this purpose, cultural and political advisors may be included in the war gaming process.

4. In this way, proposed courses of action at the operational and tactical levels may be considered in detail and in perspective of the local environment in order to help ensure that desired effects, both physical and psychological, are obtained and undesired effects are avoided.

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[55] This range of environmental systems may be abbreviated as PMESII systems.

SECTION 3
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

517. EXPANDING THE CAMPAIGN PRESENCE: PHYSICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY

1. The operational plans that are issued to implement and execute the campaign may be prosecuted in a number of ways. The concept of the campaigning COIN forces, and with them their security and control and other agencies working to the same end, spreading like a **tache d'huile** or **ink spot** over the contested environment is an effective, practical and methodical manner of achieving success in the campaign. In simple terms, it sees the expansion of the campaign and its influences, both physically and psychologically, throughout the environment, gradually dislocating the insurgent from his physical and moral support bases. This is particularly effective when parts of a territory or nation have been lost to insurgent control.

2. The process of spreading the presence and control of the government and its campaigning forces requires the comprehensive approach of all elements of power. This will thus address the security and social issues inherent to the insurgency and in turn will build legitimacy for the campaign and its forces and begin to influence the local populations to accept and support the COIN campaign.

3. In keeping with the philosophy and principles of COIN, political engagement will lead, followed by simultaneous military and social/economic engagement. All should be advertised and explained through information operations to the public audiences in order to influence the understanding, perceptions and will of the indigenous populations and to win their support for the campaign.

4. At every stage of the campaign plan implementation, local forces and agencies must be seen to be in the lead and at the forefront to the greatest extent possible. This will enhance their legitimacy and undermine insurgent claims that the COIN campaign is an occupation. Every advance of the "ink spot" should be done in consultation with national, regional and local authorities as appropriate.

5. As the deployment and manoeuvre of military forces cause insurgent activity and presence to be pre-empted, dislocated and disrupted in a new area, other agencies (but possibly the military initially) must undertake activities to relieve suffering, provide aid and essential services, address grievances and generally gain support for the campaign. Thus together, this will involve full-spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability operations.

6. The manoeuvrist approach taken to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the insurgents will involve both fires and influence activities (information operations) on the physical and psychological planes as detailed below:

a. Fires, or physical activities, will physically separate the insurgents from the populace by pre-empting their plans, dislocating their forces and presence in a population and disrupting their activities. Furthermore, military forces will directly target the insurgents in order to destroy or deter them and their influences whenever possible. Such activities must be done with a long-term view of securing the population, allowing for the return of normal levels of civil activity and deterring further insurgent actions.

b. Influence activities will seek to shape the understanding, perceptions and the will of a wide variety of targets—be they adversary, friendly or neutral—in order to gain and maintain support for the campaign:

(1) PSYOPS, through such means of radio stations and public messages, will inform the indigenous population as to the purpose of the mission and seek to undermine the narrative of the insurgents.

(2) Public affairs will support national and international media to ensure the truth is presented in a public forum regarding the expansion of the campaign and actions taken to support and protect the populace.

(3) CIMIC related projects will address essential services, emergency aid and other projects that will quickly impact upon the well-being of the populace, alleviate suffering and gain their support for the campaign.

(4) The profile, presence and posture of the forces, particularly those providing a framework security presence amongst the public, must be carefully considered. Forces should present hard targets to insurgents but be accessible to the population at large. Apart from gaining support, this may induce a flow of information on insurgent intentions and activities.

7. In such a manner, the insurgents will become not only physically, but psychologically, separated from the local populace (see Figure 5-10).

518. SECURING A FIRM BASE AND INITIAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING

1. It can be anticipated that the host nation government will have sufficient control of its territory to provide a secure base where reinforcing coalition contingents can build up and establish essential support elements. If this is not the case, an initial entry into the nation may establish a firm base or one can be found amongst a supportive element of the populace.

2. Consideration must be given to not overburdening the host nation with demands for administrative support. This can be best achieved through increased self-sufficiency by the deploying units. Incoming military formations and units should be deployed on the same geographical basis as the host-nation security forces, corresponding with the boundaries of the civil administration. It is possible, however, that the situation is deteriorated to such an extent that no area is safe from insurgent activity. It may therefore be necessary to hold some logistic assets afloat or in a third country while troops are committed to secure a base area. From this secure area, troops are deployed into hostile territory to begin the process of re-establishing control and security area by area.

3. From this firm base, the COIN forces will conduct planning in cooperation with the federal and/or regional political and civil authorities. This plan should layout the process for spreading control and presence into the next area to be secured. Such a plan must take a comprehensive approach and take into consideration all aspects of engaging in the new area, using comprehensive operations to physically dislocate and pre-empt the insurgents and to psychologically dislocate and disrupt them.

519. ENGAGEMENT OF THE LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

1. Once the plan has been agreed to by the national or higher regional government, the expansion into the new district or area may begin. This expansion should have an indigenous government lead to it. In beginning to make this expansion, the following should be undertaken or considered:

a. Key leaders in the area or district are engaged to develop a plan customized for that region and the group or groups of people contained within it. This

engagement must incorporate all leaders—be they elected, appointed or traditional—that wield influence and power within the population. The leaders will be able to identify the grievances and issues unique to that area, the expectations of the populace and the intent and capabilities of the insurgents in that area.

b. A comprehensive approach must be incorporated from the outset, which sees the military and other agencies planning the expansion hand-in-hand with local leaders. Thus, engagement of the local leaders must be conducted with all elements of power represented. Planning may follow the lines of operation developed in the campaign plan. Any committee system established at the higher national levels may be replicated at this local level in order to harmonize information and plans between levels of government. A formal committee should be established and regular meetings planned. This will support the coordination of all campaign activities, be they offensive, defensive or stability.

c. A specific assembly or committee may be developed with local stakeholders and power structures in order to identify the needs of the local populace from their perspective. This may include short-term projects and/or long-term developmental undertakings.

d. An information operations (influence activities) programme must be planned to advertise immediately to the populace this cooperation between indigenous government and COIN campaign forces.

e. If not already present, indigenous police forces must be brought into the area. Those already there should be enhanced if necessary. These local constabulary forces must be integrated into the local government and into the campaign plan. Wherever and whenever possible, they should have the lead in operations.

f. Quick-impact CIMIC projects may be conducted in order to relieve serious suffering, quickly gain the support of a local, perhaps wary, populace and to build campaign legitimacy. Military forces may undertake some of these projects, particularly if they are the only agency in the area. This will include simple but effective measures such as emergency medical care, medical clinics in villages or neighbourhoods, repairs to schools or orphanages and/or delivery of aid.

g. In addition to quick-impact projects, long-term development planning must begin. The root causes or grievances of the insurgency likely result from long standing and complicated social, political and economic issues that may be difficult to resolve. This may require extensive development in such areas as infrastructure, economic development and political reform.

h. Auxiliary security forces should be recruited and developed in these newly secured areas. This will add legitimacy to the campaign, help provide enduring security and help ensure a security vacuum is not created once campaigning forces move to the next area. Such forces will require significant support but will likely be able to provide excellent situational awareness and intelligence within their areas. The raising and training of these forces should not be done as an ad hoc measure once security forces arrive in the new area but should be part of the plan from the beginning, and forces specifically designated for this training and mentoring role should be allocated.

i. Simultaneous to the political engagement will be the establishment of a security force presence in the new area. Ideally, this will include an indigenous element.

The forces will establish a form of a forward operating base (FOB) within the area in order to support and realise the physical and psychological dislocation of the insurgent from the populace. These security forces will support other agencies and provide the security framework for their operations. Ideally, initial expansion will occur in areas traditionally loyal to the central government, where the population will readily rally back to its allegiance once it feels secure from insurgent actions and retributions.

(1) The selection of the area of the FOB must be one that can be consolidated quickly and used as a base for further operations designed to link up with the initial firm base and be able to spread government control and influences to other areas.

(2) Although an FOB is necessary, whenever possible military forces should live and work amongst the population. Although the security situation must be somewhat stabilized for this to occur, and that such a practice may entail a higher level of risk to personnel, it is the only sure way of developing solid relationships with the communities the security forces are trying to protect. The constant and prolonged use of FOBs will create in the minds of both the campaign forces and the indigenous populace a fortress mentality and posture that physically and psychologically separates the security forces from the population. This fact and perception must be avoided.

520. CLEAR AREA OF INSURGENT PRESENCE AND INFLUENCES

1. Once security forces have moved into an area and are supported by a political plan and scheme of manoeuvre in conjunction with indigenous forces, measures may be taken to clear the area of insurgent presence and influence.

2. Influence activities (information operations) must be exploited to morally separate the insurgents from the populace. This requirement to gain the support of the indigenous population must be understood down to the lowest rank levels, and all operations must be conducted with the ultimate goal in mind.

3. Daily contact with the local populace must also be used to gain valuable information regarding the insurgents, their aims and methods as well as any reasons as to their support amongst the populace. This will support the pursuit and engagement of the insurgents and inform other activities that will seek to undermine the moral claims of the insurgents and address root causes and grievances.

4. A combination of offensive and defensive operations will be used to directly pursue and engage the insurgents. Where deemed prudent, Special Forces may be used to conduct direct action.[56]

5. Wherever and whenever possible, indigenous forces should be seen to lead such offensive and defensive operations. If still developing, they may have to be mentored and continuously trained by specially designated observer and mentoring teams. Even if local forces are in a developing stage, they should still be involved and certainly consulted in terms of

[56] Direct action is defined as "A short-duration strike or other small-scale offensive action by special operations forces or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage to achieve specific, well-defined and often time sensitive results" (AAP 6).

situational awareness and intelligence information requirements. Particular caution may need to be used when considering the operational security limits and challenges of indigenous forces.

6. Local police must be developed and exploited as greatly as possible. They bring a sense of normalcy to the indigenous population and are significant sources of intelligence regarding local insurgent groups and their support bases. This is particularly true since insurgents often stem from or work with local criminal organizations, about which police forces should have detailed knowledge. As the security situation improves, the role and presence of indigenous police forces should be raised in order to give a visible sign of improvement and to free up military forces for other duties.

7. Depending upon the situation and capabilities of the constabulary, local police forces may be able to take the lead in pursuing and arresting insurgents whilst military forces assume the manpower-intensive tasks of vital point security and routine patrols.

521. GOVERNMENT LEAD IN THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS

1. Once a designated level of security and stability has returned to the local area, national and regional governments may take the lead in the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

2. This must be handled carefully. Any underlying cultural or ethnic tensions between competing groups must be managed and alleviated. As well, these groups cannot be returned without a coherent and comprehensive plan that provides for their continued security as well as for their welfare and sustainable employment. Displaced refugees will not stay, nor even begin to return, if they cannot feel secure and have a means of supporting themselves.

3. The return of refugees and IDPs will not only be a sign of returning normalcy and security but will breed additional security through their presence and support of the campaign.

522. CIMIC ACTIVITIES BY THE MILITARY

1. Even before non-military agencies arrive in the area to begin long-term development projects, military forces may begin the process to alleviate suffering, spark development and gain campaign support. Measures will involve quick-impact projects such as repairs to wells and the conduct of local medical clinics, remuneration for collateral damages, low-level employment schemes such as war damage repairs and checkpoint construction and delivery of basic tools for work and agriculture.

2. Much of these CIMIC activities should be planned in advance and started as soon as possible after expanding into a new area. Many of the initial supplies may be delivered quickly to theatre having been pre-planned as part of the campaign. Funds, resources and the authority to use them should be pushed prior to the actual requirement to the unit and sub-unit levels so that the quick-impact CIMIC projects may be designed to meet the needs of the immediate local populace.

3. Ideally, pre-planning with other agencies will allow these military lead projects to support the further development of larger projects by other elements of power in due course.

523. ESTABLISH LOW-LEVEL (COMMUNITY-BASED) DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS

1. The establishment of community-based development councils will allow local leaders the opportunity to guide the development in their local areas in order to meet local grievances and needs. These councils must bring together all agencies, including the military and political

leadership. This should ensure that not only are local needs met but that best use of resources is made and duplication and conflicts are avoided. The committee should be able to identify and vocalize priorities and specific projects.

2. Although the incorporation of local leadership is vital, care must be take to ensure that the support won by such development is support and legitimacy for the campaign and is not exploited by local leaders with their own agendas to gain support for themselves at the expense of the larger campaign.

524. DEVELOP SECURITY PRESENCE AND SET CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE SECURITY

1. Development can only be supported by a permanent security presence and stable state. The presence of security forces must be expanded in a logical and measured manner. As the security situation improves, security forces should be increasingly integrated into the local populace in order to avoid development of a fortress disposition and mentality and to further separate and dislocate the insurgent.

2. Local forces must play a key and ideally lead role. Their counsel will be vital in gaining accurate and timely intelligence from the local populace and in identifying insurgents amongst the local populace. Local security forces may require an ongoing training and mentoring regime.

3. Key to local forces will be the establishment or re-establishment of constabulary forces. The presence of police forces brings a certain sense of civil normalcy to a population. Furthermore, police are ideal for tackling the criminal elements and activities that routinely become part and parcel of an insurgency. The expansion of a police presence will see the creation of police posts and sub-stations throughout the area, which may be co-located with military forces for a certain amount of time.

4. Security forces should begin to raise auxiliary security forces, particularly such elements as auxiliary police services. These will consist of locals who know their own areas and populace the best and who have a vested interested in guarding stability and development. This raising of auxiliary forces should be part of the overall security sector reform process. Ideally, police training is conducted by civilian police forces as part of a comprehensive approach.

525. SET THE CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

1. Once security has been established, other agencies within the comprehensive approach should begin to create sustainable development. Agencies will include other government departments (both indigenous and those of supporting nations), international organizations, private business and NGOs. The activities of these organizations must be carefully coordinated with those of the security forces through either a single command system or a committee system.

2. Just as with the security forces, work towards sustainable development and improved governance should be led by indigenous and local authorities. Only members of the indigenous population will understand the needs and grievances of the local populace and be able to guide development in a manner to address those needs and to meet local expectations. Without local leadership, development may not meet the needs and expectations of the indigenous population.

3. Remediation and payment for collateral damages must be foremost in any scheme, as the related grievances will be readily identified with the campaign and its legitimacy. Likewise, any expropriation of private property must be immediately repaid and ideally should start from a premise of negotiation. Failure to quickly re-pay incurred debts by the campaigning forces will undermine legitimacy, build distrust of the campaign, create grievances and feed insurgent propaganda.

4. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process of any former military, militia or insurgent forces must be carefully planned and managed in detail by both military forces and other agencies. Former soldiers and fighters cannot simply be disarmed and sent home without a reintegration plan that will include gainful employment.

5. Expectation management of local populations must be carefully managed, as unrealistic expectations that go unsatisfied will lead to discontent and a loss of legitimacy for the campaign. Quick-impact projects and humanitarian aid should address short-term needs and gain quick support for the campaign. Long-term development and its measured progress will have to be well advertised to local populations. In order to avoid initial delays in development, the campaign plan from the outset must include details for the sustainable development. Plans should include project details, responsibilities and pre-approved funding envelopes. In this manner, delays that will lead to indigenous frustration and disappointment will be avoided to the greatest extent possible.

526. CONTINUED CAMPAIGN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION

1. As the security situation improves, successive operational orders will continue to pass increased authority and responsibility to local security forces and agencies in each area. Viable improvements in each area should encourage similar development in other areas as the "ink spot" expands (see Figure 5-10 for a summary of the process).

2. The expansion of the campaign into various contested areas will seldom follow a smooth and orderly fashion, identical in each newly gained area. Regardless of how the COIN campaign is conducted in detail, the following key elements must be maintained:

- a. a political lead and engagement of acknowledged leaders in each area;
- b. the incorporation of indigenous forces, ideally seen to be leading operations but as a minimum done in cooperation with them and exploiting their local expertise;
- c. the simultaneous engagement through influence activities to gain the support of the indigenous population and gain the moral/psychological advantage over the insurgents; and
- d. sustainable development within carefully managed expectations based on a comprehensive plan incorporated into the campaign plan from the outset.




Figure 5-10: Example of the "Ink Spot" to Execute a COIN Campaign Plan

Application of Campaign Expansion

During the period December 2006 to February 2007, Canada's Joint Task Force Afghanistan achieved remarkable success using classic "ink spot" doctrine to counter the existing insurgency in Kandahar Province. Although known officially as the Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) concept, it was in reality nothing more than expanding the Government of Afghanistan' influence using ink spot doctrine. In essence security and quality of life had been improved in the small town of Pajry Panjway (unofficially known as the "ink dot') to the point where the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts of Panjway and Zhari assisted their government and NATO forces in establishing security. As 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group and partnered Afghan National Army units pushed forward to clear the districts, the Taliban, knowing they had little support from the local population, withdrew. In conducting these operations, a workable step-by-step process was developed.

Source: Colonel F.A. Lewis, Deputy Commander Canada's Joint Task Force Afghanistan, August 2006 to February 2007

SECTION 4
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE IN A COIN CAMPAIGN

527. INTRODUCTION

1. The conduct of any operational plan and subsequent tactical activities must be conducted in keeping with the philosophy and principles inherent in a COIN campaign. Furthermore, their conduct must all lead directly to the attainment of the operational objectives delineated in the campaign plan.

528. BALANCE ACROSS FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

1. The simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive and stability operations, that is, the realization of full-spectrum operations, will occur throughout a COIN campaign. Commanders must carefully balance forces and activities across these three sets of activities in order to further the campaign and reach operational objectives.

2. Offensive operations are conducted in order to separate the insurgents from their supporters, resources, suppliers and sources of information in the designated area. Such operations must be based on actionable intelligence and sound planning. The secondary effects of offensive operations must be carefully considered so that they do not cause undue collateral damages or alienate the local populace. Indeed, there may be times when short-term tactical success must be postponed in order to avoid undesired effects that will undermine the campaign.

3. The resulting dislocation of the insurgents from offensive operations will allow civil administration to be re-established. Essential services, infrastructure development and improvement to governance may commence through a comprehensive approach. The military security forces may provide robust support to the police or be asked to help train local auxiliary forces that will support the police when military forces withdraw. These newly controlled areas then provide firm bases for further security operations, until gradually the entire theatre or nation is restored to civil government control and enduring stability.

4. Defensive operations will consist mainly of securing those areas from which the insurgents have been displaced. They will secure base camps, government institutions, vital points such as key infrastructure and the population at large. Military forces may assume many of these manpower-intensive tasks in order to free up local constabulary forces so that they may take the lead in pursing the insurgents and their related criminal activities and linkages.

5. There will be occasions when private security companies assume defensive activities. These may be hired by the indigenous government, brought into theatre by coalition forces or hired by NGOs, international organizations or private businesses. If such private security companies are considered part of the coalition, their rules of engagement, employment responsibilities and limitations must be clearly defined. The local populace will not distinguish between campaigning forces and these private security organizations, and indiscretions and illegal use of force by either will undermine the campaign and its legitimacy.

6. Stability operations consist of security and control activities, support to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, support to security sector reform activities, support to civilian infrastructure and governance and assistance to other agencies. In due course, many of these stability activities will be assumed by other agencies and indigenous government services. Nevertheless, many stability activities, such as the training of new security elements and the provision of military forces to augment the police in security patrols, will require direct

military involvement or at least the military acting in a supporting role. Stability activities, particularly the provision of security and control, will continue the dislocation of the insurgents and will attempt to pre-empt or disrupt future insurgent activities. Other stability activities, such as the training of indigenous forces and the development of local governance, will consolidate the insurgent dislocation and morally dislocate the insurgents by addressing root causes and grievances that support insurgent motivations and aims.

7. Military forces and other security forces will always be in short supply. A careful balance must be struck between the three types of tactical operations in order to meet the demands of situation and the operational objectives. Too much of an emphasis on offensive operations will allow insurgents to infiltrate amongst the populace and its vulnerable infrastructure. The insurgents will thus be offered an opportunity to achieve easy successes against poorly protected vulnerable points and thus embarrass the government and undermine its support. With too little emphasis on offensive operations and a focus on defensive and stability operations, the insurgent organization may continuously grow, and an ever-increasing proportion of the campaign's resources will become devoted to defensive countermeasures, so that eventually the insurgents achieve their aim by making it appear that the price of further resistance is too high.[57]

8. The security and control activities and tasks within stability operations should be emphasized whenever possible as a means to take a measured approached to continued dislocation and disruption of the insurgents. Offensive activities should only be initiated on sound intelligence. Activities for security and control will create a security framework within which the military and civilian agencies may operate and the local populace may assume routine civil duties. Patrols, checkpoints, observations posts and similar stability tasks will protect the populace and disrupt or pre-empt insurgent activities and movement. They will gain valuable intelligence which will support subsequent selective offensive operations.

529. COMPRESSION ACROSS THE LEVELS OF COMMAND

1. The relationship between the operational and tactical levels of command during COIN operations are somewhat compressed. Given the focus on winning popular support for a campaign, actions at the tactical level can have far reaching operational and strategic repercussions. Activities will be conducted in public view, and the manner in which routine patrols, checkpoints and other tactical tasks are conducted will either support the attainment of operational and strategic objectives or undermine them. The conduct of an individual soldier, amplified by the media, can become an issue. A thoughtless move or overreaction at the section or platoon level can easily have ramifications above the immediate tactical level that undermine the legitimacy of a campaign and loose public support. Even if the majority of tactical tasks are conducted with a view to gaining public support and winning campaign legitimacy, the populace will remember and the insurgents will exploit those few poorly conducted tasks that undermined legitimacy. Measures and precautions must be taken to limit such occurrences. This must be understood by all levels of command, in all components, including Special Forces.

530. MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

1. The record of attritional success in COIN operations is generally a poor one. Effective COIN operations place due emphasis on the intellectual and psychological aspects of

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[57] Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, London: Faber and Faber, 1977: *passim.*

operations not simply the material. They emphasize the focus on people and ideas not only on ground.

2. To this end, insurgent cohesion is identified and attacked by applying concentrated, yet discrete, force against key vulnerabilities. Surprise, tempo and simultaneity are used to overwhelm and unhinge the insurgent, attacking will and shattering cohesion and ultimately helping to create the conditions for political defeat. Force is applied selectively, and destruction is a means not an end.

3. The successful application of the manoeuvrist approach still has limitations in a COIN campaign. Even if COIN forces are highly successful in destroying insurgent critical vulnerabilities, the insurgent's will and cohesion are likely to remain intact or at least be less affected than a conventional enemy, for insurgents are motivated by a political idea and narrative. The insurgents may continue to fight, change tactics or simply go into abeyance and re-appear at a later date.

4. Thus, the manoeuvrist approach must be expanded to include psychological attacks directly against the will, motivation and cohesion of the insurgency. Insurgents must be defeated psychologically, as a first-order effect, and not solely through physical attacks. Influence activities such as PSYOPS and CIMIC must seek to undermine insurgent legitimacy and claims to a superior political option. The populace itself must be engaged with influence activities that seek to gain their support and undermine or preclude support of the insurgency.

5. In this way, the manoeuvrist approach within the campaign involves a blend of fires that attack the insurgent's capability to ultimately affect his will and cohesion and influence activities that attack his understanding, perceptions, will, cohesion and legitimacy directly. Together these fires and influence activities are synchronized through manoeuvre and battlespace management.

6. Furthermore, classic police work will undermine insurgent cohesion by evidence gathering, arrest and legal action. Surprise can be achieved, for example, through developing information by all sources then acting on the cue of intelligence gathering technology or human intelligence (HUMINT). Rapid exploitation of this intelligence by either covert action or rapid concentration of combat forces into a given area sows confusion and disruption throughout the insurgent's command structure. This occurs in large part because the level of trust within and amongst insurgent cells is compromised and reduced.

531. MISSION COMMAND

1. Success in COIN requires all participants to be actively aware of the long-term goals and the plan to achieve them. Tactical-level commanders must be made to understand the philosophy and principles by which a COIN campaign is conducted. The mission command approach to leadership reaffirms this view, emphasizing informed initiative throughout the force. This methodology is particularly applicable to COIN, given the key role played by low-level tactical commanders. Militarily, COIN is quite often a platoon and section conflict.

532. DESCRIBING OPERATIONAL SUCCESS IN A COIN CAMPAIGN

1. Success is defined by the state of affairs that needs to be achieved by the end of a campaign—an end-state. Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, it may be that the desired end-state of the government (and supporting nations) falls short of an identifiable victory in a strictly military context.

2. Success in COIN may equate to reducing the threat to a point at which the situation may be passed to the civil police or simply not losing control to the insurgents. If, for example, the intention of committing troops is to buy time in which to address particular grievances, then dramatic tactical military success may in fact be counter-productive. Troops must be aware of the military role, which is normally a supporting one, and commanders should select accurate measures against which to judge the effectiveness of military tactics. Ground captured has much less significance in COIN than it does in conventional warfighting. Militarily speaking, operational success may equate to the containment or reduction of violence and threats to a level at which the police can deal with the situation and civil society functions normally.

533. DESTRUCTION OF INSURGENTS

1. In COIN, physical destruction of the enemy may still have an important role to play. Despite the best efforts of influence activities to persuade insurgents and their supporters to pursue peaceful means to affect political change, there will be some insurgents who will remain committed to the violent destruction of the in-place political and social structures. These insurgents must be captured, killed or so physically and psychologically isolated that they are no longer effective.

2. Attrition will be necessary, but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve success. Wherever possible, non-lethal methods of neutralizing the enemy such as arrest, physical isolation or subversion are more likely to advance the campaign's cause. Given intense media scrutiny and domestic and international legal oversight, sound judgement and close control of lethal force will need to be exercised.

534. ATTACKING INSURGENT LEGITIMACY

1. The political and moral legitimacy of the insurgents must be attacked if a COIN campaign is to be successful. Insurgencies gain legitimacy through a combination of words and actions that emphasize flaws and injustices in the government or status quo while providing evidence of the insurgent narrative and ideology as a viable alternative. Insurgent legitimacy must be undermined through coordinated influence activities, including those aimed at specifically countering the insurgent propaganda. These should aim to erode the narrative of the enemy, exposing fallacies and fabrications. Other influence activities, such as CIMIC, governance reform and public affairs, must reinforce the legitimacy of the campaign, the government and its long-term objectives.

535. ATTACKING INSURGENT FUNDING

1. Although many insurgencies will be fiscally supported from abroad, it is important that all sources of funding within the host nation be identified and neutralized. Insurgents use funding not only for the purchase of weapons, equipment and explosives but to pay informants, supporters and members of the local population to be proxy fighters.

2. Insurgent funding will likely be complex and involve sophisticated networks that include international electronic banking and trading. It may also involve criminal activity such as narcotics production and trafficking and the use of fraudulent charitable organizations or legitimate charities that have been duped. Insurgent funding will also come from rather low-profile and mundane sources such as pirated media sales. Attacking the sources of funds that support the insurgency will be a complex effort that relies as much upon police and legal efforts as military activity. However, it is absolutely vital that such an effort be made.

536. SIMULTANEITY

1. All effective insurgent strategies emphasize simultaneity by creating parallel political and social challenges to the in-place authorities in addition to military challenges. If the use of simultaneity is productive for the insurgent, then it is equally applicable for the COIN effort. Tactically, it can be achieved through the restrained and carefully considered use of, and by grouping for independent action, a mix of agencies, such as joint military-police patrols with compatible communications reporting to a single headquarters. Operationally, it is achieved through the development of a harmonized campaign plan using a comprehensive approach along multiple lines of operation. This will attack the insurgents physically, undermine their legitimacy and gain support of the local populace in a concerted and complementary fashion.

SECTION 5
THE ROLE OF MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENTS AND INDIGENOUS FORCES IN COIN

537. LAND COMPONENT

1. The predominant service in counter insurgency is the land force, although air elements often play a strong supporting role. Unless the insurgents are joined by an outside power with significant naval and air forces, counterinsurgency will remain primarily a land force responsibility with the other two services acting largely in support. This reflects the nature of COIN and its focus on the indigenous population. Insurgents can only be countered comprehensively through deploying troops on the ground, amongst the population.

2. The land force can expect to be called upon, particularly at the tactical level, to employ its traditional skills, ranging from providing observation and security to closing with and destroying the enemy. The subtle political nuances underpinning COIN operations, the focus on gaining popular support and the dispersed nature of the battlespace, however, require greater initiative and flexibility at the sub-unit, platoon and section levels. (See Chapter 6 for a further discussion on the employment of land forces in a COIN campaign.)

538. AIR COMPONENT

1. The use of the air component during various COIN and peace support campaigns has clearly demonstrated the potential of advanced technology for surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance and attack of targets. These capabilities have been expanded upon through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and have become a significant enabler of land operations. The use of air support in a COIN campaign has been able to be expanded and enhanced through precision weapons that have made improvements in reducing casualties and collateral damage to infrastructure near the target area.

2. For COIN operations, fixed-wing aircraft can provide the same types of support—troop lift and resupply and photographic and visual reconnaissance—as they do for conventional operations. Air component capabilities can be employed for ground attack missions, when confirmed targets can be found along an insurgent's lines of communication and when insurgents are engaged by ground manoeuvre forces. Nonetheless, one must not underestimate the insurgent's ability to counter air power through deception, reduced signature and even low-level air defence weapons such as man-portable air defence system (MANPADS).

3. The use of air component assets to attack insurgents must be carefully considered and targets confirmed in terms of their authenticity and value. Collateral damages and civilian casualties will do much to undermine the campaign and its public support, both indigenously

and abroad. Insurgents will exploit such incidents through propaganda and will be the first to ensure international media coverage.

4. Air-land integration and battlespace management will require careful planning. The nature of COIN operations and the high volume of aircraft sorties available compared to conventional operations will likely cause air-land integration coordination teams to be pushed to lower levels of command.

5. Aviation assets have obvious roles for troop carrying, surveillance, liaison and over-watch of ground troops. Given the nature of COIN and the dispersed nature of insurgent targets, it is unlikely that aviation will be used as a manoeuvre arm. Aviation can be used in many roles comparable to those given to armoured reconnaissance regiments, such as surveillance, point and area reconnaissance, imagery support to intelligence, economy of force tasks and command and control (C2).

6. Aviation assets may be employed in close fire support to ground manoeuvre forces. Their target acquisition systems, responsiveness and ability to remain in the immediate area make them valuable fire support assets.

539. MARITIME COMPONENT

1. Much of the world's population lives in littoral states and in large coastal cities. Therefore, maritime considerations may be an important factor when campaigning in such regions. Naval support may consist of providing deterrence and presence patrols, enforcing international sanctions and blockades and providing some degree of support for troops ashore. The presence of naval forces can also send a strong political statement and message to insurgents and their supporters.

2. Naval ships may be close enough to provide a timely, high profile appearance to demonstrate support for a threatened ally. Conversely, naval forces have the ability to loiter over the horizon for prolonged periods, providing a warning to hostile elements with minimum provocation.

3. They can be used in a sea basing concept for command and control and for resupply of forces ashore. In addition, naval air support can potentially augment the air assets in theatre.

4. Naval forces may also provide the initial firm base needed to support expansion into a new territory. This may be the initial entry, or it may be an expansion further along the littoral regions of a nation. Despite the advantages to the use of maritime resources, security must be vigilant. Given the concentration of resources onboard ship, a single successful surface attack by insurgents could cause significant loss of life and material.

540. SPECIAL FORCES

1. The organization of Special Forces (SF) units, the high quality, versatility and comprehensive training of these troops, and their capacity to work well in small groups make them particularly suitable for a supporting role in COIN campaigns. Care should be taken, however, that they be used to complement rather than replace conventional units.

2. Tasks for Special Forces may be wide ranging and include special reconnaissance, close protection, deep penetrations and covert observation in remote or difficult areas. They

may undertake direct action[58] tasks. However, care must be taken that Special Forces do not become employed in tasks that are within the capability of line units, for this would be a waste of valuable resources.

3. Despite their capabilities and independent nature of operating, Special Forces must be employed in line with the same principles of COIN as other forces. They too must understand the need to win and maintain popular support and, to this end, avoid collateral damages and civilian casualties. To the greatest extent possible, their operations must be coordinated with the local tactical commanders in whose area they are operating, for these local tactical commanders know their own areas and will be left to deal with the repercussions of the operations.

4. Special Forces may be used to train indigenous forces, however, this should be limited. Training and mentoring forces should train forces that have identical or similar roles, mainly for purposes of commonality, identity and mentoring. Thus Special Forces may be used to train indigenous Special Forces and units responsible for typical special force operations.

541. INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES—POLICE FORCES

1. Indigenous police forces may play a valuable role in the conduct of a COIN mission and will be a key element in **a comprehensive approach**. Indeed, if competent and trustworthy, they will likely have a detailed knowledge of insurgent leaders and their links to criminal elements. The presence of police forces, particularly if seen to be leading operations, will have a normalizing effect on the population.

2. Military COIN forces must be closely coordinated with police forces, and military forces will likely be employed in support of police forces in order to provide security and protection for them in their routine duties. In some cases, police forces may play a supporting role, such as the arrest of insurgents captured and detained by military forces.

3. Police and military forces may be co-located in stations and sub-stations in order to conduct joint operations and to afford the police additional protection, particularly in the early stages of a campaign.

4. The role of police in the host nation and the level of employment of those police are often dependent on the competency of the police force and judiciary and their reputation amongst the population. For example, if a police force or judiciary is regarded as corrupt, the people will have little trust that the police will have the best interests of the people in mind or that the force can provide real security.

5. Military forces may be used, at least initially in a campaign, to train indigenous civilian police. Ideally, this responsibility will be assumed by supporting police forces so that they receive proper mentoring and training in all aspects of police duties. Nevertheless, the military will continue to work closely with police forces and mentor them when necessary.

6. Close and routine coordination with police forces will also provide valuable intelligence sources. Joint intelligence and analysis centres may be established in order to exploit the capabilities and resources of both military and police forces.

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[58] Direct Action is defined as "A short-duration strike or other small-scale offensive action by special operations forces or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage to achieve specific, well-defined and often time sensitive results" (AAP 6).

7. As security improves, police forces should assume a greater role and profile amongst the populace. This will enhance the sense of civil normalcy and free up military forces for other duties. It will also increase the sense of campaign success and legitimacy.

8. It is possible that the police forces of a state are not organized or controlled in a manner common to responsible governance. There have been many instances when police forces have been poorly organized and trained, ill equipped and corrupt. Indeed, the behaviour of police and other security forces in a nation may have been an aggravation of the crisis leading to the insurgency. One must also understand the potential ramification of using former combatants as police. Account must be taken of these factors when planning the overall campaign, and measures taken to improve these circumstances must be foremost in the minds of planners. Plans must be made to rectify the professionalism, competency and role of the local constabulary forces. It is unlikely that a nation will be considered stable without a competent police force.

542. INDIGENOUS MILITARY FORCES

1. Indigenous military forces will vary from situation to situation in terms of quantity, quality and effectiveness. In terms of a standing army, they may be non-existent. However, regardless of their state of existence at the start of a COIN campaign, they will be indispensable in terms of creating enduring solutions to the crisis.

2. Indigenous military forces, if existing and supportive of the campaign, will be a key source of intelligence and situational awareness for campaigning forces, particularly those of a coalition not familiar with the local terrain, people, power structures and culture.

3. Even if still under development, indigenous forces should be seen, to the greatest extent possible, to be leading missions against the insurgents. This will indicate an attempt at a local solution to the insurgency and add legitimacy to the overall campaign. Furthermore, it will help to further develop the indigenous forces in terms of their professional skills, both individual and collective.

4. The lead role of indigenous forces must be respected even if they remain a developing force with limitations. Although coalition forces may produce a more effective outcome if leading, the issue of establishing and maintaining campaign legitimacy and popular support is so crucial that indigenous lead should be emphasized even at the risk of losing some short-term tactical success. Notwithstanding this, coalition forces will continue to train and mentor indigenous forces, even in the midst of operations.

5. The training and development of indigenous forces will be a key part of security sector reform. This requires a comprehensive approach with the military and other agencies working in a synchronized and complementary manner to develop not only police and military forces but other aspects of security and governance, such as border police, prison services and judiciary services. Security sector reform must be part of the campaign plan from the outset, and the campaign plan and resulting initial operational order should clearly annunciate the security sector reform responsibilities of each agency.

543. INDIGENOUS IRREGULAR AUXILIARY FORCES

1. In almost all COIN campaigns, governments have attempted to mobilize the local population to protect themselves by forming auxiliary forces. When soundly based, sensibly organized and properly coordinated with other units, these forces have proved indispensable and indeed, on occasion, the key to a successful campaign.

2. It is not unusual for regular soldiers to be scathing about the appearance, operational efficiency, fighting potential and loyalty of auxiliary forces. This attitude, usually stemming from an ignorance of the characteristics of auxiliary forces and a misunderstanding of their motivation together with a lack of appreciation of the wider issues at stake in a COIN campaign, may have unfortunate consequences. It can hinder the proper development of auxiliary forces and their integration into the overall operational plan. Although the nature of these forces may differ between campaigns, commanders and staff need to understand the characteristics of these forces and the requirements and problems associated with their raising, training and employment.

3. Auxiliary forces contribute significantly to the campaign. Apart from providing the needed manpower to replace regular and coalition forces, they have access to local intelligence and detailed situational awareness that can help support further operations. They also have the advantage of having a committed interest in seeing the campaign and its stability and development succeed. The commitment of the local population through the raising of auxiliary forces also adds further legitimacy to the campaign.

4. The government campaign to defeat an insurgency will succeed only if it wins the loyalty and support of the population. The real test of loyalty is whether the people will actively support the COIN campaign since this will inevitably involve risk.

5. COIN is expensive in terms of personnel. Successful campaigns may require a security force-to-insurgent ratio of up to 20:1. Auxiliary forces help meet the personnel requirement. They are particularly useful for defensive and stability operations, releasing the more mobile, better-trained regular troops and police for offensive operations.

6. The intimate and thorough knowledge that auxiliary forces can provide of their local area and its people considerably ease the intelligence problem. They are more likely to pick up information from the network of informal contacts throughout the populace, and that may even extend to the insurgent forces. Furthermore, they will be able to advise on local power structures and provide guidance to regular commanders regarding issues of cultural or social significance, which in turn will help avoid offence to the local populace.

7. Finally, some auxiliary forces may have specialized skills developed as part of their social culture that complement those of the regular forces. While they have neither the training nor equipment to operate like regular soldiers, they may excel in certain skills such as tracking, patrolling, observation, the use of ground and communicating with the local population.

8. Auxiliary forces may be employed as independent units to secure areas cleared of insurgent control. Given their value and skills, particularly in language and local knowledge, auxiliary forces will prove highly valuable if they are used to augment regular and coalition forces.

9. Other security forces in an indigenous population may also help secure the gains of the campaign. Customs, immigration, border police and coastguards are all designed to control movement across frontiers and coastlines and to prevent smuggling. While they tend to concentrate their efforts at officially designated crossing points, they may also incorporate a mobile element for patrolling unwatched sectors. These services are usually well acquainted with the identities, habits and routes used by the smugglers and illegal border crossers that an insurgent organization will use to move troops, arms and equipment.

10. The use of auxiliary forces will create challenges in operational and information security. Whilst care and caution must be exercised, some risk may have to be taken, at least in the early stages, until auxiliary forces become a better known element. It must be recognized that, in many cases, members of auxiliary forces accept considerable risk to themselves and their

families in volunteering to combat insurgents. Therefore, a certain level of trustworthiness should be assumed.

11. By the time coalition forces arrive for the campaign, local auxiliary forces may be under considerable pressure and discouraged by insurgent successes. They will need support and encouragement as well as the opportunity to play a positive and constructive role in operations. As areas are successively brought back under government control, they will be handed over to the local administration together with its police and armed forces. Those auxiliary forces recruited and deployed on a territorial basis near their homes will be key to securing those areas and allowing long-term development and stability.

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CHAPTER 6
LAND COMPONENT OPERATIONS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

The fight against the guerrilla must be organized methodically and conducted with unremitting patience and resolution. Except for the rare exception, it will never achieve spectacular results.[59]

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

1. Amongst all the various military assets deployed to a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the land force plays the central role. Its tactical units conduct all operational functions (command, sense, act, shield and sustain) through execution of tactical operations: offensive, defensive, stability and enabling. Indeed, given the nature of COIN operations, the emphasis in terms of time and resources will be allocated to stability activities.

2. In the conduct of full-spectrum operations, units will carry out tactical tasks that will be, in terms of their effects, shaping, decisive or sustaining in support of the overall objectives and campaign. Through the operational functions, they will find, fix and strike. Within a single unit's area of operations (AO), one sub-unit may be defending industrial vital points, another may be attacking a recently discovered insurgent headquarters (HQ), another assisting police in conducting snap vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) and another providing security for civilian contractors and assisting in a reconstruction project.

3. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) must remain flexible and should be altered to meet the threat and situation in theatre and to exploit any immediate lessons learned during operations. The campaign plan must ensure that all tactical activities are directly linked to, and work towards, operational objectives. Although tactical operations may be planned and coordinated at the highest levels, they must be controlled and executed at the lowest levels. Units become enablers for their sub-units, which in turn prosecute the tactical tasks in a decentralized but coordinated fashion. The battle, which will involve a combination of fires and influence activities creating physical and psychological effects, is fought and won at the section and platoon level.

4. Tactical activities, such as an attack, will be conducted in accordance with the principles for offensive operations.[60] However, their conduct and adherence to their own principles should not violate the overarching philosophy and principles of a COIN campaign. To do so will undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the overall campaign.

SECTION 2
ESTABLISHING THE FOOTHOLD—PHYSICAL AND MORAL

1. As with any military operation, the first phase of a COIN campaign will likely involve establishing a viable and secure base of operations. A unit/sub-unit will normally be assigned an AO in which it will be responsible for the conduct of full-spectrum operations. This can be considered the first "spot" in the *tache d'huile* or ink spot technique.

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[59] Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, 2006), p. 54.

[60] See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations* regarding the principles for tactical operations and activities.

2. This physical foothold should follow the principles and characteristics of the defence but adjusted for COIN.[61] This foothold will become (at least initially) the base of operations for the unit/sub-unit. It should be located on key terrain that will allow the forces to respond rapidly to any threat or incident in the AO, to seize sudden opportunities and to provide a constant presence in the AO. Although it must be defensible, the location cannot be viewed as a fortress on a hill, remote and distant from the local populace. It is critical that the soldiers integrate with the population. By establishing physical and emotional connections with the population, close relationships will be developed that will increase popular affinity for the government, trust in the security forces and provide intelligence that can be exploited in operations. These psychological or moral connections and affinity will enhance the overall legitimacy and popularity of the campaign. In short, the forces will establish a moral foothold as well as a physical foothold.

3. Whilst the commander will seek out and identify the key public figures in the area—police chief constable, local mayor, industry managers, etc.—human intelligence (HUMINT), counter-intelligence and possibly Special Forces (SF) intelligence specialists will seek to identify and contact the actual power brokers within the social structure, who may be different from the public figures.

4. Patrols create links with the population and are the most obvious representation of a nation's commitment and resolve. Platoon and section patrols will seek to establish contact with the average citizens in the streets and villages. The tone and demeanour set by the patrols is critical and demands exemplary standards of conduct.

5. A certain amount of risk management must be taken to allow patrols to set this needed profile and to send the appropriate message to the populace. This of course does not mean that the troops conduct themselves in a relaxed manner. Although the patrol leader may be talking with local school children or shopkeepers, other members of the patrol maintain a secure stance that implies the patrol remains a hard target for insurgents. This blend of openness and a stern professional exterior impresses the civilians, gives them confidence and unnerves the insurgents, who will always be watching.

6. This foothold not only begins to reassure the populace and dislocate the insurgent, but it begins the tactical-level intelligence collection, against which measures of effectiveness will be devised and used as the campaign progresses.

7. As the situation develops, other satellite camps or patrol bases may be established, permanently or temporarily, even at the platoon level. This spreads the influence of the security forces, supports intelligence collection and dislocates the insurgents. This represents part of the "spreading" component of the ink spot or *tache d'huile* technique.

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[61] For example, the area will have observation posts (OPs), stand-to positions and interlocking arcs of fire—defensible, force protection measures—but will unlikely clear fields of fire in the urban area. Liaison and close surveillance will occur with locals in the immediate area in order to identify the local patterns of everyday life.

Establishing Physical and Moral Footholds

Upon arrival in Haiti in March 2004, I Coy, 2 Royal Canadian Regiment (2RCR) established their company location in the centre of their AO, on the main supply route (MSR), across from a public park. Within hours of arriving, an observation post (OP) reported a civilian man beating a woman in the park. Whilst many may have simply dismissed the matter as a non-military affair, or as just an aspect of Haitian culture, the company recognized the incident as firstly a violation of the rule of law and secondly as simply unacceptable behaviour in their AO. The quick reaction force (QRF) was dispatched, and the man was apprehended and detained. The action and the reasons for it were explained to the individual and those in the immediate area. After a quick medical inspection, the detainee was transported to the nearest civilian police station and passed to their authority. Although it was highly unlikely that any civilian charges resulted, a clear message had been sent to the populace. The security forces had established their physical and moral foothold in the area. In addition, the action began to dislocate the influence of the criminal and insurgent elements in the region. The next day, normal levels of civilian activity returned to the immediate area of the camp location.

Source: Op HALO, After Action Reports.

SECTION 3
ATTACKING THE INSURGENTS' WILL

601. ROLE OF THE TACTICAL COMMANDER

1. Even at the tactical level, a manoeuvrist approach to a COIN operation will seek to disrupt and dislocate the adversary's moral and physical cohesion rather than pursue his wholesale destruction. If afforded confidence and freedom of action and supported by good intelligence, commanders at the tactical level will be able, through ingenuity and a pro-active stance, to undermine the power, authority and eventually the will of the insurgent.

2. Commanders must be able to quickly identify and exploit those opportunities to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the insurgency and its operations. Opportunities will be fleeting. Therefore, recognizing and exploiting these opportunities in a timely and effective manner requires a high level of tactical awareness and ingenuity. In this way, the power that the insurgents hold over the local populace, which is often founded on intimidation, can be severed.

3. In order to be successful in attacking the insurgent on the physical and moral planes, the tactical commander requires more assets, independence and authority than he would normally possess in conventional operations. Some examples are as follows:

a. Independence and flexibility to establish and (if possible) chair, operational and intelligence committees appropriate to his level of command with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), coalition partners and local police and civic authorities.

b. Resources (namely monetary) and authority to conduct low-level civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and reconstruction projects in order to create an immediate impact, which will, in turn, reinforce the positive aspects of the security force's presence.

c. Authority to respond immediately to calls for assistance from local police and security forces, without reference to higher authority as long as the requirements

fall within the rules of engagement (ROE), tactical tasks assigned to the unit and the campaign objectives.

d. Authority to conduct information operations (Info Ops) that follow approved broad Info Ops themes and messages. It is of the utmost importance that commanders be able to pre-empt and counter the propaganda messages of the insurgents.

602. PRE-EMPTION

1. Pre-emption is the taking of action so as to prevent an anticipated event from occurring. In military operations, particularly COIN, pre-emption will require the seizing of opportunities before an enemy can act in order to preclude insurgent operations and to deny them advantages. The insurgents may be constantly destabilized by the initiative of security force actions with both fires and influence activities (psychological operations [PSYOPS], deception, profile, posture and presence, CIMIC and public affairs).

2. Pre-emption is facilitated by a sensor-to-shooter link that is instituted through doctrine, technology, training and organization. Pre-emptive operations will depend on a pro-active and responsive intelligence system linked with a rapid decision-making process in such a way that the detection of an opportunity can be translated into a successful outcome.

3. Key to pre-emption is a covert surveillance capability at the unit and sub-unit level. This may consist of dismounted reconnaissance assets, sniper detachments or rifle platoon elements rehearsed and equipped for the task. Cunning use of surveillance will act as triggers for other forces to deploy to exploit the fleeting opportunity.

4. Even overt presence patrolling can pre-empt insurgents.[62] For example, threats by insurgents to keep the local schools closed and attempts to intimidate families to keep children home can be pre-empted by the placement of standing patrols at the schools until such time that confidence returns to the population and the insurgents have been displaced from the neighbourhood.

5. In COIN it is frequently the case that one success leads to opportunities for another: an arrest may lead to the discovery of an arms cache and so on. Special forces (SF) and reserves such as quick reaction forces (QRFs) must be available, properly positioned and able to exploit unplanned opportunities to strike at the insurgency. Locating the QRFs with surveillance assets (for example, covertly, inside a dilapidated building) will ensure an immediate response. Police and other government agencies must move in quickly behind the military forces to re-establish and retain control and influence.

6. Pre-emption should also be a goal of influence activities (Info Ops). A flyer handed out by patrols that explains the purpose of the security forces and their future operations may pre-empt insurgent propaganda that paints the security forces as oppressors. Likewise, the timely implementation of reconstruction projects at local schools will rob insurgents of a possible grievance that the current regime fails to provide for the country's citizenry and future.

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[62] Presence patrolling is considered part of a broader concept of framework operations, which are those generally overt military operations conducted to establish a safe and secure environment, which in turn contributes to the defeat of the insurgent in an area (British Land Force Field Manual, Vol 1, Part 10, *Counter-Insurgency Operations*). Framework operations generally consist of those security and control tasks and activities that are part of stability operations. They provide the secure environment in which normal civil society can function and other agencies may conduct their activities in support of the campaign.

603. DISLOCATION

1. One of the main aims of presence patrols, checkpoints and other security and control activities is to dislocate the insurgents and their influence over the populace. Dislocation denies the insurgents the ability to bring their strength to bear and goes beyond merely frustrating the enemy's plans by making their strength irrelevant by refusing to fight on their terms. It will consist of deterrence and security measures such as protection of vulnerable targets, search operations, overt surveillance of potential mounting areas or meeting places or places of intimidation and a proactive Info Ops message that reinforces the legitimacy of the government and security forces. The results of a determined effort to dislocate the insurgent may not be spectacular and may not even be apparent to troops on the ground, but over time will rob the insurgent of the initiative.

604. DISRUPTION

1. Disruption seeks to attack the insurgent selectively, targeting his most important assets and so throwing him into confusion. Well-executed, overt military operations will help to disrupt the insurgent by threatening deployment and escape routes, locating arms caches and restricting movements. Even the threat of aggressive covert and overt operations can be effective in creating disruptive physical and psychological effects. Insurgents who know that they are being actively hunted will be tempted to flee the AO.

2. Disruption will also occur as security forces in the process of conducting security and control tasks encounter insurgents attempting to infiltrate or operate in the area. Forces should be prepared to not only disrupt and prevent the insurgents,but ideally will be able to fix them so that they may be struck by reserve forces or other forces operating in the local area.

3. Disruption calls for tactical awareness, cunning and a robust use of forces so long as collateral damages and civilian casualties can be avoided. Commanders should also appreciate that rare opportunities may be better exploited by other agencies (a minor arms find for example could, if left undisturbed, become a fruitful ambush site). Speed and alertness will be essential.

4. In order to create disruption, tactical commanders must be afforded freedom of action. Commanders cannot await authority from higher echelons, as the opportunity to strike effectively will likely be lost.

605. APPRECIATING SECONDARY AND TERTIARY EFFECTS

1. Commanders and staff must understand that every action will have second- and third-order effects. On one hand, pro-active security and control activities, robust deliberate operations and thoughtful Info Ops measures to influence target audiences will dislocate and disrupt the insurgents' presence and influence amongst the populace and in turn corrode and undermine their confidence and will. On the other hand, these operations—particularly if they create undesired results such as collateral damages, do not meet their immediate aims or produce physical signs of improvement—may cause embarrassment to the security forces, unwanted disruption to the population and in turn undermine the public's confidence and empathy and the overall legitimacy of the campaign. Long-term success in COIN will be affected by these second- and third-order effects of activities.

2. This issue may best be illustrated by the following example. A cordon and search operation of a suspected weapons cache in the heart of an insurgent controlled neighbourhood, conducted in conjunction with local police forces may find few if any weapons. However, the

second- and third-order effects may be significant and will be either positive or negative in nature:

a. The positive secondary and tertiary effects may include the following:

(1) New intelligence sources are identified within the establishment and from within the spectators who gathered during the conduct of the operation.

(2) Insurgent leaders are identified either through arrest/detentions or from evidence found at the scene.

(3) The use of local police forces may have several effects:

(a) increase the legitimacy of the military forces in that they are seen to be working with local authorities;

(b) increase the profile and esteem of the local police forces (who may not be well-regarded by the local population); and/or

(c) improve the professional conduct of the local police force by way of example and through the training value of the operation.

(4) Insurgents, knowing that they and their resources are being sought actively, are forced further underground and may even flee the area.

(5) The local populace begins to feel more secure and less afraid of the insurgents and their power.

(6) Weapons are forced further underground and are less readily available to insurgent forces.

b. The negative effects in this example may include the following:

(1) embarrassment in that no weapons were found;

(2) insurgent propaganda highlights this lack of success and attempts to demonstrate that the security forces are incompetent, over-reacting, heavy-handed and not to be trusted;

(3) intelligence sources could be compromised;

(4) interference to the local population's daily routine incites anger;

(5) local police assisting with the action loose confidence and trust in the security forces; and/or

(6) damage occurring to shops and homes during operations angers the populace.[63]

3. Information operations (influence activities) should be planned to exploit the positive follow-on effects and attempt to mitigate the impact of the negative effects. Commanders must ensure that this is considered from the outset of planning.

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[63] Commanders must insist that, during such operations, collateral damages are limited to the greatest extent possible. Although troops must be prepared for breaches, locked doors can usually be removed from their hinges, cut locks can be replaced and damages repaired by engineers in the days immediately following the operation.

SECTION 4
SECURING AND CONSOLIDATING A CONTROLLED AREA THROUGH FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS[64]

1. Once the presence of a security force has been established, operations to clear, secure and consolidate the next area to be brought under government control are launched from established operating bases. While offensive and defensive activities will establish and consolidate gains made in dislocating insurgents and securing a geographical area, the presence and influence of COIN forces are maintained mainly through stability activities.

2. The immediate aim of security and control tasks is to expand the area controlled by the government. This can be viewed as another component of the spreading ink spot or *tache d'huile* concept. The goal is to separate the insurgents from their sources of moral, fiscal and logistical support as well as disrupt their intelligence networks. These continuous stability activities such a presence patrols, mobile checkpoints and searches aim to wrest territory, and more importantly the hearts and minds of people who live in it, from insurgent control and influence. To this end, the profile and posture of troops and the manner in which they deal with the populace will be crucial. Every action must seek to gain support for the campaign. Other activities such as PSYOPS, CIMIC and public affairs must work to keep the profile of COIN forces high, gain credit for the campaign and ultimately gain popular support. Stability activities and the information they gain from the populace should also lead to opportunities to conduct offensive operations such as attack or raid against the insurgents.

3. The security and control activities of stability operations will include surgical cordons and searches, raids, presence patrolling and mobile checkpoints. These tactics force the insurgents to react or surrender the initiative.

4. Specific offensive activities will stem from specifically gained intelligence. Well planned and organized ambushes destroy the adversary. When the opportunity arises, infiltrations and attacks may be used to destroy known and vulnerable insurgent camps and base positions. Success, however, rests on very good intelligence, and commanders must make every attempt to verify the accuracy and veracity of reports. Insurgents or others may plant false information to cause embarrassment to security forces and to undermine the campaign. Furthermore, the conduct of offensive activities, such as an attack on an insurgent stronghold, must not undermine or counter the principles inherent in a COIN campaign. They must not risk effects, such as civilian casualties or collateral damages, that will ultimately undermine public support and cause segments of the populace to support the insurgents.

5. Defensive tasks will likely include operating base security and defence of civilian vital points such as key infrastructure.

6. As areas of the hostile territory are cleared of insurgents, the civil administration must be re-established. This will be part of the overall stability operations. It is possible that many of the area's former civil servants, magistrates and police may have escaped the initial insurgent take over and would be able to put their local knowledge to good use on their return. However, they and the civil police will undoubtedly need the backing of suitable military forces for some time and certainly until the neighbouring regions have been brought back under government control. Consideration must be given to the possibility that corruption in the civil administration may be a legitimate grievance. If this is in fact the case, the commander must work closely with other agencies participating in the campaign to devise a solution that redresses this problem.

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[64] See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations* for further details of full-spectrum operations.

7. In the absence of civil administration or in the presence of a corrupt or developing administration whose shortcomings may have led in part to the insurgency, campaigning forces must be prepared to assume governance and administrative duties. This should be identified in the campaign planning stages and other agencies used to implement it. In such a circumstance, measures even at the lowest level must be taken to develop indigenous governance capabilities and to have indigenous leaders at the forefront of governance development. Agencies other than the military will be key to such development, and their work in this endeavour will be their equivalent of tactical-level activities supporting operational objectives. Such development in terms of governance and infrastructure will be the true consolidation of the military operations that removed the insurgents.

8. Part of this development will include the stability activities inherent in security sector reform (SSR). The military and appropriate other agencies will, in a coordinated and complementary manner, undertake reform and development of various security services and related governance and administration. Beyond military and police reform, SSR may include prison services, the judiciary, border security, customs authorities, civil defence and auxiliary forces.

9. Inter-agency cooperation at the tactical level within a comprehensive approach may take the form of a civil-military transition team. A civil-military transition team is defined as: "An organization designed to integrate and coordinate interagency and multidisciplinary efforts within a given geographic region. Note: Its purpose is to develop capacity in local agencies and institutions in order to promote long-term stability. It may be referred to as a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in some theatres."[65]

10. This construct will see a number of agencies working in a cooperative and formal manner to develop the infrastructure and governance of the nation. It may work on a single line of operation or on a number of lines of operation. Generally, they focus on reconstruction, development and governance development and mentoring. It could include SSR responsibilities. In sort, the transition team will focus on stability activities that create long-term solutions to the crisis. The military will likely have a supporting role and will provide security and possible command and control assistance. The military may also support some reconstruction and quick impact projects.

SECTION 5
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN

606. TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. Defensive operations include the activities of **defence and delay**. Unless insurgent forces reach the point at which they develop manoeuvre forces, it is unlikely that a delay battle will be required.

2. The defence will play a major role in securing the local populace, their infrastructure and territory gained through offensive operations. The defence will be realized through a wide array of tactical tasks such as standing observations posts, standing patrols, vital point protection and defensive positions, particularly around operating base locations (see Chapter 1, Figure 1-3).

3. Defensive operations by the security forces will assist in the stabilization of the area and allow the government and other agencies to effect their tasks. Defensive activities will seek to

[65] Submitted to Army Terminology Panel, September 2007.

create a form of protection and sense of confidence for the security forces, the populace and their institutions.

607. DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES—THREAT

1. In most COIN campaigns, areas of operation will be non-linear and perhaps non-contiguous. The threat will be irregular, and no area can be assumed to be safe, although significant improvements in security will lower the threat level. Even in a cleared and consolidated area, the insurgents may still likely have a capability that can launch bomb attacks or carry out assassinations. They may attempt to reintroduce insurgent cells to launch terrorist attacks both for their propaganda value and in an attempt to force a redeployment of police and troops to remove the pressure from their forces elsewhere. Hence, defensive measures and protection may be necessary for a wide range of people, areas and facilities.

608. RESPONSIBILITY

1. The issue as to what security forces conduct these defensive measures will depend greatly on the situation and may vary from area to area within the same theatre. If indigenous security forces, particularly with a police lead, are capable of fixing and striking the insurgents, then military forces may assume manpower-intensive defensive tasks. If indigenous, particularly constabulary, forces lack the capability or resources and are continuing to develop, campaigning security forces may have to assume the fixing and striking of insurgents whilst local forces assume defensive roles. Ideally, as time progresses and the security situation improves, auxiliary forces and police may be able to assume many of the static defensive duties.

2. In some campaigns, it may be desirable and practical to use private security companies, particularly in terms of supporting NGOs or private organizations that are working in the theatre. These private security companies must be employed carefully if they are part of the campaign plan. They must be given a limited and specific mandate, clearly defined tasks and clear rules of engagement.

609. ENDURANCE

1. Defensive activities and protective measures will still be required in the most secure base areas, although the tasks may eventually be handed over progressively to the police or auxiliaries. A priority will be force protection of the security forces' base areas. If the security forces cannot protect their own infrastructure, the populace will have little confidence the security forces can protect them. Government, infrastructure and economic vital points and lines of communications will require protection, for they provide high value targets for the insurgents. At all times and at all levels, vigilance must be stressed and enforced.

610. BALANCE

1. Defensive activities and protective measures in high risk areas are manpower intensive. Many of the tasks are routine and boring, and soldiers tend to lose their vigilance after long periods without an incident. If possible, troops on such duties should be rotated with those on more active operations, and every effort must be made to maintain a continual training programme in theatre.

611. OBJECTIVES OF DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

1. Defensive activities and protective measures will have to be taken with respect to security forces themselves, other agencies in the campaign and the local populace and their infrastructure. The general aims of defensive activities and protective measures include the following:

a. ensure security of all base areas, including forward operating bases and temporary bases;

b. secure controlled areas;

c. secure lines of communication;

d. disrupt supply and reinforcement of insurgent units;

e. secure key infrastructure;

f. protect vulnerable groups or individuals; and

g. prevent disruption of the economic life of the nation.

612. TACTICAL TASKS FOR DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

1. Defensive activities and protective measures will include a wide variety of tasks. In the conduct of defensive activities, tactical-level units will be expected to conduct the following:

a. **VIP Protection**. Protection may be required for key members of the government, certain security force commanders and visiting dignitaries. It may include the training of local forces in this role. Close protection will likely be conducted by military police and SF troops, while temporary outer cordons may be conducted by line troops.

b. **Security of Troops and Base Areas**. Security force troops, their resources and their locations will all require a certain level of defence. Administrative moves of troops often expose concentrations of troops as soft targets. Forces will likely have to be allocated for their protection.

c. **Convoy Security**. The security forces will be expected to secure government and NGO convoys as well as their own. This may be done through escorts or through defence of the convoy route.

d. **Protection of Other Agencies**. Other agencies within the environment and campaign may, at least initially in the campaign, require levels of protection that can only be provided by military forces. This will include protection of their base camps and of their movements. This requirement will increase when battlespaces are non-contiguous.

e. **Securing Routes and Lines of Communication**. Main supply routes (MSR) and lines of communication will always be vulnerable to attack. Likely or previously used ambush areas may require picketing. Technology can be exploited and pickets located on dominating terrain will be able to act as triggers for the dispatch of reserves to either increase protection or disrupt an insurgent operation.

f. **Static Defensive Positions**. Security forces will not only have to secure their own locations but may be tasked to guard civilian installations and vital infrastructure along with government institutions. These will be augmented by

standing patrols and clearing patrols around vulnerable sites, which will continue the disruption of insurgent activities and surveillance. They should also seek to disrupt the placement of mines and improved explosive devices (IEDs).

613. COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE MEASURES

1. Insurgent groups will rely on committed members, sympathisers and coerced neutrals for surveillance and information on indigenous and coalition security forces' actions, capabilities and weaknesses. Much of the purposeful surveillance will occur in a fairly open, low-technology fashion, with watchers blending in with the general public, shadowing patrols or watching base camps. Intelligence gathered by sympathisers and coerced neutrals will be collected through simple surveillance of security force practices. Counter-measures must be employed at all levels. Vigilance must be stressed and practised constantly. Soldiers should be assured that, in most cases, their departures and movements are reported. Some methods of countering such surveillance include challenging suspicious persons or those shadowing patrols, and avoiding patrolling patterns, and the use of clearing patrols around fixed locations.

614. STANDING PATROLS

1. Apart from static defensive posts, the establishment of a network of overt and covert standing patrols occupying key positions provides an important means of furnishing a defensive posture and acquiring information. This in turn will assist in dominating an area and dislocating and disrupting possible insurgent offensive activities.

2. Standing patrols will generally have an assigned area that includes one or more dominating positions from which they can maintain observation. The tasks allocated to standing patrols may include:

a. over-watch of locations, both permanent (such as base camps) or temporary (such as VCPs);

b. clearing insurgent watchers from points of observation;

c. obtaining information on insurgent activity and noting patterns;

d. observing the movement and activity of curfew breakers and crowds;

e. identifying ring-leaders and law-breakers;

f. directing patrols, police, reserve units or helicopters to incidents;

g. providing covering fire to vehicle and foot patrols should they come under a level of attack which necessitates the use of firearms; and/or

h. assisting in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies and crowd confrontations by passing information to elements of the security forces involved in crowd control.

Counter-Surveillance Measures

Surveillance by insurgent gangs began as soon as Canadian troops arrived in Haiti in early 2004. Observant soldiers in observation posts (OPs) and clearing patrols quickly identified and eliminated watchers. Patrol commanders detained individuals who were shadowing patrols, removed (temporarily) their cell phones and recorded the names and numbers in the calling memory and directory. This information was passed to United States Marine Corps (USMC) regimental and Canadian intelligence staffs who used it to identify the insurgent organization and command.

Source: Op HALO After Action Reports.

SECTION 6
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN—GAINING THE INITIATIVE

615. INTRODUCTION

1. Offensive operations support the military's key role in neutralizing the insurgent. They effectively take the battle to the insurgent in order pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt him. They will be key to gaining the initiative over the insurgent.

2. Offensive operations include a wide range of activities, each of which are realized through a wider range of tactical tasks (see Chapter 1, Figure 1-3). During a COIN campaign, the most likely offensive activities that will be employed are:

a. attacks, hasty or deliberate, against insurgent positions and locations, including command and control centres and systems;

b. fighting patrols for the conduct of a raid[66] or an ambush;

c. reconnaissance in force; and

d. pursuit and exploitation.

3. The conduct of offensive activities will follow their own principles and TTP. However, the conduct of offensive activities should not violate the overarching philosophy and principles inherent in the conduct of a COIN campaign. At times, the tactical success offered by a potential offensive activity may have to be delayed in order to support the operational objectives of the campaign. For example, the pursuit of a fleeing adversary may have to be ceased or postponed in order to secure an urban area or provide emergency humanitarian assistance to a local populace that has been under adversary control. Whilst the pursuit may destroy some insurgents, the emergency assistance to the population will engender popular support and gain legitimacy for the campaign.

616. ATTACKS—HASTY ATTACKS

1. Occasionally, COIN forces will be able to wrest the initiative from the insurgent and conduct hasty attacks. Any such opportunity should be fully exploited in order to gain the

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[66] Raid is defined as: "An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission" (AAP 6). Note that a raid differs from a cordon and search.

initiative and undermine insurgent will and sense of impunity. These opportunities will be fleeting, and commanders must have standing authority to assume offensive operations as the opportunities arise. Depending upon the nature of the campaign, many of these opportunities may occur at the section and platoon level during the conduct of presence patrols. Here, commanders will have to make a rapid transition from stability activities to offensive activities.

2. Any hasty attack should be conducted with a view to avoiding undesired effects such as collateral damage and civilian casualties. A successful attack may kill a small number of insurgents, but if completed with collateral damages and civilian casualties, it will do irreparable harm to the campaign in the eyes of many. Indeed, it may even drive neutral members of the populace to support the insurgency.

3. In the conduct of hasty attacks, commanders must be cautious of insurgents seeking shelter amongst local populations and institutions.

617. DELIBERATE ATTACKS

1. As in any campaign, deliberate attacks will require detailed planning and reconnaissance. In a COIN campaign, they will likely occur against insurgent bases and concentrations of forces. Given the nature of insurgency, the opportunities for deliberate attacks will not routinely occur.

2. In the conduct of the battle procedure, operational security (OPSEC) will be paramount and, given the nature of insurgent information collection practices, difficult to maintain. Special consideration must be made to ensure the OPSEC is maintained.

3. Apart from the conduct of the attack itself, plans should focus on the exploitation of success. This will include the pursuit of fleeing insurgents (ideally by specially designated forces), emergency aid to any non-combatants in the area and consolidation of the position. Considerations must be given to the need for and possibility of permanent occupation of the cleared location. The success of the deliberate attack will be limited and impermanent if security forces withdraw and insurgents are permitted to re-establish their presence and continue to influence any local populace.

618. LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. In cases where an insurgency controls large areas of the theatre, the insurgents may raise and deploy a sizeable force. Such a situation is most likely to occur where they have access to a friendly neighbouring country which they use as a haven to assemble, train and equip.

2. Large-scale offensive operations are attractive for many commanders, as they imply initiative and provide the opportunity to be pro-active and gain a major success against the insurgent. They will include a variety of offensive activities such as deliberate and hasty attacks, fighting patrols, pursuits and large scale “sweeps.”

3. Past campaigns, however, do not provide many examples in which large-scale offensive operations gained significant advantages and led to success. Difficulties with OPSEC and the scale and inherent tactics of such operations allow insurgents adaptable to dispersal to ex-filtrate and avoid decisive engagement.

4. Ideally, insurgent forces should be engaged and destroyed in battle while they are relatively small and before they pose a major threat. This may not be feasible for a number of reasons:

a. the threat is likely to develop in a remote area while the host government focuses on securing vital areas close to the capital, the main towns and their surrounding well-populated and economically important rural areas;

b. the host nation may have neither the troops available nor the means of projecting force over a considerable distance into a remote and possibly mountainous jungle region; and/or

c. there may also be a risk that operations on the border of a stronger, hostile neighbour may provoke an unwanted intervention on the pretext that the neighbouring country's borders have been violated or its security threatened.

5. There are a number of prerequisites for the success of a large-scale offensive operation:

a. **Good Intelligence**. The locations of units, headquarters and key leaders are as important as the knowledge of the enemy's positions and security screen. Equally important is good intelligence on the insurgent's supporting political and logistic organization.

b. **Isolation**. The area chosen for the operation must be isolated as much as possible to prevent insurgent reinforcement or exfiltration. If the escape of small parties cannot be stopped, the enemy should not be able to evacuate formed units. Enemy escape routes should, as far as possible, be blocked.

c. **Surprise and Deception**. Obtaining surprise presents the greatest problem. Preparations and preliminary moves that cannot be hidden must be disguised. Patrolling to obtain information should be carried out in as many areas as possible, with no obvious emphasis on the selected area. Rumours of possible operations planned to take place elsewhere may be fed into the insurgent intelligence organization through channels which the insurgents are known to trust. Demonstrations and feints may be launched in such a manner as not to arouse suspicions as to the location of the main effort, its aims and its objectives.

6. The execution of such an operation requires rapid deployment to encircle the main enemy forces. Insurgent forces should not just be surrounded by a cordon, which is likely to prove porous in the best circumstances, but located and pinned down. Once surrounded, disorganized and broken up, the insurgents must be pursued.

7. Success must be followed by rooting out the insurgents' political and logistic support organization and replacing it with the host government's administration. The people in the area must be protected from future covert insurgent infiltration by insurgent political cells and/or forces.

619. OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST INSURGENT COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

1. Offensive operations should include when possible action against insurgent command and control (C2) systems. Such actions may be a particularly effective and often the most economical means of reducing the combat effectiveness of insurgents, applicable at all levels of command. The primary objectives of offensive operations directed against insurgent command and control capabilities include the following:

a. slow his tempo in relation to that of the security forces;

b. disrupt his activities;

c. degrade the insurgent commander's ability to command and control;

d. interdict electronic signals used to detonate improvised explosive devices; and

e. disrupt his ability to generate and sustain offensive activities.

2. Technological advances will greatly enhance the ability of security forces to affect the insurgents' command and control systems. Care must be taken, however, to minimize negative consequences for the non-combatants. Also, one must be aware of the effect upon potential intelligence collection. For example, shutting down a cellular telephone grid in order to deny its use by insurgents has a strong negative impact on the civil society in addition to precluding electronic warfare exploitation of intercepted communications.

620. FIGHTING PATROLS—RAID AND AMBUSHES

1. Fighting patrols are distinct from other patrols, particularly presence patrols for the purposes of security and control (stability operations), in that they are conducted for the purposes of conducting an ambush or raid. The purpose of fighting patrols is to pre-empt or disrupt the insurgent and his aims. A series of fighting patrols followed by the establishment of a permanent security force presence will dislocate the insurgents. Fighting patrols bring troops into contact with the insurgents on favourable terms.

2. Fighting patrols are particularly effective in COIN campaigns in terms of gaining tactical success over the insurgents, pre-empting and disrupting their activities and undermining their will and cohesion. The inherent tactics of patrolling match those of the insurgents: planning is detailed and they are conducted by small, mobile elements exercising initiative.

3. Fighting patrols must be based upon good, accurate and specific information and intelligence regarding the planned objective. Such information may be obtained from a variety of sources, including police and military collection, technical sensors including imagery, HUMINT sources, reconnaissance, routine presence patrols, tracking and, sometimes, a lucky contact.

4. Fighting patrols will be planned in detail, but they must retain the ability to develop and adapt flexible TTP that can counter the mutable tactics of the insurgent. Lessons learned during patrols should be disseminated quickly so that they may be incorporated into follow-on activities.

5. Fighting patrols, particularly those conducted for ambushes, need not have a specific target in mind but may simply be executed on the basis that the opportunity to ambush the adversary may be encountered and exploited. It must be remembered that despite the offensive nature of fighting patrols, normal rules of engagement (ROE) will apply and must be followed.

6. In close terrain, where it is seldom possible to set in a stealthy manner a cordon successfully, a fighting patrol has a better chance of scoring a success. The patrol may be able to set a hasty ambush or raid an insurgent base. Used judiciously, fighting patrols are an excellent way of keeping small groups of enemy on the move, inducing a sense of insecurity and dislocating insurgent plans.

7. Ambushes are usually deliberate, but drills must be developed to enable a section or patrol to move rapidly and quietly into an ambush position when its lead elements spot insurgent forces moving. Ambushes may be conducted in areas under government control or in areas still under the control of insurgents. Because they are followed by a withdrawal, raids will be

conducted against insurgent camps or strong points in areas not yet under the control of government forces.

8. Ambushes and raids may be conducted with any combination of the following aims:

a. the destruction of an insurgent force;

b. the capture or killing of a wanted insurgent;

c. the capture or destruction of weapons and equipment;

d. gaining of intelligence;

e. deterring the insurgent from using an area; and/or

f. preventing the insurgents from approaching friendly positions.

621. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

1. Campaigning forces may conduct reconnaissance-in-force tasks in order to gain required information regarding insurgents, their location, disposition, strength, intentions and influence in a region and amongst its population. Such activities will likely be conducted in a more overt fashion than fighting patrols, which rely upon stealth to reach their objective and withdraw. Reconnaissance in force may be mounted or dismounted.

2. Although information collection will be the primary aim of a reconnaissance-in-force activity, forces must be prepared to exploit opportunities such as the ability to ambush insurgent groups. Well-practised drills, good communications and high levels of training will ensure the required flexibility to exploit fleeting opportunities.

SECTION 7
STABILITY OPERATIONS[67] AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN

622. INTRODUCTION

1. Stability operations are defined as "tactical activities conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved."[68] Stability activities seek to gain support and legitimacy for a campaign by addressing the root causes of a crisis. They include tasks that seek to protect an area and populace in order to allow other agencies and the civilian populace to function, and they include reconstruction, training and development. Compared with offensive and defensive activities, they are generally the predominant type of operation in COIN and peace support campaigns.

2. Stability operations consist of the following activities:

a. security and control tasks;

b. support to demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR);

c. support to SSR;

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[67] For a more detailed discussion of stability operations, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

[68] Army Terminology Panel. NATO defines stability activities as: "Tactical activities that seek to stabilise the situation and reduce the level of violence. They impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies" (NATO AJP 3.2).

d. support to civilian infrastructure and governance; and

e. assistance to other agencies.

3. These stability activities are realized through a wide array of tactical tasks, such as: cordon and search, vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), curfew implementation, presence patrols, humanitarian aid delivery, training of indigenous security forces and crowd confrontation to name a few.

4. Initially in a campaign, the military may be the only agency in theatre or the local area that is able to conduct stability activities and tasks. The military will initiate some aspects of the work and establish the security and control needed for other agencies and civilian society to be able to operate. Many stability activities require other agencies. SSR, for example, will require not just the military but other agencies to conduct reform of other facets of a security apparatus, such as prisons, police, border control and the related civilian and political administration and oversight.

5. Stability activities set the conditions for an enduring stable and secure situation and thus future sustainable development. They often address many of the conditions and circumstances that led to the instability and insurrection in the first place.

623. SECURITY AND CONTROL TASKS

1. Security and control tasks seek to create a security framework that will allow the conduct of normal civil society and will permit other agencies to conduct their operations. In other words, the creation of a security framework will permit other agencies to operate and manoeuvre. Security and control may be imposed through a wide variety of tactical tasks that support this aim but will normally be conducted through presence patrols, observation posts, cordon and searches, checkpoints, curfews, movement control and the use of reserves to react to emergencies or threats.

2. Security and control tasks often support the collection of information, namely from the local populace and troops on the ground, which leads to the conduct of other stability activities or even offensive activities.

624. PATROLLING AND OBSERVATION POSTS

1. Most patrolling and observation posts conducted for the purposes of security and control will be overt. However, in certain circumstances, they may be covert and seek to lure out insurgents or other irregular threats, such as criminals, that threaten security. Such activities are often termed framework operations or framework patrols, for they help create that security framework that permits other agencies to operate.

2. Patrols are a mainstay of COIN operations and must be conducted with a robust spirit, taking into consideration, however, that they will be occurring often amongst civilian populations. Most types of patrols should be assigned standing and specific information requirements (IRs) to support the overall campaign and specifically planned operations. Given the overt nature of most COIN patrolling, patrols are more vulnerable to ambush than those conducted in conventional operations. Every effort should be made to avoid creating predictable habits, including standardized routes and timing. Failing to do so will invite effective enemy attacks.

3. Presence patrols provide a force presence that helps to create the secure environment. They dislocate insurgents' presence and influences and disrupt any insurgent activities. They provide protection and should actively seek information through their contact with the public and through observation.

4. Presence patrols may operate as a complete platoon or in a dispersed manner at the half-section or section level, albeit controlled at the platoon level. They may operate on a half-platoon or multiple system.[69] The tactics and procedures will vary in accordance with the environment, the threat, insurgent tactics, their task and the involvement of other security force elements.

5. The patrols may work from firm bases or from temporarily established patrol bases. They may be mounted or move on foot. Patrolling should avoid creating a pattern of predictable habits. In broad terms, their tasks are to:

a. Provide local protection for security force bases by complimenting other protective measures such as standing patrols, observation posts (OPs) and sensors.

b. Inhibit insurgents' freedom of movement by random deployment at different times in different areas. This supports the dislocation of the insurgent.

c. Through their presence and positive influence on the public, dislocate the influence of insurgents and their psychological hold over the populace.

d. Increase the chances of intercepting gunmen, bombers or weapon runners.

e. Conduct snap VCPs or "cordon and knock" operations.[70]

f. Be in position to react to a threat or developing situation in a particular area or to reinforce other patrols.

g. Deter an insurgent attack or sniping operation by saturating an area and threatening the escape route of a bomber or sniper.

h. Gather information and intelligence through the issue of standing and unique IRs.

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[69] In a multiple patrol system, the basic tactical element is the four-man brick. Hence, a rifle section will consist of two bricks. A multiple will normally consist of three bricks, and thus a platoon can form two multiples, one commanded by the platoon commander, the other by the platoon second-in-command. Bricks patrol in support of one another, normally within visual, or at least radio, contact, and are thus able to support one another while remaining flexible enough to out-manoeuvre any insurgents encountered.

[70] Roving snap VCPs are often more effective than static VCPs, which will quickly become known to the insurgents. Patrols will often encounter suspicious activity, notice an irregular action or notice something out of its ordinary place or simply receive a tip from a local. The patrol commander must be prepared to stop and search suspicious vehicles. Additionally, he must be prepared to conduct a low-level cordon and search. With the combat power available, or with additional reinforcements, he may simply set an immediate cordon and "knock" on the premises, explaining the situation to any occupants and then conducting a search.

During the deployment to Haiti in 2004, intelligence sources at the United States Marine Corps (USMC) regimental level indicated that a hardware store in the west end of Port au Prince was a possible weapons cache, as the store was owned by a known gang leader. This was added to a company target list, and framework patrols assigned to this area were tasked to search for and identify this store. Eventually, after about 20 days later, a patrol located the store. The patrol commander conducted his combat estimate and after receiving authority to do so from the company command post, the patrol conducted a cordon and knock operation. Nothing was found, and two locks had to be cut during the operation. It was explained to the store manager that if the owner wished, he could report to the company location and his locks would be replaced. Three days later, the owner and other man arrived at the camp seeking new locks. The two men were, and had been, posing as Haitian National Police (HNP) officers and were listed on the HNP most wanted list, a copy of which was held in the company command post. They were detained and turned over to HNP authorities.

625. MOVEMENT CONTROL

1. Control of movement is a vital aspect of COIN operations. Although manpower intensive, it is necessary to dislocate and disrupt insurgent activities and reassure the public. Movement control measures can also be highly inconvenient to the general public and a point of contention. Therefore, the need for them must be clear and well advertised (in terms of purpose, vice location and time) through the Info Ops communication plan. Ideally, movement control measures are conducted in conjunction with the local police, with the latter seen as being in the lead.

2. **Principal Methods**. Before movement controls are imposed, aims and plans and must be discussed between the civil authorities, the police and the military to make sure the enforcement is a practical proposition and that the necessary police and soldiers are available to put them into effect. The principle methods of movement control are:

   a. road blocks;

   b. checkpoints, both snap and deliberate;

   c. traffic control points; and

   d. curfews.

3. Controlling movement may have any of the following aims:

   a. permit security forces to enforce the law, thus increasing public confidence in the government's ability to protect them;

   b. disrupt insurgent groups and plans by making movement difficult and precluding coordination between insurgent cells and groups;

   c. dominate an area to prevent crowds from gathering and to deter hostile action;

   d. control the movement of crowds that do form and prevent their reinforcement;

   e. intercept and discourage the illegal movement of arms, explosives, medical supplies and food;

   f. seal off an area to prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives and subversive propaganda material;

g. arrest wanted persons;

h. record movement to detect patterns and obtain information; and/or

i. facilitate the movement and operations of the security forces (for example, part of an outer cordon of a deliberate operation may include a temporary road-block).

4. Vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) will be a regular means of controlling movement and disrupting insurgent activity. In the conduct of VCPs in a COIN operation, the following points should be considered:

a. Planning must be detailed and appropriate resources applied. These should include enough resources and mobility to provide effective cut-off and pursuit elements.

b. Reserves or QRFs should be aware of the operation and prepared to support if necessary.

c. Modern communication devices, particularly cellular telephones, will alert insurgents seeking to avoid the VCP to its presence within minutes of its establishment. Thus the use of snap VCPs at the section level put in location for very short periods and the simple stopping of suspicious vehicles and individuals will do more to pre-empt and disrupt insurgents than long-term VCPs.

d. Vehicle checkpoints provide members of the public the opportunity to pass information to the security forces without raising the suspicion of insurgents. Troops conducting VCPs must be prepared to receive such information or to provide the informant with a contact.

5. Large-scale or continuous movement control measures will require much consideration, planning and coordination. Likely public reaction must be taken into account during the planning stage. Agitators will be quick to exploit any adverse reaction, and the need for any unavoidable irksome restrictions should be anticipated and explained to weaken hostile propaganda. Ill-conceived measures that lead to the collapse of public services must be avoided. The committee system exists to discuss these plans and their likely consequences. A sound plan must be based on good intelligence, which involves close liaison and joint conduct with the police. The concept must be supported by a specific Info Ops plan explaining the purpose and goals of the control measures.

626. CROWD CONTROL MEASURES

1. Crowds and violent demonstrations are often a feature of insurgencies and are easily exploited by insurgents for their own ends. Insurgents will stage events to draw crowds and often attempt to provoke security forces to over-react to a demonstration. These events will be filmed by insurgents and the images quickly disseminated internationally in a carefully coordinated propaganda effort. Crowds and resulting riots undermine the overall security situation, weaken the government's control and destroy civil infrastructure.

2. In spite of measures to prevent it, crowds may rally around a particular issue and assemble, usually in urban areas, in front of government offices, security force camps or in public spaces. The civil police may be unable to cope with the situation, and military assistance may be required. The size of a crowd is no indication of its attitude. A large crowd containing many curious onlookers may be docile, until agitators begin to influence it. A small crowd may be peaceful, or it may be a concentration of those with extreme views. The military commander on the spot must use his own judgement as to how to deal with any particular situation.

3. Crowd control operations (CCO) require special training in specific TTP and equipment. These should not be acquired on the job and must be included in all pre-deployment training. In theatre, regular training schedules should include a CCO refresher. Likewise, CCO-specific equipment must be positioned forward with tactical sub-units, for violent crowds can gather with little notice. Furthermore, when there is a threat of crowd confrontation, the mere appearance of properly prepared troops can help dissuade the crowd from turning violent.

627. SEARCH TASKS

1. As security forces impose control over urban and rural areas, search tasks become a mainstay of the security environment. Searches must be guided by accurate intelligence in order to minimize disruption of the population and embarrassment for the security forces.

2. The purpose of search tasks is to isolate a selected area by deploying a cordon, either by stealth or at such speed that the intended quarry has no chance to escape, and then searching it thoroughly. The target area may be a single house or an entire city block. Obviously, the more precise the target area can is the better.

3. Search tasks are conducted whenever possible with police authorities. They may be conducted in order to:

   a. capture wanted persons, weapons, communication devices, propaganda materials and means, explosives or documents;

   b. disrupt insurgent activities;

   c. eliminate insurgent activity in a specific locality, particularly with a view to expanding a controlled area;

   d. gain evidence to support prosecutions or to prove links with expatriate communities and fraudulent fund raising schemes; and

   e. gain information to support future operations.

4. In conducting such tasks with the local police and other forces, OPSEC is essential. It is not uncommon for local security forces to be infiltrated by insurgents or to contain informants who pass the insurgents information. If this is a concern for military commanders, methods should be used to conceal the nature and area of the task until the last minute.

5. The establishment of the cordon and the search are two separate activities but are mounted as one task. Because the search part of the task is usually a lengthy affair that disrupts the life of a locality, cordons and searches should only be mounted on reliable information. A series of fruitless operations merely alienates the population from the government and unnecessarily provides the insurgent with propaganda.

6. Cordon and search tasks are not easy to execute, due in good part to the difficulty of closing the cordon so quickly that the insurgents have no chance to escape. It is easier to position a cordon in open country with a good road network, long fields of observation and with the help of helicopters. In close terrain (jungle, urban) it is virtually impossible to position and link up a cordon because movement is restricted, buildings are connected, watchers may see the forces coming and alert the target area, and observation may be restricted to a few metres. Ingenuity will be required by commanders to work around these challenges.

7. During COIN, cordon and search tasks will often be conducted based on HUMINT sources. Information from informants must be treated with caution. It is always possible that an informant may simply wish to “set up” a local rival or may wish to lead the security forces into an

ambush. Caution must be exercised at all times and information gained, when possible, should be confirmed by other sources.

628. SUPPORT TO DDR AND SSR[71]

1. The design of required demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes should begin as part of the overall campaign planning process. Specifically designated forces will normally be required, particularly for the SSR programme.

2. The military will play a supporting role in the overall DDR process, which sees various armed elements undergo a dissolution process. DDR by its very nature will require the involvement of any number of other agencies in order to properly demobilize and reintegrate former combatants. These former combatants may be regular army members, conscripts, private militia members, former insurgents and other irregular actors.

3. It must be remembered that the DDR process cannot simply disarm former combatants and return them to their homes without support or employment. Such actions will breed instability, criminality and possibly insurrection. Therefore, other agencies are required to work to avoid such problems. Work schemes and re-training will be necessary to occupy former soldiers and to support wider development. Special programmes may be required to deal with situations involving child soldiers.

4. To this end, the DDR process will require a wide range of agencies, with the military forces playing a supporting role. The likely tasks that the COIN military forces will undertake in a DDR process include:

a. disarmament of security forces, militias and/or illegally armed groups;

b. weapons collection and accounting;

c. weapon destruction;

d. protection, escort and transportation of demobilized personnel, particularly where they may be threatened by elements yet to be demobilized; and

e. assistance in selection for a new security service.

5. Not all former combatants may be demobilized. Many, either as collective groups or individuals, may undergo a reform process in the creation of new security forces.

6. Likewise, the SSR process will require a comprehensive approach involving a wide range of agencies. Reform may be required for a variety of elements within a security apparatus, including the military, police, judiciary, border and customs control, prison services and national defence control, administration and governance. The level of reform required will depend upon the situation and state of the indigenous security forces and administration.

7. Many possibilities exist for the development or reform of security forces. The design of the SSR programme should be undertaken within the campaign planning process, and specifically assigned forces should be allocated. The design for the reformed security sector should reflect the nation and environment (including social structures and culture) within which it

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[71] See B-GL-300-000/FP-001 *Land Operations* for details regarding demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) processes.

will occur. Structures or power arrangements that may have lead or contributed to the insurgency or crisis in the past should be avoided to the greatest extent possible.

8. Tribal lines and loyalties will have to be overcome in some cases. This may occur between unit and sub-unit lines, in which units (battalion level) are integrated, but at the sub-unit level, they are affiliated along regional or tribal lines. Indigenous traditions and opinions will have to feed whatever construct is designed.

9. The military's role in the SSR programme will likely include the following tasks:

a. selection and recruitment of future security force personnel;

b. allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure; and

c. training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility to indigenous military and, in the short term, other security forces such as police and border guards.

629. SUPPORT TO RECONSTRUCTION AND GOVERNANCE—CIVIL-MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS

1. Although the military forces may assume initially some provision of essential services, reconstruction and governance, long-term development and governance maturity will require the application of other agencies, working in conjunction with the military.

2. Reconstruction and governance should initially seek to provide emergency and essential services to a population. This will not only address issues and stresses within the environment but will gain local support for the campaign and increase campaign legitimacy.

3. Reconstruction and governance will require a comprehensive approach with the military in a supporting role to other agencies better suited for these inherent development tasks. This may be realized through the creation of civil-military transition teams (CIMITTs). These are defined as: "An organization designed to integrate and coordinate interagency and multidisciplinary efforts within a given geographic region. Note: Its purpose is to develop capacity in local agencies and institutions in order to promote long-term stability. It may be referred to as a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in some theatres."[72]

4. Civil-military transition teams will incorporate a number of agencies under a single construct and ideally command in order to conduct capability building within the developing nation, its government and administration. It will attempt to address the root causes of instability and the insurgency itself if possible. It will gain support and legitimacy for the campaign and create the solutions for enduring stability. It may assume a wide variety of tasks, such as training of police and prison officials, government leadership training, infrastructure repair and development and other civil capacity development and expansion. These organizations should be considered units or formations that undertake tasks and create effects that support operational objectives. They must operate in cooperation and synchronization with other units and activities in the theatre.

5. The military's role will be a supporting one. The military may assume some of the capacity building, particularly in the early stages of the campaign when not all of the other agencies have deployed. The military will be responsible for local security, defence and force protection of other agencies. The military may also assist with C2 structures and support, intelligence and threat analysis support and liaison support, to name a few possibilities.

[72] Submitted to the Army Terminology Panel, September 2007.

6. Likely military tasks within infrastructure reconstruction and development include the following:

a. provision of mobility on roads, railways and waterways;

b. restoration of airfields, harbours and ports;

c. provision of essential water, fuel and power;

d. restoration of essential health and public buildings and services, including sewerage and waste;

e. limited medical assistance/advice;

f. enabling of humanitarian aid; and

g. securing key national infrastructure.

7. As the security situation improves, many of these tasks should be assumed by other agencies, including indigenous elements.

8. The military may assume some initial governance tasks, but ideally these will be undertaken by other agencies better suited for their conduct and development. Requirements for interim governance by military forces and other agencies may include the following:

a. commercial support and economic institutions (e.g., establishment of local markets, banks and village business cooperatives);

b. public transportation nodes such as ports and airports;

c. management of essential services and industries;

d. education institutions and infrastructure;

e. public civil service institutions, including refuse, health, customs, media, etc.;

f. political institutions, particularly at the local, municipal level, such as a mayor's office and support staff;

g. humanitarian assistance and aid distribution;

h. enabling political negotiation at local level;

i. providing pan-agency C2 framework;

j. rule of law implementation, specifically policing duties against criminal activity and border control; and

k. support to elections.

9. The provision of infrastructure and governance support will be developed and implemented through the campaign plan and its lines of operation. Detailed plans will have to be refined once the command and control relationship has been established across any coalition and with the indigenous authorities.

630. ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES

1. Within the comprehensive approach to the campaign, there will be agencies operating that may require military assistance. This assistance may include provision of transport and security to select NGOs or other such assistance to their operations. Such assistance must be clearly linked to the Info Ops being concurrently conducted to ensure a unified message and effect are created. Such assistance must also be in line with operational objectives and, where

possible, provide additional opportunity for information collection and the development of situational awareness.

SECTION 8
ENABLING OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN

1. Enabling operations consist of those activities and tasks that enable forces to conduct other tactical operations. Enabling operations include activities such as the withdrawal, relief in place, passage of lines and advance to contact to name a few.[73]

2. Enabling operations within a COIN environment will be conducted using extant principles and TTP. However, special consideration will have to be made with respect to the threat and overall COIN campaign and environment.

3. Echelon forces will require additional security and protection given the ubiquitous nature of insurgent threats. It may be unlikely that the conduct of an advance to contact will be required, but all forces moving from one point to another must conduct such movement as a tactical movement prepared for engagement.

4. Relief in place will occur repeatedly throughout a COIN campaign at all levels of command. The details required for passage to the incoming force must not only include the immediate tactical situation and threat but must include a holistic hand-over of the environment, its actors and influences, local culture and power structures.

5. Reconnaissance patrols will continue to be conducted within a COIN campaign and will likely include both mounted and dismounted patrols. As in conventional operations, they may be conducted as point, area or route reconnaissance. The information requirements will vary with the specific task; however, they will likely focus on both physical terrain and elements of the local populace. Within a COIN environment, the conduct of reconnaissance patrols will require some specific considerations:

a. Small reconnaissance patrols (which are relatively weak) will be vulnerable, particularly if conducted overtly. They can be easily attacked in any terrain or swarmed by crowds in urban areas.

b. Covert patrols have a reduced threat profile, avoid early warning to insurgents of their presence and do not reveal the information being sought.

c. Reconnaissance patrols with technical requirements (e.g., route reconnaissance) should include specialists such as engineers, where applicable. Depending upon the intended mission, it may include members of other agencies, such as NGOs (although these will more likely be classified as liaison visits).

d. The insertion of covert patrols and OPs is very difficult in dense urban areas. Ingenuity must be used to disguise their insertion, which can be concealed amongst an overt operation.

e. A QRF must be prepared to extract or reinforce the patrol.

f. The patrol may assume additional responsibilities, as opportunities present themselves, such as the conduct of snap VCPs.

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[73] See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations* for more details regarding enabling operations.

SECTION 9
RESERVES AND QUICK REACTION FORCES

1. Quick reaction forces (QRFs) are formed at the tactical levels in order to react to the unexpected, exploit opportunities and success and support/reinforce threatened areas and friendly forces. They are simply a form of reserve forces.

2. In addition to supporting military forces, there will be a requirement to provide rapid support through a QRF to local security forces and institutions. Even in dense urban areas, civilian police stations and other offices of local authorities can feel isolated and threatened. In rural areas, police outposts and border stations are vulnerable to attack due to their isolation. It is important that such local forces be made aware the military forces are willing and capable of rapidly and effectively coming to their aid. Without this confidence, they will be unwilling to undertake operations and may flee from their posts, thereby allowing insurgents to destabilize an area and undermine the government control.

3. Likewise, coalition military forces operating from small platoon-sized bases or patrolling at the section and multiple levels will at certain times require reinforcement or extraction. QRFs must be ready to respond to such calls for support. QRFs may also be used to exploit brief opportunities to strike at insurgents or to secure intelligence finds.

4. Thus, QRFs must be identified and held in readiness to go to the aid of threatened detachments or to exploit possible successes. The planning of QRFs in a COIN operation should consider the following:

a. The establishment of fixed communications means between the force and those local security elements (such as police posts) that are within the unit's AO and for which the units are responsible.

b. The allocation and practice of alternative routes in order to reduce the risk of ambush from insurgents who have deliberately planned to attack the relieving force.

c. The allocation of armoured vehicles to the QRF to increase mobility and force protection. There is a possibility that they may be blocked on an approach route or ambushed with anti-armour weapons.

d. The use of helicopters for rapid movement. This is often the best option for rapid insertion but is vulnerable to all types of fire and may not be able to land in dense urban environments.

e. The design of a QRF as an all-arms grouping is based on manoeuvre forces with embedded supporting forces such as field engineers, fire support and medical support.

SECTION 10
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. Within the continuum of operations, overall success is generally measured by progress along the spectrum of conflict towards the end of less violence. Whilst this holds true for COIN, there can be much finer indications of success as operations are conducted over a period of time. Even though the measurement of overall success is of interest to all levels, strategic to tactical, many of the indications will be measured at the tactical level.

2. In order to determine progress in a campaign, a commander will assess the conduct of the campaign through measures of performance (MoP) and measures of effectiveness (MoE).[74] Whilst MoP ask the question, "Are we doing the task right?" MoE ask the question, "Are we doing the right tasks to create the desired effects?"

3. MoE are defined as: "a criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected system behaviour or capabilities over time."[75] MoE refer to the desired effects and whether or not the activities conducted have created those effects, that is, achieved results. They apply to both fires and influence activities.

4. With respect to fires and their effects on the physical plane, MoE remain relatively obvious. An attack may have been conducted well, but if it failed to seize the assigned objective or failed to achieve its purpose, then the MoE were not met and the activity failed.

5. With influence activities and effects on the psychological plane, MoE are applied to activities and the resulting changes in understanding, perception and the will of the target audience. Given all of the individual and environmental variables in the human decision-making process, developing MoE for influence activities and effects on the psychological plane may be one of the most daunting intellectual tasks facing a commander. Influence activities seek to work through external and internal filters in order to affect understanding and will. These filters are often culturally and socially based. Hence, the planning and conduct of these activities is an *art* requiring the commander's subjective feel for their effect. The results of these influence activities require as defined a set of indicators as possible in order to detect changes in perceptions, understanding, attitudes and behaviours. These indicators need to account for the effect of cultural and environmental influences.

6. Developing appropriate MoE to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very difficult task. Willpower, perceptions and beliefs are all less-than-completely-tangible variables that defy simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of gauging a target audience's attitude. Trends, however, require a definable baseline, and this will be difficult to identify.

7. At the start of an operation, the start-state of the security situation should be noted and, ideally, recorded statistically. Indicators to be examined in a specific area may include the following:

a. number of murders or killings;

b. number of insurgent attacks on government buildings, persons and security forces;

c. number of violent incidents and general levels of crime;

d. number and intensity of public demonstrations;

e. state and provisions of civil services such as sanitary collection services, schools open and government offices open;

f. police station manning and equipping and the profile of police presence in public;

g. commercial activities, particularly small shops and open markets; and

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[74] For a more complete discussion on measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

[75] Army Terminology Panel, May 2006.

h. public activities in urban areas, particularly at night.

8. As the mission progresses, improvements in the above indicators will indicate the measure of effectiveness. The development and application of measures of effectiveness is key to understanding and fostering success in a campaign.

9. Success, that is, improvements in the civil situation, will not occur evenly over a region. Improvements may occur in one area, while an area in which the insurgents have more influence and power will be slower to improve. Likewise, improvements may come more rapidly in the daytime, but the situation will be worse at night. Such indicators will allow the security forces to focus their resources more effectively.

SECTION 11
CONDITIONING THE TACTICAL LEVEL FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

1. Commanders and soldiers alike must be made to appreciate the differences between COIN and conventional campaigns. Their actions and activities must be guided by the philosophy and principles of COIN. This must begin in the training for deployment and continue throughout the operation. It is very much an intellectual challenge that must accompany the training in TTP specific to COIN. Points that must be considered in educating commanders and soldiers in COIN will include the following:

a. Cultural training that will inform attitudes towards the civilian population. A lack of cultural awareness and understanding can generate considerable animosity between civilians and soldiers. Cultural training must include not only macro-level factors (religion, language, geography, etc.) but also micro-level factors (traditional, local political constructs, tribal identities and relations, local mannerisms and the like). Soldiers must be made to appreciate the fear, stress and frustration that the civilian populace will feel in times of an insurgency. Furthermore, they must appreciate the effect that their tactical operations will have on the local populations. Simply trying to imagine how one would feel if an insurgency and COIN operations were taking place in one's own neighbourhood will go a long way towards developing an understanding attitude and empathy towards civilians during operations.

b. Junior leaders and soldiers must be made to realize the key importance that they have in the information gathering and intelligence process. Every soldier must realize they are a sensor or information collector. Patrol commanders must conduct detailed patrol debriefs with their troops and provide detailed patrol reports to the intelligence and operations staff. Additionally, soldiers require regular feedback regarding the value and usefulness of the information they provide.

c. Commanders and soldiers must have measured expectations regarding the quality and calibre of the local security forces. In many failed or failing states, the local police and military will not be of a standard common to many soldiers. They must realize that these assets, despite some shortcomings, have great knowledge of the local issues, threats and insurgents' methods. Furthermore, soldiers and junior leaders must be made to realize that part of their mission is to educate and improve local forces where necessary.

d. Junior leaders and soldiers must be made to realize that COIN is a complicated, long process and that success only comes after a long period of security and development. Furthermore, success cannot be measured by offensive action

and the number of insurgents killed because for every insurgent killed there will be at least one more recruit ready to take the deceased person's place. In fact, the soldier must understand that COIN is a battle of wills and that attrition may be the insurgent's friend. They must understand that success comes through the gaining and maintaining of the public will over the long term.

e. All ranks must realize the operational and strategic implications that individual actions at the tactical level can have across the entire operation. An overreaction to a threat or failure to react to a small civilian emergency can critically undermine the operation and the esteem of the security forces in the minds of the public, nationally and internationally.

SECTION 12
CULTURAL AWARENESS

1. **General**. Historically, an understanding of the host nation's (HN's) culture is critical to success in COIN. Cultural awareness (CA) can reduce battlefield friction and the fog of war during COIN and thus improve the ability to accomplish the mission. CA gives insight into the intent of insurgents and other groups in the battlespace, while reducing cultural friction with the HN peoples. Additionally, CA assists in building rapport while preventing misunderstandings that undermine support for the security forces.

2. **Cultural Considerations**. Culture is a broad and encompassing term. The following descriptions define the key aspects of culture:[76]

a. **Cultural Terrain**. Culture is simply another element of the terrain, environment and a particular battlespace. Cultural terrain parallels geographic terrain for military consideration as both influence decisions. Cultural terrain presents battlespace obstacles and opportunities.

b. **Cultural Factors**. Cultural factors are dynamic aspects of society that have the capacity to affect military operations. They include religion, ethnicity, language, customs, values, practices and perceptions. All these factors affect the thinking and motivation of the individual or group and make up the cultural terrain of the battlespace. Not all factors are applicable to all operations, and additional factors may be considered as necessary.

c. **Cultural Awareness**. Cultural awareness is the knowledge of cultural factors and an understanding of their impact on the planning, conduct and outcome of military operations. Cultural awareness results from both standardized and specific training.

3. **Power Structures**. Within an environment and its culture(s), commanders must come to understand the power structures, both formal and informal, that exist and will influence the outcome of the campaign. Within a single group or situation, there may be a number of power structures. Those who appear to be in charge, may, in actual fact, have very limited powers. Not all elements within a social group may acknowledge uniformly the actual power and influence of a certain leader. Furthermore, leaders in one field, such as religion, may have influence and power in other social fields, such as politics. In many communities, the only authority figure that locals acknowledge may be a local or tribal elder, despite the existence of a

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[76] Excerpt from American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) Cultural Awareness Project Team Final Report, March 2005.

central government. Commanders must come to understand these power structures and work with them to further the campaign objectives.

4. **Operations**. Cultural considerations must be fully incorporated into the conduct of operations. Commanders must understand the impact of culture on the execution of their operations and plans and the implications inherent in the fluid nature of the complex environment. All personnel must consider culture during the reassessment of the battlespace, the amendment of existing plans and transition of authority/battle handover.

5. **Cultural Awareness During Relief in Place**. A key piece of the successful relief in place between tactical units and formations is the exchange of cultural information.

6. **Training**. Any pre-deployment training for a specific mission area must include briefings concerning the culture issues relevant to the operational area. If a specific AO is known prior to deployment, then cultural awareness training should include any aspects that are unique to that particular region. Aspects of the culture should be folded into pre-deployment training exercises.

SECTION 13
THE TACTICAL-LEVEL COMMITTEE SYSTEM

631. ESTABLISHING THE COMMITTEES

1. **General**. The comprehensive approach and its multi-agency execution of the COIN campaign demands close cross-agency planning and coordination down to the lowest levels. The committee system of coordination provides for such cooperation in the multi-faceted approach to defeating the insurgency in both the short and long terms. It is especially important when a formal single chain of command has not been established or other agencies and organizations not within the formal chain of command participate in the campaign.

2. **Roles**. The committee system will mirror that which is built at the operational level but will be implemented and influenced at an appropriate level of civilian and police authority. The various committees established should reflect the **lines of operation** established in the campaign plan. In many cases, the committees will be based on geographical and civilian lines of organization, such as municipalities and counties. At the tactical level, the role of the committee system remains the same as that of operational level or national committees:

a. establishment of priorities;

b. coordination of intelligence and security;

c. coordination between security and civil activities;

d. joint consultation and, as far as security will permit, joint planning;

e. joint direction of operations;

f. arrangements for public safety and protection of public institutions; and

g. direction of the Info Ops / influence activities.

3. The committee system will harmonize the fires and influence—the comprehensive operations—of the campaign at the tactical level.

4. **Regional, Provincial and District Committees**. Fully integrated coordinating committees are necessary at various subordinate, tactical levels. These will comprise the regional representatives of the agencies cooperating in the conduct of the COIN. The

committees will often be based on boundaries that reflect civil administration and local government boundaries in regions, provinces, counties and/or districts.

5. **Committee Features and Membership**. Depending upon the level concerned, a number of committees may be formed, or at the lowest social levels, a single committee may be formed to deal with all issues. In the establishment and conduct of the tactical-level committee system, the following should be noted:

a. These lower-level committees and any subordinate coordinating bodies may be referred to as operations or action committees. The taxonomy may have to be flexible to reflect the desires of indigenous leaders or those of international organizations participating.

b. The chairman is usually the senior officer/administrator of the local indigenous civilian administration, in whose support the security forces are working. Depending on the size of the area, he could be a minister appointed for the purpose, a provincial governor, the chairman of a county council, a civil chief executive officer or a mayor of a large city. Depending upon the local culture and society, he may be a religious leader with influences in other fields. Commanders and agency leaders must avoid assuming that the same social or political delineations that exist in their own societies will work in the society and culture in question.

c. The local police and military commanders and the intelligence and security organization representatives will form the membership of appropriate security and supporting intelligence committees. Local civilian experts may either be full members or "in attendance," as the occasion demands. Coalition formation commanders of the appropriate level would normally attend the appropriate host country's committees.

d. Senior administrators from various NGOs and international organizations operating in the region may sit on the committee(s) or be in attendance.

e. Depending upon the culture concerned, local religious and/or tribal leaders may also attend the committees.

6. **Town, Ward and Village Level**. Smaller, less formal committees are needed to coordinate civil, police, military and intelligence operations at the lower levels without jeopardizing security or creating a cumbersome bureaucracy. This is the level at which the campaign plan is implemented as tactical-level action. It must be seen to succeed to retain the loyalty and support of the people. It is important that local interests are represented and that the people can relate to government policy. Locally acknowledged leadership figures must be included if the system and campaign are to have legitimacy and thus support at the local level. Failure at this level will mean defeat. The chairman is normally the head of the civil administration, possibly the local mayor, the chief administrative officer, the rural council chairman or even tribal elder. The membership reflects the police, military and other interests at this level. The military representative may be a battalion or company commander, depending on the scale and geographical area concerned.

COMMITTEE LEVEL	MILITARY LEVEL OF COMMAND	CIVILIAN POLICE	CIVIL ADMINISTRATION	OTHERS
National	Coalition commander and political advisor (POLAD).	Chief constable of national police and paramilitary police commanders.	Senior government official or minister of defence or internal affairs.	UN special envoy or other international parties. National religious leaders.
Provincial or large regional	Formation commander.	Chief of city police or provincial-level police force.	Senior provincial minister or federal representative. Mayor or large city.	Administrators for major NGOs. Local religious leaders.
Regional, county or city.	Unit commander.	Local police chief, Division commander or paramilitary police.	Mayor or senior administrative officer for city/town or county administrator.	Local NGO officers. Local religious authorities.
Town, district.	Sub-unit commander[77] (possibly platoon level in remote areas[78]).	Station police chief(s).	Mayor or district representative. Tribal leader. Religious leader.	Local NGO. Local religious authority.

Figure 6-1: Example Delineation of a Committee System

632. CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN AND COIN PRINCIPLES

1. It will be important that all members of the committees, at whatever level, fully understand the role and capabilities of the military element. They must also understand their limitations in terms of resources, skills and ROE. Furthermore, they must understand the national strategy and campaign plan, including their individual roles and that of the committee itself. Many members of the committee will not be familiar or even comfortable with these issues, and military personalities must be prepared to take a leadership role in what may be, initially at least, a collective education process. Likewise, military members of the committees will have to become familiar with the abilities and limitations of their counterpart agencies.

2. The committees, even at the local level, may incorporate more than military, police and local government; they may include leaders from other government departments, representatives from international organizations and even NGOs if appropriate. Sub-committees focusing on specific issues such as security or regional development may also be created as required.

3. Military commanders must remember that principles are easier to affirm than to apply, particularly in a COIN campaign with its inherent variables, tensions and multiple agencies. The committee system will help coordinate actions and harmonize means across the various agencies. In many failed or failing states where insurgencies will occur, there will be a lack of professionally trained administrators, and other professionals will lack depth and extensive

[77] At this level, formal committees may not exist, but the military commander will conduct individual liaison and coordination and call together ad hoc meetings as an issue may warrant.

[78] The same manner of ad hoc coordination may be required at the platoon level should a platoon be operating away from the sub-unit with its own AO.

training. Hence, progress and implementation of the principles and plan will be slow and require patience on the part of the military.

4. For their part, military commanders must remember that enduring campaign success will only be realized through the benefits and development for which other agencies are required. Other agencies enhance and truly enable the concept of comprehensive operations. Only in this manner will the support of the populace be obtained.

5. There will be a need for tact, understanding and compromise as individuals and organizations are persuaded to give up some of their power and influence in the interests of greater efficiency and closer cooperation.

633. FACILITATION OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

1. **Boundaries**. Civil administration, police and military unit boundaries should be the same in the interests of liaison and planning and coordination and to avoid operational and intelligence conflicts and confusion. Police boundaries usually coincide with those of the civil administration. In cases of disagreement, military boundaries should conform to the civil/police ones because the latter are usually well established and will remain when the land force withdraws. Occasionally, it may be expedient to adjust boundaries in order to bring a known insurgent organization within the area of responsibility of one commander.

2. **Location of Headquarters and Joint Operations Centre**. A joint operations centre at each level of command in support of the committee system provides the focal point for the conduct and coordination of operations and for the collection and processing of information. It also provides a secure meeting place for the civil authorities, police and military commanders and has the staff machinery for disseminating decisions for implementation by all the various forces and organizations within the local boundary. Other points to note in the establishment of the HQ and joint operations centre are:

a. it should be located, if possible, at the police HQ where police files and intelligence are readily accessible;

b. if the military HQ is not co-located, communications must be established between the two locations; and

c. OPSEC will remain an important consideration when working with local government and police forces.

634. EXECUTION OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM—COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. **Committee Directives and Operational Orders**. The committee framework will vary with each situation but should run along the following lines:

a. The committee chairman or director of operations will issue a policy directive for the implementation of the national and campaign plan at that regional level. Military assistance in drafting this document may be required. The directive should reflect the lines of operation and objectives in the campaign plan and tie together the activities for all agencies involved at that level and in that region. It is issued initially as a guiding document and reviewed periodically.

b. Formation and unit commanders issue operational orders that reflect and implement the committee policy directive and highlight the military's support to each of the lines of operation. It translates the general policy direction into tactical activities. It will need regular review and adjustment based on the MoE.

c. Regular, and at some levels daily, operational meetings will provide feedback between agencies and allow for coordination and updated direction as required.

d. At the unit level, the operational order should guide the day-to-day activities of the sub-units, however, it will require regular updating particularly the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and IRs. Specific orders are then issued for individual deliberate operations.

2. **Command and Control**. Much emphasis has been placed on the need for centralized direction and decision-making. However, the function of the committee system is essentially to provide a forum for planning and coordination. The command function remains the prerogative and responsibility of each military and police commander or civil department head. These officers and officials will be expected to consult one another before taking any initiatives or making any changes to previously agreed policy or plans.

3. **Rapid Decisions**. There will be occasions when a quick decision is needed, perhaps to exploit a fleeting opportunity or to foil an unexpected insurgent initiative. If there is no time for a military commander to consult his superior or his committee members, he will have to make a timely decision and act upon it. Provided that a good understanding exists amongst the members of the local committee and within the chain of command, and that some thought has been given on how to react to foreseeable contingencies, the commander's decision should be a sensible one. A commander who tells his superior, the police officer and, if necessary, the chairman of his committee what he has done and why he has done it should expect rapid support and cooperation. In making such decisions and taking independent action, commanders must consider the effects that will occur with regard to these other agencies. Decisions and actions should reflect the principles of COIN and support the long-term operational objectives of the campaign.

SECTION 14
EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ARMS AND SUPPORT ARMS

1. **General**. The land force will play the key role in the conduct of a COIN. As with any type of military campaign, the combat arms and support arms will all have separate, but mutually supporting, roles to play. Military forces generally face a lower threat from insurgents than they do when facing a conventional enemy. However, the nature of COIN operations creates a high demand for patrolling and interaction amongst the civil population and a unique level of exposure to an enemy indistinguishable from the local populace. A premium will be placed on infantry for these tasks. Hence, non-infantry arms may be required to re-role in order to undertake these manpower-intensive operations. Regardless of the situation, such units must be prepared to conduct their normal combat functions should the threat warrant it.

2. **Infantry**. Given the nature of COIN—with its requirement for pervasive, wide-spread operations—infantry units will be in high demand. Both mechanized and light infantry complete their missions dismounted (in all operations, not simply COIN). Mechanized infantry have the advantage of protection, mobility and firepower, while light infantry adapt more readily to close terrain such as urban areas, jungle and mountainous terrain. Given the need for rapid reaction, the size of AOs and the "ink spot" doctrine of continually extending the influence of the security forces and their campaign, even light infantry will require integral means of transport for the conduct of operations. Regardless of the means of transport, all junior leaders and soldiers must understand that success in COIN will only be realized by dismounting and spending time amongst the local populace and gaining information from them.

3. **Armour**. Armour, and all heavy firepower, must be used most judiciously in COIN so as to avoid the "David versus Goliath" PSYOPS advantage this could give to the enemy, as well as

to limit unnecessary collateral destruction. Nonetheless, particularly in high intensity COIN operations, armour plays a valuable role with its characteristics of firepower and protection. In rural areas, armour provides both breaching capabilities and the power to strike at insurgents outside the effective range of many of the typical insurgent small arms. In urban areas, armour can provide invaluable protection, neutralize strong points and assist in breaching structures. When not employed in this capacity, the troops may be employed in presence patrolling and movement control.

4. **Armoured Reconnaissance**. The mobility, protection, firepower and surveillance capabilities that are offered by armoured reconnaissance forces make them useful for a variety of tasks. Apart from surveillance and mounted reconnaissance patrols, they can perform area security, lines of communication security, route picketing, convoy escort and form part of a QRF, amongst other tasks. Nonetheless, armoured reconnaissance personnel must be prepared to dismount and interact with the local population in order to maximize their usefulness as information collectors and confidence builders.

5. **Dismounted Reconnaissance and Snipers**. Given the requirement for intelligence gathering and the need to conduct covert operations in close terrain, reconnaissance and sniper detachments will prove very useful. Apart from gathering information, they can establish and man covert OPs that will trigger the deployment of other forces to kill or capture insurgents and disrupt their actions. They can also provide over-watch and protection for deliberate operations such as cordons and searches.

6. **Aviation**. Aviation assets deployed in a COIN will prove most useful in the same manner as conventional operations. Apart from troop movement, sensor tasks and fire support, aviation assets provide valuable over-watch during deliberate operations. Timings become crucial as their appearance before the start of a deliberate operation will give early warning to insurgents.

> *Prior to any ambush, we would select and prepare our ambush positions, but we would not occupy them since helicopters would always overfly the route ahead of the convoy looking for ambushes and roadblocks...The helicopter over flight was our usual tip off that the convoy was coming and a signal to us to put out the roadblock and occupy our positions.*
>
> **—Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif, a *mujahideen* from the Soviet-Afghan war**
>
> *Col. A. Jalali and Lester Grau,* The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, *Vol.1, Stirling VA: The Military Press, 2000, p. 11.*

7. **Artillery**. Precision capabilities will allow the employment of artillery against pinpoint targets. When not providing observation and fire support, their forward observation teams can act as liaison cells for rifle companies and assist in manning command posts. The batteries may be employed in presence patrolling, including assistance providing force protection for firm bases.

8. **Engineers**. During COIN, engineers will continue to provide their mobility, counter-mobility and general engineer support to all forces in theatre. This will include a focus on the detection and clearing of IEDs. Their capabilities will be a mainstay of military-led development and reconstruction tasks, and their impact can be substantial. Commanders must give careful consideration to the balance of resource and time allocated between CIMIC and support to the force itself. A heavy weighting of resources to support for the force, vice CIMIC projects, may send the wrong message to the local population.

9. **Signals**. In addition to providing communications to the force itself, the military will be required to establish communications with other agencies, such as police. This may entail the provision of signals detachments to those locations, particularly if communications are to be secure.

10. **Military Police**. Military police may be tasked to provide direct liaison to civilian police services and in doing so will be able to provide an accurate assessment of the capabilities and attitudes of those police forces.

ANNEX A
CULTURAL INFORMATION
RELIEF IN PLACE TEMPLATE[79]

1. **General**. This template provides commanders and staff with a guide/checklist that identifies key questions pertaining to cultural information that must be addressed during a TOA. This template may also be useful as a reference document during the conduct of a counter-insurgency (COIN). It should be used in conjunction with Chapter 2.

2. **Transfer of Cultural Information**. Cultural information included in this template should be made available to units, down to the lowest level, preparing to enter the battlespace. As a minimum, the following should be addressed during the TOA.

6A01. LEADERSHIP AND POWER STRUCTURES

1. Who are the leaders in your battlespace?

   a. What groups or interests do they represent?

   b. What are their personality types?

   c. What is your unit history with each leader?

   d. What is your personal assessment of each leader?

   e. What level of control does each leader exert on his/her group?

   f. What level of influence does each leader have within the battlespace?

   g. What strategies have you used to interact with each leader?

   h. Do some leaders have more or less power than it appears?

   i. How often do you meet with each leader and why?

   j. What meeting format do you use? What works best?

   k. What negotiating strategies do you find most effective with each leader?

   l. Is there a succession plan?

   m. If so, what is the plan to manage this change?

   n. What specific incidents with your units during your tour have impacted your relationship with each leader, and what have you done to alter perceptions based on that impact?

   o. What are the relationships between leaders, and how have those relationships impacted your mission?

   p. How have you attempted / how do you plan to influence relationships between leaders to alter the battlespace environment?

   q. What outstanding issues do you have with each leader that may impact the mission/battlespace? What current contracts are in force with each leader?

   r. Hand over all meeting reports from meetings with leaders as available.

   s. Hand over all biographical reports on each leader as available.

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[79] Excerpt from ABCA Cultural Awareness Project Team Final Report, March 2005.

t. Hand over all intelligence assessments on each leader as available.

2. What are the influential groups in your battlespace?

a. How influential is each group?

b. How does each group influence the battlespace?

c. Has each group had a helpful, neutral or hostile relationship with your unit, and how has that impacted your mission?

d. What strategy have you employed to influence the behaviour of each group?

e. What specific incidents with your units during your tour have impacted your relationship with each group, and what have you done to alter perceptions based on that impact?

f. How does each group interact with other groups, and what impact have those interactions had on your mission and/or the battlespace?

g. What is the source of power for each group, and how can you influence that source of power to accomplish your mission?

h. What outstanding issues do you have with each group that may impact the mission? What current contracts are in force with each group, and how do those contracts influence the group to support the mission?

i. How does each group fit into the campaign plan?

j. What non-traditional shadow groups influence the battlespace but may not be readily apparent to an outsider?

k. Hand over all meeting reports and intelligence reports on each group.

6A02. GOVERNMENT

1. What is the current government structure in the battlespace, and how does this structure differ from historical data?

2. Which elements of government are functioning well, and which are functioning poorly? Why?

3. What actions have you taken to alter, improve or change the government in your battlespace?

4. What government services do you consider vital to mission success, and what actions have you taken to ensure they continue?

5. How much influence does each government leader have, and from where is their power derived? (Appointed? Elected? Took power through force?)

6. What financial, support or construction contracts are currently in force or signed with the government, and how do those contracts influence your relationship with the government, people and groups within the battlespace?

7. In what key ways does the battlespace differ from your pre-deployment impressions and studies, and how can we avoid these misperceptions?

6A03. BATTLESPACE AND ENVIRONMENT

1. What are the atmospherics (sense of the community) of each village, town, city, province, region or other key areas within your battlespace, and how do those atmospherics impact your mission?

2. Where have your units encountered the most cultural friction? (Cultural friction may include reactions like open hostility, hostile gestures, sullen looks, etc.) How have you attempted to deal with this friction?

3. What are the perceptions of your soldiers/personnel of the people, groups and leaders in each area and why?

4. What are the perceptions of people, groups and leaders of your soldiers/personnel in each area and why?

5. What are general perceptions or misperceptions of your unit that have hindered or helped your ability to accomplish the mission? How have you attempted to discourage or encourage these perceptions?

6. What are the cultural hot spots within your battlespace? (Include any site where cultural friction could lead to a negative incident that would detract from mission accomplishment.) How can these hot spots be dealt with to reduce friction?

7. What patterns are common on the streets, and how do changes in those patterns indicate shifts in hostility or supportiveness?

8. What other cultural factors may impact your mission? What are the normal working hours and working days? What days are children in school and from what age? How does this information differ from pre-deployment assessments?

9. What external cultural forces, such as religious influence, impact behaviour in your battlespace, and how have you reacted to that influence? What is the cultural significance of outside groups and/or leaders on the groups and leaders in the battlespace?

6A04. RELIGION, LANGUAGE AND CUSTOMS

1. What are the key religions in your battlespace, and how do you perceive religious influence? How do your current perceptions differ from pre-deployment assessments, and how do you account for these differences?

2. Where are the key religious sites within your battlespace? How does each religious site influence your mission (e.g., "no-go" areas to reduce friction)?

3. What influence does religion have on each group and/or leader within the battlespace? How are religious groups and leaders linked with secular groups and leaders, and how does that relationship impact the battlespace?

4. What political influence does each religious group have within the battlespace, and how do they exercise that influence?

5. How does religion influence the everyday behaviour, action and reaction of people within the battlespace?

6. How do religious perceptions and beliefs affect the relationship between your soldiers/personnel and the people? How have you attempted to influence those perceptions and beliefs?

7. What religious minorities live within your battlespace, how are they treated, how do they interact with majority religious groups, and what has your relationship been with these groups?

8. Have you been forced to interject yourself into any religious issues (e.g., minority rights), and how did that action affect the perception of your unit with each group?

9. What are the dominant languages within your battlespace, and how does language impact the relationship between various groups?

10. What major stumbling blocks has language caused between your unit and the people/ groups/leaders?

11. What is the availability of local translators, and have you found them to be trustworthy, effective, biased/unbiased? What tactics can you recommend for recruiting, employing and monitoring local translators?

12. How effective was your pre-deployment language training? What did you do to improve the language capability of your personnel during operations? What phrases or translation tools did you find the most useful to reduce cultural friction caused by language barriers?

13. What local customs have caused the most friction between your personnel and the people? How have you adjusted operations to reduce this friction?

14. Recommend strategies to follow local customs without compromising mission requirements.

15. Which local customs do you recommend must be followed without exception, and which can be ignored without causing undue friction?

16. What customs have your personnel followed that have given you the most dividends in improved perception/atmospherics?

6A05. ONGOING CULTURAL INITIATIVES

1. What cultural initiatives have you undertaken to improve perceptions, reduce friction and gain compliance or neutrality? What initiatives would you recommend for the future, and what would you recommend against?

2. What cultural exchanges have you attempted with groups, people and/or leaders? Have these exchanges been effective?

3. How effective have civil affairs projects been in influencing the battlespace? What strategies and tactics would you recommend to improve or make best use of civil affairs projects and missions?

4. Where do you recommend applying civil affairs projects in the near term to achieve the greatest effect?

6A06. SECURITY AND ARMED GROUPS

1. What cultural influence have you used, or is available, to coerce hostile forces within your battlespace?

2. What cultural tactics (e.g., religious hatred) have hostile forces within your battlespace used against you? How effective were these tactics? How did you try to counter them?

3. What are the cultural vulnerabilities of hostile, non-hostile and supportive groups within the battlespace? Are there inherent cultural frictions that can be leveraged to reduce their effectiveness? How have you exploited these vulnerabilities to ensure mission success?

4. If you are training or working with local security forces, what cultural issues have helped/hindered your relationships? What training strategies work best within this culture?

5. What cultural frictions exist within the security forces that undermine their ability to accomplish their missions? How can we reduce that friction?

6. How do locals view the security services? How do those perceptions impact their effectiveness, and how can we reduce frictions / improve effectiveness?

7. When and on what day do hostile forces conduct attacks and why? Is there any religious or cultural significance to these patterns that can be exploited or used in assessments?

8. What are the crime levels, what types of crime are committed, and what are the reasons behind crime trends? Are there cultural factors that we can influence to reduce crime or identify criminals or criminal groups? How do people accept or reject criminal activity, and how have you used that perception to impact crime?

6A07. OTHER ISSUES

1. What are the cultural differences between rural and urban populations, and is there any resulting cultural friction? How does this affect your mission?

2. Are there any outstanding debts owed to any group, leader or individual in the battlespace? What do we owe and why? Are there any outstanding debts such as compensation or contract fees?

3. What have we promised (money, contracts, support, medical aid, etc.) to groups, leaders or individuals within our battlespace? What benefit will we receive from following through on these promises, and what are the consequences of not following through?

4. Which relationships (with leaders, groups, individuals) should we maintain, which ones should we end, and which ones should we alter and why?

5. What cultural opportunities do you see in this transition? Where can a fresh start help, and where would it hurt?

6. Which groups, leaders and/or individuals will try to take advantage of our relative ignorance of the battlespace environment? What actions are they likely to take and why? How can we counter these actions or use them to our advantage?

7. What are the greatest cultural challenges and dangers to our mission? How should we overcome these challenges?

8. What has been your most successful cultural tactic (e.g. frequent meetings, meals, aid delivery)? What would you like to have tried but didn't because of a lack of resources?

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CHAPTER 7
INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

They have already learned to regret the emergence of new intelligence targets that lack any concrete form: aggressive belief systems not subject to central authority, shifting alliances of dangerous malcontents, stateless migrants disloyal to any country of settlement. It is from those backgrounds that the agents of anti-Western terrorism are recruited.[80]

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

701. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

1. Good intelligence is vital in any campaign and throughout the conduct of all of its lines of operation. It is especially inextricable to successful counter-insurgency (COIN), where it will be in constant and continuous demand. Sound intelligence supports continuing success that over time will wear down the insurgent movement, restricting its capability and reducing its morale. Accurate intelligence will permit commanders to conduct operations with precision, reducing the detrimental effect on the host nation (HN) population and minimizing casualties among friendly forces. The combined effect will be to secure and maintain the morale among the security forces and raise their standing with the civilian population.

2. Effective and precise use of means on both the psychological and physical planes will earn legitimacy and respect, which are vital in the campaign for popular support. Ill-directed and indiscriminate use of force will merely serve to alienate any HN population. It must be appreciated, therefore, that sound intelligence is a precursor to all COIN operations. It must be built up quickly and sustained efficiently from the start of a campaign.

3. Thorough knowledge of the extent of the insurgency, the political and military aims, command structures and logistic network of the insurgents should allow the HN government and coalition forces to develop a long-term overall strategy and sensible military policies to defeat the insurgency on the physical and psychological planes. At all levels, intelligence will permit commanders to put the strategy and policies into practice, allowing for the defeat of the insurgents by killing, capturing or arresting individuals and depriving them of targets, intelligence, the means of command and communication, weapons, ammunition, food and other supplies. Attrition of all these elements will reduce the insurgents' ability to maintain the campaign.

4. In order to be truly successful in a COIN campaign, the concept of intelligence and its analysis must be extremely broad. Intelligence staff will be key to establishing a broad knowledge base regarding all systems within the environment: political, military, economic, social (including religious and cultural characteristics), informational and infrastructure. They must come to understand and describe for the commander power structures and the relationships between these systems and their overall influence on the successful outcome of the campaign. If the objectives of a COIN campaign are in general to gain support of the population and address the underlying causes of the insurgency, these can only be achieved if this broad knowledge base is created. For example, accurate intelligence regarding the exact locations of insurgent forces will be important but will not lead to enduring success if the

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[80] John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda* (London: Key Porter Books, 2003), pg. 364.

intelligence picture does not assess the root causes of the insurgency, such as a lack of economic development and political representation of a particular ethnic minority.

5. Furthermore, intelligence analysis must include the establishment of measures of effectiveness, so that progress on each of the campaign's lines of operation may be measured. This will include a base line or start-state along with specific means to measure progress.

6. There is nothing radical in the application of the fundamentals of intelligence to a COIN campaign. There are, however, three aspects that will carry greater emphasis than might be the case in conventional campaigns:

a. the predominance of human intelligence (HUMINT);

b. the influence of the civilian authority on COIN operations and the consequent constraints and complications on intelligence gathering; and

c. the appearance that, at times, operations are in support of intelligence rather than the reverse.

702. THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

1. In any campaign, the purpose of intelligence is to determine the threat (by accurate and timely assessment of both capability and intentions) and the influencing environmental factors so that the commander may develop a plan to bring about a successful mission and ultimately conclusion to the campaign. In COIN operations, the insurgency—not just the insurgent but the insurgency's idea and appeal—must be defeated, and this can be done only if commanders are given sufficient knowledge of the enemy and other environmental factors.

2. In situations where the insurgent lives among the population without uniform or a recognizable military structure, his capabilities and intentions will be largely determined from information provided by the population and individuals moving in close proximity to him. Sophisticated intelligence sensors, crucial in general war, normally cannot match the HUMINT agent, the informer, surveillance from observation posts or the reports from routine police or army patrols. Time-consuming collation of detail and painstaking analysis may then prove the key to unravelling important aspects of the insurgent's activity and his ability to influence populations. Processing HUMINT is enhanced with the use of recent software applications such as link analysis and spreadsheets.

703. CIVILIAN CONTROL AND POLITICAL, LEGAL CONSTRAINTS

1. Intelligence gathering in a COIN campaign will, in all probability, lack the freedom that may be enjoyed in conventional operations. The primacy of civilian political control, the balance between efforts to defeat the insurgency and those expended on crime prevention and resolution, the need to share with other agencies, legal limitations and the need for admissible evidence for prosecution will all constrain the gathering of intelligence. Military intelligence staffs may find themselves in unfamiliar circumstances, subordinated to civilian control and methods of operating (particularly when supporting police).

704. ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF INTELLIGENCE

1. In operations where the reliance on HUMINT is paramount, many operations and activities will be conducted for the express, or at least parallel, task of gaining information. This is particularly the case for dismounted presence patrols. The dismounted soldier becomes the eyes and ears of an intelligence organization. The value of extensive patrolling and subsequent

debriefing may not be readily apparent to the soldier. For example, the true aim might be to develop a picture of patterns of insurgent behaviour over a protracted period rather than short-term reconnaissance for immediate offensive action. The need to win the minds and hearts of the population so to weaken sympathy for insurgents and thus increase the potential flow of information may also try the soldier's patience and morale as he is obliged to adopt a less aggressive stance than he might otherwise have chosen.

2. The importance of information collection must be stressed to the soldiers, and they also benefit from and are motivated by an information feedback that demonstrates how the information they collected has benefited the mission.

705. PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

1. The four stages of the Intelligence Cycle (direction, collection, processing and dissemination) and the application of the eight principles of intelligence remain extant in COIN and provide the structure within which the intelligence organization operates. The eight principles of intelligence are:

a. centralized control;

b. timeliness;

c. systematic exploitation;

d. objectivity;

e. accessibility;

f. responsiveness;

g. source protection; and

h. continuous review.

SECTION 2
ESTABLISHING A KNOWLEDGE BASE IN SUPPORT OF A COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

706. ASSESSMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

1. The conduct of a successful campaign may require a broad range of elements or systems within an environment to be considered for their role and influence in the campaign. Such is the case in a COIN campaign, in which the population and its various leaders and institutions will play a key role in campaign success, for their support is vital for success. Thus, the systems within the environment must be considered and will cover the range of political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), information and infrastructure (PMESII). Their relationship to the population and support for the campaign must be assessed. It is this necessity that makes the campaigning environment complex and demands that intelligence staff focus on and evaluate all these systems vice simply the insurgent and his military capabilities (Figure 7-1 illustrates the complexity of an environment).




Figure 7-1: Interrelated Elements of an Environment and Society

2. Therefore, the intelligence staff must work to formulate a broad knowledge base that will allow all relevant systems to be understood and engaged as required to create enduring solutions to the insurgency. The knowledge base must include the influences that history and culture play in each system.

3. The knowledge base must also analyze each element of the society, along with the key members of each element, and understand the role they play in the environment, their aims in relation to the campaign and overall success, and the influence they have on other systems within the environment. Apart from creating a detailed situational awareness, the knowledge base should identify **root causes and grievances** that led to the insurgency and crisis in the first place. This will help inform the development of operational objectives and supporting effects. Only in this way will the commander know what, who and how to engage within the campaign to move towards the desired objectives and end-state.

4. Given that enduring solutions to underlying grievances and problems in many of the PMESII systems are beyond the capabilities of military forces, the COIN campaign demands a comprehensive approach that will use various elements of power—multiple agencies—to conduct the campaign and create enduring solutions.

5. Regardless of what agencies are used to undertake activities, much of the assessment in support of operations will come from military intelligence staff. However, just as with the rest of the military, intelligence staff will be limited in their capabilities to conduct a full assessment of all these systems and their major players.

6. Thus, intelligence staff will seek out expertise in each of these areas as required. These may include cultural, economic and political experts, to name a few. Many of these experts will reside in other agencies, and their support of military analysis will be facilitated by the use of intelligence committees.

7. The creation of such a broad knowledge base and its accompanying analysis will allow the commander to decide what effects need to be created in each of these systems in order to

realize operational objectives and thus what activities need to be conducted. The development of the knowledge base will take time and must be guided by an intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process designed for the complexity of the operating environment.

707. A SPECTRUM OF RELATIVE INTEREST

1. The systems in an environment do not exist without the people or actors who populate them. It is these individuals and groups, along with their attitudes regarding the outcome of the campaign, that must be considered and assessed. Hence, this requires a classification of all the actors, which range from the adversary through hostile and neutral to friendly forces and allies within the battlespace, as they relate to the interests and objectives of the friendly force. This may be labelled the **spectrum of relative interest**, and where these actors fit along the spectrum in relation to the desired end-state will weigh heavily on the commander's consideration of what effects he will apply to modify their positions and align them with his interests, that is, have them support the campaign (see Figure 7-2). Some of these effects will be physical, but many others, specifically those seeking to engender support from the target, will be psychological effects, the result of influence activities. The individuals and groups are all targets or target audiences for engagement, either on the physical plane, the psychological plane or both.[81]

2. This approach requires a cultural understanding and stems in part from the need to engender support from local populations and to engage other elements of an environment. In order to support this approach, the knowledge base must gain insight into the psychological plane and the intent, motivations, and relationships of elements in the battlespace in order to move them, through an effect of influence, to a position of acceptance, cooperation, or even support. The assessment and analysis that leads to this spectrum of relative interest categorization supports the targeting process, for each of the audiences on the spectrum of relative interest is assessed with respect to how they may be influenced and moved to a position of support or acceptance.

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[81] With respect to the term "targets," a broader understanding the term must be used. Targets will include adversary elements, friendly and allied elements and neutral audiences. Nothing nefarious is meant by the term, but it should be viewed in the sense of a business advertisement "targeting" a particular audience. Thus, all target engagements are considered together in a complementary and comprehensive fashion.




Figure 7-2: The Spectrum of Relative Interest

3. Each of the groups within an environment may be plotted along the spectrum of relative interest, and an assessment may be made as to what activities are required to either maintain their support or to move them to a position of support—to produce effects on their perceptions, understanding and will, in support of the end-states of the campaign.

4. This approach must also recognize the paradigm shift in information acquisition. In major combat operations, a significant part of the information required to establish understanding by the commander might flow from national or higher echelon sources. However, in a COIN campaign, this shifts towards an information flow model that is more bottom-up, with soldiers in direct contact as the key source of information. In many such circumstances, actionable intelligence regarding adversary targets and the motivations for their support will come from contact with the local populace. Furthermore, such contact will provide useful input for measures of effectiveness, particularly in terms of gauging the reaction of the local populace to the campaign's activities and conduct.

SECTION 3
DIRECTION

708. GENERAL

1. The intelligence cycle will begin with direction that stems from the requirements determined in the campaign planning process and subsequent planning processes for supporting operational plans.

2. Direction will be implemented through national chains of command and through HN and coalition chains of command. Once the campaign begins, plans and direction will likely be formulated, at least in the coalition and with the HN authorities, through a committee system. Whilst there will be certain frustrations in working through a committee system, it will ensure

close coordination and integration amongst different agencies and capabilities, which will allow for effective and complementary direction to be issued.

709. INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY—DESIGN OF INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

1. Early in a COIN campaign, it will be necessary to establish a chain of operational command that reflects the political and military requirements of the HN and assisting coalition. When this has been established, there will be a need for a supporting structure of intelligence staffs placed at appropriate levels in order to provide timely, responsive intelligence for commanders. It is inevitable that the intelligence structure will develop with the campaign. The architecture must anticipate this and deploy progressive stages of capability that can be readily linked together. In parallel with these staffs, a communications network that permits the rapid, efficient passage of intelligence data of different types upwards, downwards and sideways must be established. In a coalition operation, it will need to cross national, military, civilian and service boundaries so that it can link staffs and agencies at every level.

2. Unlike the military chain of command, which is purely hierarchical, this network should be constructed on the principle of providing intelligence from where it is available to wherever it is required. This may result in it bypassing some levels of command in order that it reach the appropriate user. This "skip-echelon" system, like collaborative parallel planning, will ensure information is available on the "pull" rather than the "push" principle at whatever level of command may need it. The intelligence architecture is not simply a communications network, for it includes the allocation of areas of intelligence responsibility (AIR) to each level of command. It specifies precisely the authority to task individual collection assets and allocates the reporting authority—who is responsible for the provision of fused intelligence reports—based on information from collectors. The intelligence architecture should form an annex to the operational directive under the title of the intelligence plan.

3. In support of operations, it may be necessary to form an all-source intelligence centre (ASIC), within which there may be a variety of enabling groups such as HUMINT support group (HSG), a cryptological support group (CSG) or an image intelligence (IMINT) support group (ISG). These may be an element within the contingent of a single nation, or they may be part of a committee system. Specialist intelligence should always be kept under close review when operating with allies, as it can encourage exclusivity and reduce the mutual trust so necessary for effective cooperation.

710. CONSTRAINTS

1. There will be constraints on this free flow of data caused by the necessity to apply the "need to know" principle. This is vital for HUMINT source protection. Some intelligence, perhaps that which is provided from strategic sources, may not be made available to all intelligence staffs at every level. For example, material with national caveats may be made available from a domestic agency for national commanders only. There will be a need for special handling procedures for this and other such material. In such circumstances, as a minimum, a national intelligence cell (NIC) may be established.

711. STRAINING COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

1. Inevitably, extensive intelligence data networks will place a large burden on the communications available. This should be borne in mind when designing the intelligence architecture with as much use being made of existing systems as possible. In a COIN

campaign, the usage by intelligence organizations of available bandwidth will outstrip that of all other users due to the need for access to national databases, imagery products and the output of national agencies. This is particularly the case when satellite communications are established in the theatre.

2. Operational planning must take into consideration this demand on communications infrastructure.

712. CENTRALIZED CONTROL

1. **The Need for Centralized Control**. Intelligence assets are normally centralized at the highest appropriate level of command in order to be available across the widest possible area of operations and group of users. In COIN operations, there are further imperatives for centralized control. Where several intelligence organizations are working against a common target, there is the danger of overlap. While some duplication is necessary to improve the evaluation of information (by its being confirmed from more than a single source), the danger exists in the possibility of a single source being exploited by more than one agency, each in ignorance of one another. This can lead to false confirmation and, in turn, gives the source greater credibility than may be its worth. There is also the potential for undesirable wastage of effort and resources.

2. **The Director of Intelligence**. In designing the intelligence organization, a decision must be made to centrally coordinate all intelligence staffs—military, civilian, HN and coalition. Ideally, a single director of intelligence should be established at the national level, with similar posts at each lower level of command. This may be the civilian administrative authority or military command depending upon the circumstances.

713. INTEGRATION AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM—ESTABLISHING AN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

1. Intelligence committees should be established at each level of command in order to coordinate the collection, processing and dissemination of information and intelligence. Each committee would owe allegiance to the next higher level, which would be responsible for the effectiveness and coordination of the intelligence efforts of those below it. Intelligence committees may be sub-committees of military-police security force committees. Intelligence committees should meet regularly if there is to be a useful exchange and discussion of intelligence and a good working relationship between civil authorities, police and military intelligence staffs established.

2. Membership of the intelligence committee should be arranged mutually between the HN intelligence services, both civilian and military, and those of coalition intelligence staffs. Security classifications will restrict complete sharing of information, and there may be established inner committees of nations with similar resources and interests. This, however, has the potential of creating two classes of nations and accompanying animosity. Efforts must be made to avoid such situations.

714. FUNCTIONS OF AN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

1. The functions of an intelligence committee are as follows:

   a. At the HN level, to keep the government, the civil and military commanders, chiefs of staff, and operations staffs informed of all aspects of intelligence and

security operations and to facilitate the exchange and provision of the intelligence necessary for the prosecution of a strategic campaign.

b. At subordinate levels, to keep its related operations committees and the next higher intelligence committee fully informed with relevant intelligence for operational planning.

c. To advise operational staffs on security and protective measures.

d. To develop the collection plan, against which the collection agencies will be tasked.

e. To direct the collection agencies. The intelligence staffs, through the G3 operations staff, will allocate tasks and priorities along with limitations for when the information must be obtained.

f. Where possible, to establish common procedures for all HN and allied intelligence and security organizations.

g. To provide an appropriate dissemination service to commanders.

h. To ensure coordination. The intelligence committee should ensure that coordination in the following areas occurs:

(1) Civil, police and army boundaries are the same and accord with the civil authority and security force command system. This may not always be possible.

(2) Agreed plans and direction from the committee is allocated to respective members in an appropriate fashion.

(3) Information and intelligence flow downwards as well as upwards and sideways to neighbouring committees where appropriate.

(4) Representatives of government departments and HN experts are co-opted for special advice and local or culture perspectives, with due regard for security. They might come from wide variety of agencies, such as customs services and coastguards, the transportation department, rail services, inland water transport, civil engineering, telecommunications, power and water suppliers and from a wider circle of the HN community, which might include farmers, businessmen and other traders.

715. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE STAFFS

1. Subordinate to the committees, there should be a centralized, integrated staff capable of performing collection, coordination and intelligence requirements management (CCIRM), database management and fusion functions on behalf of all the intelligence staffs of that particular mission. For this reason, the concept of the ASIC was developed. As part of the intelligence plan, clear orders should be given regarding which level has responsibility for maintaining a master database. It is essential to prevent every level of intelligence staff running databases in parallel. Although it will never be possible to avoid some duplication of record-keeping, there should be a minimum of databases with a single level—probably the highest HN or lead coalition nation—maintaining the master database, with subordinate and other levels submitting changes to it in the form of data-change requests. Maintenance of a single database is facilitated by the "pull" rather than the "push" method of information retrieval and by close cooperation between all collectors, analytical staffs and committees.

2. While intelligence committees give general direction—laying down policy and allotting general aims, collection tasks and priorities—they do not exercise command. Command and control remains the prerogative of the commanders, civilian and military, over both their respective intelligence staffs and their collection agencies.

716. FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

1. Whatever the design of the intelligence architecture, the organization and the sources and agencies deployed, there are a number of fundamentals that should be considered in intelligence architecture organization. These must be considered at the outset and plans made for their inclusion in the structures.

a. **Continuity**. Units should be kept in the same area of responsibility (AOR) for as long as possible. This ensures that they become familiar with the HN inhabitants, power structures, other security forces, the terrain and infrastructure. Consequently, they are better able to measure their opponents and they acquire the ability to develop information into intelligence. In short, they get a feel for what is normal as a background against which to observe the abnormal.

b. **Flexibility**. An intelligence organization is designed to meet a specific situation, but it must be receptive to the adjustments needed when the insurgent threat develops in new directions, themes, strategies and tactics, or the situation changes in some other way. Such changes in the situation may make fresh demands upon specialist services such as imagery interpretation or interrogation. Commanders and their intelligence staffs must be able to respond quickly to new needs by redeploying resources and, where necessary, adjusting the functions they fulfill. Furthermore, intelligence staff and the organizations must be capable of collecting and assessing information regarding all systems within the environment rather than simply collecting information on the enemy.

c. **Robust Information Handling Capability**. The intelligence system, whatever its shape, must be able to cope with an increasing amount of information as units, with growing experience, become more productive and better focused. It is hoped that with time the indigenous population becomes sufficiently confident to pass more information to the security forces. As this happens, sufficient intelligence-trained personnel must be made available to collate the additional information, analyze and fuse it, interpret its meaning and disseminate the resulting intelligence in time for it to be used operationally.

(1) **Specialists**. The training of analysts, source handlers, surveillance operators, imagery interpreters, linguists, interrogators and other intelligence specialists must be developed as early as possible if the inevitable shortage of such skilled personnel, which exists at the beginning of any campaign, is to be overcome. The careful husbandry of scarce skills, specific to the ongoing campaign, is necessary throughout a campaign but particularly essential at the beginning until more trained specialists become available.

(2) **Liaison**. If the intelligence organization is to work effectively and efficiently, good liaison between all intelligence organizations and agencies—HN, allied, civilian and military—is paramount. The specialists referred to above are vital elements in establishing effective liaison with HN intelligence agencies. The sensitivities of such intelligence liaison

duties require the liaison officer to have wide experience of military capabilities and knowledge of intelligence.

(3) **Security**. The need for security, especially source protection, must be fully understood within the intelligence organization and among those to whom it is disseminated. The "need to know" principle has to be enforced and clear guidelines given on dissemination, particularly to HN, civilian authorities.

In the immediate era of Canadian Confederation, 1864-1870, the first Canadian Intelligence Service was formed under one Gilbert McMicken, a stipendiary magistrate based in Windsor, Ontario. This period saw numerous and confusing alarms brought on by the American Civil War and the subsequent Fenian insurrectionary movement (an extreme Irish nationalist movement) that raided Canada with the aim to influence British policy on Ireland. McMicken "had organized an excellent detective force along the frontier, and had a wide acquaintance of spies and informers. [Prime Minister Sir John Alexander] Macdonald usually knew more about the plans of the Fenians than the Fenians did themselves."

Extract and quote from Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician *(Toronto: the Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 1956) pages 393, 421 and 438–439.*

717. INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION

1. There is no fixed establishment for an intelligence organization, nor is there any pre-determined scale on which to base its composition. Its size will be determined by the extent and nature of the threat, the commander's requirements, the architecture necessary to support operations and the intelligence collection agencies that can be made available.

2. Within a COIN campaign, there will be an enormous demand for information regarding the systems in the environment (PMESII) that may influence the support of the population and the successful outcome of the campaign. The intelligence staff organization must grow to include specialists in those non-military areas. They will be able to advise the commander and staff planners regarding the role and influences of these systems, the cultural context within which they operate and the means needed to create desired effects within them. In addition to political advisors, intelligence staff may include economic, cultural and religious advisors as necessary. They will also be helpful in the determination of measures of effectiveness.

3. As no two campaigns are ever fought in quite the same circumstances, it follows that the intelligence organization for each new commitment should be customized, although past campaigns will provide guidance and lessons where there are useful parallels. In all cases, the principles of intelligence and fundamentals for organization should be followed.

4. The size of any national contribution to a COIN campaign will have to be designed in consultation with the senior intelligence officer and the intelligence staff of the HN. Almost certainly, the size of intelligence staffs will grow as the campaign develops.

718. FACTORS AFFECTING COMMITTEE INTEGRATION

1. Although a single, centrally controlled, integrated intelligence organization answering to a single director of intelligence is the ideal, the circumstances prevailing in a HN and coalition campaign may not be conducive to such a system. Where it cannot be achieved, a compromise

solution must be brokered between the interested parties. The establishment of a centralized system may be affected by a variety of factors, including:

a. The effectiveness, reliability and vulnerability of the HN's security forces and its intelligence and security organization.

b. Willingness by all parties to cooperate, to share information and details of, perhaps sensitive, HN sources, other intelligence details and, particularly at the higher levels, matters of political sensitivity.

c. The different points of view and doctrine of the security forces, both HN and allied. Because the HN's security forces, in particular the police, must continue to live and work among the population after the eventual departure of the allies, they will be subject to greater internal pressures and constraints. It is important that intelligence staffs overcome this problem as failure to integrate will seriously impede the intelligence effort.

d. The degree of authority delegated to officials at each level of the command structure and committee level (national, provincial, regional and district).

719. ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

1. Whether or not an intelligence committee is established, the normal focus for intelligence for campaign forces will be the all-source intelligence centre (ASIC) or, if a joint operation, the joint ASIC (JASIC), which will be located alongside the joint operations cell (JOC), forming the hub of any joint task force headquarters (JTFHQ).

2. Within the ASIC will be the senior intelligence officer and his staff. This will include CCIRM and the all-source cell (ASC), in which fusion and analysis will be conducted. Representatives of the agencies (e.g., HSG, CSG and ISG) will be located in the ASC. In some cases, it will be necessary for these elements to be afforded their own segregated area with more stringent access controls.

720. TASKING—THE COMMANDER'S INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. Direction will begin with a determination of the commander's intelligence requirements or as they are more commonly termed, priority intelligence requirements (PIR). These will be the product of his mission analysis and should be discussed with the senior intelligence officer, who will be able to ensure that they are accurately focused.

2. It may not be possible in the early stages of a campaign to fully state the commander's intelligence requirements. When this is the case, the intelligence staffs have the responsibility of giving guidance to commanders on the kind of intelligence that they will require. This may be done by an intelligence estimate. An intelligence estimate takes the commander's plan, no matter how broadly defined, and compares it with existing intelligence on the insurgency.

3. Concurrent with the intelligence estimate, the staff should apply intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Together, the intelligence estimate and IPB will give the intelligence staff a good idea of the gaps in their knowledge, which can form the basis of the initial collection plan. It is likely, particularly in the initial stages, that there will be a shortfall in intelligence, with more basic intelligence than current intelligence available. The preparation of an initial collection plan will also give some indication of the necessary collection assets and intelligence architecture that will be needed for the campaign.

4. IBP within a COIN campaign must focus not only on matters of terrain, but on the cultural factors and environmental systems (PMESII) that are at play in the insurgency.

721. DIRECTION TO THE COLLECTORS

1. Even when an intelligence organization has been established, information does not flow automatically into the hands of the intelligence staff and then to the commander. If direction is poor, the intelligence organization may be in danger of collecting large quantities of irrelevant information.

2. A commander must give his intelligence staff clear direction and a firm indication of the priorities to be allotted to his intelligence requirements. On receipt of the commander's intelligence requirements, the intelligence staff will, with the aid of the intelligence estimate and IPB, identify gaps in the intelligence already held. These gaps should be filled by tasking collection agencies (units and resources) to collect against them. The questions put to the collectors are known as information requirements (IR), and their collection is carefully planned by the senior intelligence officer in conjunction with his CCIRM staff, who will coordinate the collection plan, IRs and the related intelligence requirements. The resultant collection plan must, in turn, be approved by the commander before collectors receive their direction from the operations and intelligence staffs. The collection plan will normally be maintained on a collection worksheet that will show the allocation of tasks, in order of priority, to individual collection agencies and the time and form in which information is to be reported.

SECTION 4
COLLECTION

722. GENERAL

1. There are two aspects of collection: exploitation by intelligence staffs of their sources and agencies, and the timely delivery of collected information to intelligence staffs for subsequent processing into intelligence or, when appropriate, directly to weapon systems. Collection will be based on the collection plan drawn up by the intelligence staffs under the direction of commanders and the intelligence committees during the direction phase. The CCIRM staff will manage collection.

723. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE—COLLECTION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

1. The most effective source of intelligence during a COIN campaign will be that derived from the direct questioning of persons, whether formally or informally, in other words, from HUMINT sources. HUMINT sources may include the following:

   a. **Coalition Military Sources**. This will include all ranks of the security forces, especially those whose duties require them to move among the HN population, on patrols, on collection of locally-produced supplies, on liaison with HN authorities, dock workers, airport workers, aid workers and the like. It is vital that all such personnel are thoroughly briefed on the gaps in intelligence that their duties might enable them to fill. They should be made "intelligence aware" so that they are always prepared to report information which may appear trivial but which, when added to other pieces, may be important. Dismounted patrols are critical to collection in COIN operations, and all soldiers are sensors who should be debriefed upon return. Patrol report formats may have to be amended to better suit the environment in which forces are operating.

b. **HN Security Forces**. HN security forces will include military, paramilitary, auxiliaries, reserves and police forces. They will be an excellent source of information along with the cultural reference, but they must be handled with great sensitivity. The forces' intimate knowledge of the local population, culture and related grievances will provide more accurate information, of value both when on duty and on leave. Like their coalition counterparts, they should be encouraged to become intelligence aware. Attempts should be made systematically to brief those going on leave locally and debrief them on return. Care must be taken not to duplicate the information collection from police officers being undertaken by their own intelligence staff. Police equivalents are very likely to be handling their own sources among the population. It is probable that there will be a strong reluctance to disclose these sources to intelligence staffs, but their tasking and the information they provide should be coordinated and fused by the centralized intelligence machinery.

c. **Military Surveillance**. All the usual conventional campaign surveillance sources—observation posts (OPs), mounted and dismounted patrols, reconnaissance units, air reconnaissance and troops supplemented by specialist surveillance equipment—are equally useful in COIN operations. They must be tasked and briefed with great care because insurgents operate more covertly than a conventional enemy. Units will frequently be tasked to mount operations specifically to obtain information or to give cover to other intelligence-gathering operations, for example, the insertion or retrieval of covert OPs.

d. **Covert Surveillance**. Covert surveillance can obtain significant amounts of information for later exploitation, criminal prosecution and for the triggering of security forces to fix and strike targets. Line forces and Special Forces (SF) may be used in this capacity. When SF are deployed, it will be normal for there to be SF liaison officers in the HQ of the formation to which they are assigned.

e. **Irregular Forces**. Irregular or auxiliary units may also be raised locally from the police, the HN's army and from friendly sections of the civilian population for the purpose of defensive and stability operations in order to continue the dislocation and disruption of insurgent activity and influence. Defensive operations include the guarding of key points, storage areas and, most importantly, towns and villages that have come to the HN government's side. In Malaya, such irregulars were used to infiltrate the insurgents' command structure by completely replacing a group in one particular area. They then operated to unravel the chain of command from the inside. In Kenya, during the Mau Mau campaign of the early 1950s, "pseudo-gangs" were used to attack insurgents in their own territory. These groups were comprised of soldiers, local security forces and former insurgents convinced to support the government campaign. Such use of irregular troops is, however, relatively sophisticated, and these operations can be developed only over a protracted period in an environment that is very well understood by the intelligence organization.[82]

f. **Interrogation and Tactical Questioning**. Prisoners can be an important source of information. Interrogation in a COIN campaign can, however, be a sensitive

[82] Although the Mau Mau campaign is a useful study for counter-insurgency lessons, the campaign is considered to have been especially brutal. Some of the techniques used at the time are unacceptable today and, in the long term, would only serve to undermine the legitimacy of a COIN campaign.

matter. It must only occur when authorized and by specifically trained personnel. It must be subject to rigorous oversight by the chain of command. Any abuses must be dealt with in accordance with regulations and quickly, for they will only cause campaigning forces to loose the moral superiority and damage campaign legitimacy. It is important to be fully aware of the legal basis under which interrogation takes place. Systematic interrogation of captured insurgents can have excellent results, particularly in building a picture of command structures, communications and other aspects of the insurgents' infrastructure. In low-level conflict, interrogation is less likely to produce intelligence of immediate tactical value, simply because insurgent operational methods normally involve a very restricted circle within which future plans are discussed. In general terms, but not always so, interrogation should be capable of producing evidence that will be acceptable in court. It is vital, therefore, that it is conducted strictly in accordance with rules laid down by the HN's judiciary and the law of armed conflict.

g. **Debriefing**. Arrangements must be made to provide a debriefing team (DDT), personnel skilled in debriefing willing subjects. These will normally include domestic citizens or ex-patriots with recent knowledge of the HN situation and environment. Such people might include travelers, airline crews, expatriate workers and members of Canadian diplomatic missions. If the crisis has resulted in an exodus of such people from the country, then debriefing will be established in a domestic location. If such people have remained in the country, then a debriefing team may deploy for debriefing operations in the HN.

h. **HUMINT Support**. Both interrogation and debriefing require close steerage and extensive intelligence support if they are to be effective. Liaison representatives will be established at appropriate ASICs and will need extensive analytical and research support.

i. **Captured Documents, Equipment and Stores**. These are valuable sources of information. Troops must be trained to realize their worth and encouraged to make them available to intelligence staffs at the earliest opportunity. Documents found on suspects may assist in the questioning of prisoners by providing interrogators with information that they can exploit during interviews. In certain instances, it may be necessary to employ specially trained personnel to undertake sensitive site exploitation (SSE) when rules of evidence or human rights investigations may be indicated. Documents and equipment captured may also lead to evidence of third nation or party support of the insurgency, which can be attacked using legal means in those other nations.

j. **HN Population.** Undoubtedly, the HN population will, if systematically exploited, be the best source of HUMINT. An informant is one who gives information—a casual source. Great care must be taken in developing the HN population as sources which must be done in close coordination with HN intelligence agencies. HN informants should be given the opportunity to contact the security forces confidentially. This can be done by making confidential telephone lines, text message numbers or post office box numbers available and by keeping routine military patrols in close proximity to the population. They may also be permitted to pass information during vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), during cordon and search operations or during other activities such as civilian medical clinics. Doing so will permit a budding informant to pass information without unduly drawing attention to himself and thus fearing reprisal by insurgents. Insurgents may use bogus informants to plant false information or uncover the source-handling network,

thus efforts must be made to verify sources and/or information. All military patrols must be trained to talk to HN people as a matter of course and should be given standing PIRs to address. The intelligence organization will be capable of developing a system for making contact with, or being contacted by, sympathizers.

k. **Informers and Agents**. Much of the useful information that reaches the intelligence staff will come from informers and agents. In HUMINT terms, an agent is a person specifically recruited and trained, placed in a hostile organization and who is tasked with information gathering on the organization of which he is part, in other words, a controlled source. An informer is a person who, perhaps uninvited, passes information to an opponent about his organization, in other words, an uncontrolled source. A small number of well-placed and reliable agents can provide information of value well beyond their cost, particularly if aimed at the pivotal points in the insurgents' command. If agents are able to penetrate the top level of the insurgents' command and control organization, information may be provided on the development of their strategies, the identification of important leaders, the system of liaison between the military wing and the insurgent political leadership and the methods of acquiring resources. At lower echelons, informers are useful in providing information on, for example, personalities, tactical plans and weapon caches. At these levels, if continuity is to be maintained, it is important that the agent network expands at a similar rate to that of the insurgent movement, otherwise their relative value will diminish. The problem with acting on information supplied by an individual is source-protection. In an insurgent organization, the circle of knowledge is kept small. If an informer reports the move of weapons to a new hide, for example, perhaps only three insurgents have been made aware: the courier, the commander and the quartermaster. A subsequent, immediate operation by the security forces to recover the weapons might raise suspicions. This could seriously jeopardize the security of the source. Therefore, care must be exercised in such matters and the advice of the HSG sought when planning operations.

l. **Non-governmental Organizations/International Organizations**. Reports, surveys and databases created by non-military organizations and other agencies offer a potential wealth of information for the intelligence organization. Materials created by these organizations may contain information not available to military sources due to the close contact these organizations enjoy with the public. It should be noted that in the interest of maintain impartiality, neutrality and a favourable operating environment, some of these organizations may not be interested in sharing their information with the military. These relationships must be cultivated with care and will often depend upon the personalities involved.

In Czarist Russia, the Okhrana had succeeded in infiltrating the Bolshevik Party to such an extent and with such zeal, it became difficult to tell whether the agents were acting as Bolsheviks or agents. When the triumphant Bolsheviks seized the Okhrana record, Lenin discovered that some of his most trusted companions and advice givers had been in the pay of the Czar's police. Although the use of the agents did not produce a wholly successful COIN campaign for the Czar, infiltration to such a high degree can produce significant tactical victories. One example of such victories was when Okhrana agents were able to engineer a provocation that ended in the assassination of an influential Grand Duke.

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice *(U.S.A.: Praeger Security International, 1964), pg. 46.*

724. COORDINATION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

1. Whenever HUMINT sources are to be exploited, it is imperative that all HUMINT collection agencies operating in the theatre effect liaison closely with each other. This liaison is vital to ensure:

a. **De-confliction**. No source should ever be run by more than a single agency. If a single source works for more than one agency, it is possible that his reports can, unwittingly, confirm themselves. This false confirmation, sometimes called false corroboration, is a danger to the intelligence process and can cause the source to gain greater credence than his worth. Furthermore, if the situation becomes known to the insurgents, they can exploit the false collateral at the expense of the security forces.

b. **Veracity**. There is always the risk of a source, if not properly handled, producing information which is unreliable or even acting as a double agent. Tasking must be rigidly controlled to reduce the likelihood of this happening. Reliability of sources must always be evaluated with great care and records maintained by the HUMINT agency.

c. **Security**. The smaller the circle of people knowing the identity of a source, the safer he can operate. If sources are to be maintained, and confidence spread, source-protection must be effective and be seen to be effective.

725. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLICATIONS—OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

1. Intelligence derived from open sources (OSINT) is playing an increasingly important role. Nowhere, however, will the role of the media be more important than in COIN. The actions of the security forces will be scrutinized closely and will play a major part in forming public opinion and in building and maintaining the legitimacy of the campaign. Relations with the media are not the direct responsibility of the intelligence staff. They should remember, however, that reporters can get access where security forces often cannot. Furthermore, press teams are often out and about for protracted periods. A warm relationship, built up between intelligence staffs and individual members of the press corps, can reap dividends in the form of low-level information.

2. Many journalists will cover the campaign for an extended period, visiting the country for a number of weeks at a time before returning home for one or two months. They may even be a regional expert with a unique range of contacts. If an intelligence staff develops a sufficient

relationship with individual members of a media team, information might be forthcoming in return for, perhaps, a sanitized update or a security brief on their return to the theatre of operations. Journalists may be useful in providing insight into the feelings and concerns of the local populace or the opinions of local leaders.

3. Media reports should always be regarded with caution. They are likely to include a bias to some particular purpose rather than be a straight reporting of unabridged or unelaborated facts. Commanders may have seen the morning news on television about the campaign immediately before being briefed by the staff. This will inevitably lead to staffs having to respond to press reports rather than leading on subjects of their choosing with unfortunate results. Intelligence officers should take steps to avoid briefings developing in this way. HN media, in particular, will have a vital role to play in building campaign legitimacy and in gaining the support of the populace, and intelligence staff can expect to play a part in this with the public affairs staff.

726. OPEN SOURCE PUBLICATIONS

1. In addition to the current reporting of news teams in theatre, there is likely to be considerable open-source material produced prior to the campaign which will go some way to meeting intelligence staffs' requirements for basic intelligence. This can include the Internet, atlases, encyclopaedias, travel books, statistical summaries and a host of other references produced by the specialist-interest press covering the armed forces and the political, economic and geographical situations inside the country.

2. Additionally, with a media savvy opponent, the intelligence staffs should attempt to catalogue insurgent publications, for they can sometimes reveal aspects of the insurgents that are otherwise unknown.

3. It must be remembered that the insurgent movement will also attempt to make use of the media to spread its own views and discredit those of the government and the security forces. While they may use the media as a mechanism to air legitimate grievances, insurgents will also manipulate the media to their advantage to disseminate manifestos, broadcast staged acts and gain the public's sympathy. The monitoring and assessment of such propaganda will allow staff planners to develop plans to counter insurgent propaganda and to even pre-empt it at times.

727. IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

1. Intelligence derived from imagery (IMINT) will play an important operational supporting role in any campaign, including COIN. Product coverage will include a wide range of imagery, ranging from map-quality prints from airborne platforms, both satellite and aircraft, to thermal imagery (TI), and infra-red (IR) pictures. TI is excellent at detecting bodies that are warmer than their surroundings, such as people concealed in dense foliage or a warm vehicle engine. IR imagery is capable of detecting disturbed soil, which is valuable for detecting buried arms caches, command wires for booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

2. Collection platforms will include satellites, strategic aircraft, tactical air reconnaissance (TAR), helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). OPs and other reconnaissance capabilities can expect to be equipped with hand-held cameras, video recorders, TI equipment, radar and image intensifiers (II). Coordination of IMINT is the task of an ISG.

3. There will be a constant demand for photographic coverage of areas of operations. The ISG will be able to provide intelligence derived from the analysis of all kinds of imagery. Much analysis will be done through computer processed images rather than printed (hard) copies. Although prints of images can be made available, care should be taken to ensure that they are

demanded only when necessary, for example, as briefing aids. Prints should not be demanded as proof of intelligence reports as a matter of course. The time taken to interpret results of an IMINT task is considerably lengthened when prints of the imagery are required.

728. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

1. Insurgent groups have a need to communicate, and when they do via any electronic medium, they are vulnerable to intercept, which provides a means for the gathering of signals intelligence (SIGINT). Besides deriving intelligence from communications (COMINT), SIGINT analysts will exploit emissions from radars and other electronic emitters. This electronic intelligence (ELINT) can enable the detection of, for example, radio-control devices and missile control, guidance and target-seeking radars. Where SIGINT collection is envisaged, a CSG will be available to coordinate its collection and to interpret the results within the ASC.

2. Electronic warfare (EW) detachments will provide useful information and intelligence by exploiting insurgent weakness in modern civil and tactical communications. Given the nature of COIN operations, it will not be unusual to see EW detachments employed at sub-unit level. They will provide not only intelligence collection on behalf of higher headquarters but will monitor communications during the conduct of tactical operations for the purposes of intelligence collection and force protection. The monitoring of communications nets may give an indication of impending attack or an attempt to flee an area during the conduct of a tactical operation, thus allowing forces to take preventative or protective action.

3. The detection of insurgent command and control (C2) networks may be considered a target for possible engagement. However, the advantages to be gained from attacking their means and locations must be weighed against the advantages to be gained from monitoring their C2 means and exploiting them for purposes of intelligence gathering and force protection.

729. SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS—BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. Battle damage assessment (BDA) is defined as "The assessment of effects resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or non-lethal, against a military objective."[83] BDA examines the results of activities, and its collection may be the responsibility of a number of entities including G2 staff.

2. Measures of performance examine the accomplishment of a task and are defined as "a criterion used to evaluate the accomplishment of a task."[84] They ask, "was the task done right?" This is the purview of a commander to assess.

3. Measures of effectiveness (MoE) relate directly to BDA and are defined as "a criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected selected system behaviour or capabilities over time."[85] They ask the question, "was the right task done to create the desired results?" Intelligence staff will be key to measures changes in terms of target capabilities and behaviour.

4. MoE must be determined from the outset, based on the starting state of the planned target and the desired objective. Whilst MoE for engaging insurgent capabilities with fires will

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[83] NATO AAP 6.

[84] Army Terminology Panel, approved May 2006.

[85] Army Terminology Panel, approved May 2006.

be fairly straightforward, objective and immediate, MoE for targets that are to be changed through influence activities and psychological effects will likely be subjective to a certain extent and will require measurement over an extended period of time in order to note desired changes in a system.

730. SELECTING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. Intelligence staff will play a role in the determination and application of MoE. In order to overcome the difficulties in their selection and application, some basic **principles** exist that can aid in the development of useful MoEs:

a. **Causality.**[86] A definitive cause and effect relationship must be established between the activity and the effect attempting to be measured. Given the cultural and other variables present, there has to be a reasonable likelihood that the planned activity will create the desired effect. Secondly, commanders and staff must be able to assess any other extant factors that may be causing the effect other than their own activities. Likewise, they must ascertain if the measured effect is merely coincidental.

b. **Quantifiable.**[87] An MoE that can be counted helps to remove some of the subjectivity that plagues MoEs on the cognitive plane. Quantification allows accurate trend measurement.[88]

c. **Observable and Attributable**. When drafting MoEs, consideration should be given to the possibility that all of the variables influencing an activity and change in behaviour cannot be observed. The MoEs must be able to recognize a trend or change and confirm the connection or attribution to the activity. For example, if the presence or absence of negative graffiti is being used as an informal indicator of support for a campaign and military force in an urban area, observers will ideally be able to ascertain its timing (i.e., when it was done); its attribution to a particular group (e.g., political, criminal, military); the group's motive and whether it represents a minority or majority viewpoint; its attribution in terms of cause, particularly if it appears as a reaction to a specific event or action; and, its location in relation to the cultural makeup of the local environment.

d. **Correlated to Effects, Objectives and End-States**. Just as activities are planned to lead to specific effects and objectives within a line of operation, MoEs should be selected to correlate to the achievement of each effect and be reflective of the level of employment. The strategic and operational levels require measures that occur throughout the length of a campaign, and many MoEs at the

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[86] For a detailed discussion of causality, see William S. Murray, "A Will to Measure," *Parameters* Vol. 31, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 134–147.

[87] The quantifiable, observable and timeliness principles are adapted from LtCol. David Grohoski, Steven Seybert, and Marc Romanych, "Measures of Effectiveness in the Information Environment," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* Vol. 29, No. 3 (July-September 2003), pp. 12–16.

[88] Colonel Ralph Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," *Military Review* (May-June 2006), pp. 13–32. For example, during a tour in Iraq, 2 BCT, 1st Armored Division monitored and counted local and international media coverage of events in 2 BCT's area of operations as an MoE. This allowed positive and negative trends to be identified, which contributed to discerning the effectiveness of ongoing activities.

operational and tactical levels will measure the incremental progress through effects and objectives.

e. **Flexibility**. Although MoEs should be drafted at the planning stage, they should remain under regular review, and commanders must be prepared to adjust them as required. They must evolve as a mission progresses, particularly as the consequence of their activities leads to the attainment of operational effects. Similarly, MoEs are likely not transferable from mission to mission. Even if a mission takes place in the same area of operations (AO), the passage of time will force reconsideration of MoEs previously employed.

f. **Collection**. The commander must possess the capabilities to collect the intelligence necessary to apply an MoE and provide the direction and guidance to do so. Plans must be made to collect and assess MoEs through all units in the AO as part of the G2 information collection plan. Collection may be assisted by other agencies, however, without a formal command relationship, this may have to be done informally. Nevertheless, other non-military agencies may prove to be an effective gauge of progress in creating desired perceptions and will in a target audience. For example, increased cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or other government departments (OGDs) may indicate a greater acceptance of the campaign.

g. **Relativity**. Improvements sought in a given environment must be relative to the specific environment and to what is considered normal for that particular environment and culture. Expectations for situational improvement must be reasonable given the starting state and the normal state of that particular environment. Improvements to a situation that will make it relatively normal for that environment may come quickly; however, systemic improvements in absolute terms may require cultural changes over a very long period of time. Expectations for change and the related MoEs should be set as incremental milestones so that improvement can be measured and demonstrated as tangible progress over time. For example, a decrease in criminal activity must be initially compared with the normal levels for the environment that existed before the security situation demanded military intervention.

2. Developing appropriate MoEs to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very difficult task. Willpower, perceptions and beliefs are all less-than-completely-tangible variables that defy simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of gauging a target audience's attitude. Trends, however, require a definable baseline, and this will be difficult to identify.

731. SENSITIVE SITE EXPLOITATION

1. Intelligence staffs will be required to support the conduct of sensitive site exploitation (SSE), in which specially trained personnel systematically search a specific location in the search for evidence or other information or material. Intelligence staffs will help identify the target location, immediate threats and evidence or items to be sought.

2. SSE will often be used to collect information for additional operations or for evidence to support subsequent legal prosecution of insurgent suspects. Much of it, therefore, will be planned and done in conjunction with civilian counterparts.

SECTION 5
PROCESSING

732. PROCESSING AS A DISCIPLINE

1. The processing stage of the intelligence cycle incorporates the work of the intelligence staff in collation, analysis, integration or synthesis and interpretation of information.

2. The processing staff will normally be trained intelligence operators, often from all three services, supported by specialists in the collection disciplines. Where appropriate, specialists from other arms and services will join the analytical staff, for example, engineer intelligence operators, with their specialist knowledge of terrain, explosives and route construction. Alternately, ammunition technicians, with their training in explosives, firing devices and weapon inspection, are able to develop weapons intelligence in conjunction with the police forensic scientists. This discipline, based on such techniques as weapon matching, will be able to trace weapons to their sources of supply, to rounds they have fired, explosives and detonators to their origin and so on.

3. Given the need in a COIN campaign to create a broad knowledge base incorporating the PMESII systems of an environment, the processing stage will be complicated and require the process to be applied to an enormous volume of information. It is in this staff discipline where many of the non-military analysts will reside.

733. FUSION OF INTELLIGENCE

1. The best results will be obtained from those intelligence organizations that are fully integrated and work to a centrally-agreed collection plan, employing effective CCIRM personnel, fusion and database managers, analysts and other intelligence specialists who approach their task in a structured, objective and systematic way.

2. One of the critical tasks performed in the ASIC is that of fusion. This is the collation of reports and information from the separate, single-source agencies such as HUMINT, SIGINT and IMINT into a single assessment. Each agency produces its own view of an event or activity and reports it to the intelligence staff. This is known as "single-source picture compilation." The fused assessment—the assessment made by the comparison of more than one single-source report—becomes the recognized tactical ground (or maritime or air) picture. The recognized picture will be produced at the level with responsibility for reporting, which is usually the level maintaining the database, as that is where the broadest view will exist. This fused assessment becomes the authoritative view, which forms the basis for assessments by all subordinate intelligence staffs. It will be disseminated upwards, downwards and to the flanks in the form of intelligence summaries (INTSUMs).

734. DATABASES

1. One of the fundamentals of effective processing is the maintenance of an efficient database. In a COIN campaign there will be a plethora of small, apparently insignificant and unconnected data. Only effective collation and cross-referencing will enable analysts to assess the significance of individual pieces and make best use of them.

2. Additionally, databases will be key to a successful relief in place, when units and headquarters rotate between AOs or into a theatre. Consideration should be given to a trickle relief in place of key analysts so that a relief in place maintains some form of continuity in database familiarity.

SECTION 6
DISSEMINATION

735. RESPONSIBILITY

1. Dissemination of intelligence to subordinate commanders is the responsibility of the director of intelligence at the highest level and of the senior intelligence officers at subordinate levels. Where intelligence committees are established, individual intelligence chiefs of the represented services and agencies will accept responsibility for briefing their own commanders and subordinate representatives.

2. Depending upon the committee system used and the agencies involved, limited distribution of some products may occur given security restrictions.

736. USE OF INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

1. It should be emphasized that intelligence should flow not necessarily in a hierarchical manner, as orders along an operational chain of command, but quickly and efficiently, from whoever holds it to whomever needs it. This will mean that, on occasion, it will bypass some levels of command. This flow is greatly aided by the use of information technology. INTSUMs should be disseminated at regular intervals. These can be supplemented by detailed reports on specific topics (e.g., insurgent ORBATs or incidents) as required.

2. As with intelligence reporting in any campaign, care must be taken to avoid “circular reporting,” in which parts of a summary from one intelligence staff are plagiarized in another and returned to the originator as apparent confirmation of initial assessments. This problem is particularly acute in combined operations, where the different national authorities include reports from third parties in their own summaries. The best defence against this is clear orders for reporting authority and a thorough knowledge, on the part of intelligence officers, of the sources and agencies available to all the intelligence staffs providing reports for the theatre.

737. SECURITY

1. While intelligence is of use only in the hands of operational decision-makers, its dissemination should be closely controlled. Source-protection must always be a priority. If a source is at risk, intelligence should be sanitized or disguised in such a way as to conceal its source.

2. Access to intelligence in such circumstances should be restricted to those with a real need to know. Security of intelligence must always be balanced against the value to be gained from its dissemination. Agencies generally have strict guidelines for dissemination of intelligence in an emergency, perhaps when lives are at risk. Intelligence officers need to acquaint themselves with these procedures so that emergency dissemination can take place with a minimum of delay.

SECTION 7
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

738. GENERAL

1. Procedures and methods of intelligence support to fires are well established and practised. Given the overarching philosophy and many of the supporting principles of a COIN campaign which seek to gain campaign legitimacy and popular support for the campaign and its

objectives, there is a significant emphasis on influence activities. These are activities with first-order effects on the psychological plane that affect understanding, perceptions, will and ultimately behaviour. Some influence activities, such as psychological operations (PSYOPS) and deception, will support offensive operations. However, the aim of the majority of influence activities in a COIN campaign will be to undermine support for the insurgency, separate the insurgents morally and physically from the populace, address root causes and grievances and ultimately win mass support for the campaign.

2. To this end, influence activities consist of deception, PSYOPS, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), public affairs and presence, profile and posture of forces. The conduct of each of these will have to be supported by intelligence staff in terms of addressing requirements, targeting appropriate audiences and developing and collecting measures of effectiveness.

739. SUPPORT TO CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. Before CIMIC detachments assess the requirement for coordination and eventual reconstruction and governance development, intelligence staffs will assess the overall state of the civil institutions and infrastructure and their relation to the root of grievances and tensions that sparked the insurgency. Such assessment will have to be done in relation to other PMESII factors and systems, such as social or ethnic divides. For example, economic and social disadvantages in one region or for one ethnic group may have helped cause the insurgency. Therefore, intelligence assessment must identify these root causes and requirements for enduring resolution.

2. Once this is done, CIMIC staff may undertake a prioritization of needs and work in cooperation with local and international agencies to build civil capacity and resolve civil grievances. Intelligence staff, through their HUMINT network, should also be able to identify to CIMIC staff and commanders local officials whose agenda may not support the campaign and indeed who might seek to gain personal benefit from infrastructure and governance development.

3. For their part, CIMIC staff will be able to provide their own assessment to intelligence staff regarding the situation amongst the populace and its leaders and their attitudes towards the campaign.

740. SUPPORT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. PSYOPS elements and commanders should work very closely with the all-source intelligence cell to plan PSYOPS and to integrate these with other influence and fires activities. Intelligence staff should assist PSYOPS staff in target audience assessment. This will be particularly true for delineating between various ethnic or tribal groups and between various leaders and power structures.

2. Intelligence staff will be able to assist in historical analysis of the nation, its traditions and past experiences, all of which will help formulate the PSYOPS message.

741. SUPPORT TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. The ability of intelligence staff to support public affairs will be limited. Public affairs will have to seek assistance in terms of sanitized information that can be given to media and what threats to media exist in the environment.

2. Intelligence staff may be able to assist public affairs in assessing the legitimacy and affiliations of indigenous media outlets and personalities.

742. SUPPORT TO DECISIONS ON PROFILE, POSTURE AND PRESENCE OF FORCES

1. How soldiers and commanders present themselves can send strong messages to target audiences and the public at large. Although commanders should be able to make intuitive decisions in this field, to a great extent intelligence staff and, in particular, cultural advisors will be able to recommend to commanders how force postures will be viewed by indigenous groups.

2. Some groups may seek a robust show of force and capability in initial contacts as a means to accepting a force's legitimacy, whilst other groups will be alienated by what they consider to be an offensive first impression. Commanders should seek advice from intelligence staff regarding how the indigenous populations and constituent groups or tribes will view force postures.

3. Additionally, intelligence staff should be able to assist the commander in making risk assessments regarding reductions in the profile, presence and posture of troops.

743. SUPPORT TO DECEPTION

1. The only targets acceptable for deception are the insurgents themselves and normally in direct support of an offensive or defensive action, such as the use of tanks in a demonstration to divert attention away from the main effort of an attack.

2. Intelligence supports deception planners by analyzing an insurgent's reconnaissance capabilities and identifying his perception of the battlespace and his perception of the COIN forces. Staff also advise on insurgent deception doctrine, tactics/procedures, capabilities and intentions. This requires an insight into an insurgent commander's way of thinking, including the estimate process.

3. During the execution of deception operations, all-source intelligence, particularly on insurgent movement/deployments, is required to monitor the insurgents' response and to determine whether the deception operation is achieving its aim. In analyzing this intelligence, attention must also be paid to possible insurgent deception plans to protect his own operations.

SECTION 8
TRAINING

744. PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

1. All personnel involved in the direction, collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence should deploy to the theatre having made thorough preparation, as a cohesive unit. They must be clear on their role in the intelligence organization within a COIN campaign, having had the opportunity to rehearse the issues with which they will be dealing and with those with whom they will be working.

2. Senior intelligence officers, in particular, should take the time to examine the forthcoming operation against the principles of intelligence. It is necessary to order their thoughts on architectures and intelligence support in such a way that they can clearly conceive the infrastructure necessary to meet their aim of supporting the commander's plan. Those personnel with a role requiring them to conduct liaison with other authorities should have had the opportunity to make contact with them, to discuss the issues and, particularly, agree on their means of communication. Ideally, they should have the opportunity to exercise using similar communications systems before departure.

3. Pre-deployment training must begin with the principles, practices and tools that have served intelligence staff well in the past. This will ensure a suitable and confident start point common to all personnel involved, based on proven methods and procedures. At the very least, this will ensure well honed methods are used initially in theatre. Any changes required once in theatre are then taken from the confidence of proven practices and procedures. Any changes to practices and organization either in training or in operations should be assessed in terms of the principles of intelligence to ensure that real improvement will be obtain from the change and that the changes will not violate extant and proven principles.

745. BACKGROUND INTELLIGENCE

1. Military staff should be as thoroughly briefed as possible on the situation in the theatre of operations before deployment. Personnel recently returned from theatre or those there already but returned to advise will be able to assist with individual and unit training on intelligence matters, current affairs, lessons learned, practices tailored to the theatre and other aspects of the insurgency.

746. SPECIALIST SKILLS

1. Military staff with specialist skills should ensure that as much training as possible is done prior to arrival in theatre. Problems are much easier to solve, particularly those involving technical equipment, in a benign environment where extensive support facilities exist than in a potentially hostile, austere environment after deployment.

SECTION 9
CHALLENGES FACING AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IN A COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

747. CREATION OF THE BROAD KNOWLEDGE BASE

1. The requirement for intelligence staff to not only produce intelligence regarding the insurgent capabilities and military intentions but to assess all the systems within the environment regarding their influences on the campaign will tax intelligence staff and their organizational capabilities greatly. Staff and capabilities will have to expand greatly, as will their conceptual understanding of their role within the campaign and environment.

2. Additional staff, specialists and subordinate cells will have to be created. In doing so, the principles of intelligence and the basic fundamentals of organization should be respected.

748. SECURITY OF THE EXPANDED ORGANIZATION

1. Finding and vetting suitable personnel while preventing insurgent penetration of a rapidly enlarging intelligence system will present difficulties and risks. The difficulties may be overcome by effort and cooperation. The risks have to be accepted with open eyes and minimized by good security.

749. CONFLICT BETWEEN CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

1. At the higher levels of command, the principle is to centralize intelligence. At the tactical level of a COIN campaign, there will be a great expectation for sub-unit commanders to exercise initiative. Furthermore, operations will be conducted in a dispersed nature, likely in a non-

contiguous battlespace. Together, these characteristics will demand a decentralization of intelligence support.

2. By applying the principle of mission command, the centralized direction of intelligence policy and overarching plans need not stifle the initiative necessary to counter an insurgency and will support this decentralized demand. Sub-unit level commanders may require an intelligence processing capability within their headquarters element. Even without formal intelligence support, they should seek to establish an intelligence cycle that links and drives an operations cycle within their scope of command. This will be particularly the case if the battlespace is organized such that each sub-unit has its own AO.

3. Despite this decentralization of capability and process, a lack of at least centralized direction and policy will erode the control of intelligence work and product. In order to avoid this, the following must be kept in mind:

a. **Dissemination of Intelligence**. Given the inter-agency framework necessary for the conduct of a COIN campaign, there will likely be a need to share sensitive information with a broader audience. Whilst there will remain demands to control classified information, a delineation will be required between the information and the source. Information may therefore be shared with a broader than normal audience as necessary (maintaining reasonable precautions) but without revealing the source.

b. **Collection Methods**. Methods used to collect information can no longer be controlled rigidly from central government. HUMINT must be handled at the lowest level possible and practical. However, poor procedures and control of sources may lead to a breakdown in reporting, double reporting and infiltration by insurgents.

c. **Decisions on the Threat and Force Protection**. Commanders at various levels must discuss personally the threat assessment within their own areas of responsibility. Whilst local commanders will undoubtedly know their own areas and inhabitants the best and be able to interpret measures of effectiveness, insurgents will not respect the boundaries imposed by the battlespace organization. A threat in one area may easily migrate, even temporarily, to another area. Thus, despite the acknowledgement of success at local levels, the overall threat assessment must be made from a holistic, centralized view.

750. COUNTERING INSURGENT PROPAGANDA

1. Insurgent propaganda will work to give the impression that the military forces, and in particular their intelligence agencies, are rogue elements in the environment acting without control, appropriate governance or legitimacy. This message must be effectively countered. The relationship between the government, the judiciary, the security forces and intelligence should be indivisible, and they should all be seen to be working to a central, common authority.

751. OPERATING RESTRICTIONS

1. In combined operations, the charge may be made and exploited by the insurgents that the government is under the control of foreigners. The resultant sensitivity may cause the government to place greater restrictions on a coalition's freedom of action. This might include restrictions on intelligence-gathering, particularly sensitive collection in the HUMINT and SIGINT fields. Again, friendly messages must work to dispel any such propaganda.

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CHAPTER 8
INFORMATION OPERATIONS—INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

Insurgency is ultimately a war of ideas...Recognizing this fact, successful counterinsurgents have devoted as much effort to defeating the enemy's propaganda as they have to defeating his fighters. Winning the war of ideas has often been the decisive line of operations in successful counterinsurgency campaigns.[89]

—Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, US Army

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

1. One of the strategic centres of gravity of any counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign is the local population. History has shown that insurgents require only the indifference of a population to operate successfully. The insurgent operates amongst the population and depends on the tacit acceptance or open support of the populace for a supportive operational environment. Thus the primary target audience of information operations (Info Ops) in a COIN campaign is that portion of the population that is mildly supportive, neutral or hostile to the insurgent movement. The goal is to increase support for the host nation (HN) government or, at the very least, decrease insurgent legitimacy by undermining the narrative of the adversary through a combination of words and deeds. Ultimately this will lead to greater support for the government and decreased support for the insurgency. Absent a neutral or friendly populace, insurgents cannot operate or thrive. A second primary goal of Info Ops is the promotion of campaign legitimacy and its objectives.

2. Info Ops doctrine, as developed over recent years and in line with NATO,[90] has included three key activity areas: counter-command activities (CCA), information protection activities (IPA), and influence activities. In a review of this construct, it must be realized that CCA and IPA are simply offensive and defensive activities respectively and create first order effects on the physical plane. Influence activities, however, seek to affect understanding, perceptions and thus affect will and behaviour of the target audience as first order effects on the psychological plane. For the purposes of both land force operations and this publication, **Info Ops will be considered as influence activities only**.

3. Influence activities are defined as "an activity designed to affect the character or behaviour of a person or a group as a first order effect. (Note: It affects understanding, perceptions and will, with the aim of affecting behaviour in a desired manner.)"[91] Influence activities are considered as any other operation, as a function of capabilities. Specific capabilities that conduct influence activities are those that have first order effects on the psychological plane and thus that affect understanding, perceptions and will as first order effects: deception, PSYOPS, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), presence, profile and posture (of troops and commanders) and public affairs (PA). They affect the minds (understanding and perception) and the hearts (will) of target audiences.

4. They will comprise the bulk of activities in a COIN campaign, for they will create the enduring solutions to a campaign, namely development and the redress of grievances, and thus

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[89] John Nagl, "A Better War in Iraq," *Armed Forces Journal*, August 2006.

[90] See NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.10 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.

[91] Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.

gain and hold the population's support. Influence activities seek to predispose, persuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerce approved target audiences by promoting desired themes and messages. These activities may use one or more capabilities dependent upon the desired effect.

5. In a COIN campaign, much of this will be done to gain support for the campaign and undermine support for the insurgency. Thus, activities such as the presence of security forces in the streets, the building of infrastructure, the resolve of economic and social hardship that led to the insurgency and the advertisement of campaign objectives in the media should all be aimed at gaining support for the campaign and undermining insurgent claims to legitimacy.

6. Influence activities are combined with fires—physical activities (including electronic warfare [EW] attacks and defence) that create first order physical effects—to be comprehensive operations. Fires and influence activities are planned, targeted and conducted together in a synchronized and complementary fashion through manoeuvre and battlespace management.[92]

7. Due to the focus on the will of the population, COIN operations are less about the application of physical force (fires) than the influence of perceptions and ultimately will and behaviour. Given this focus, the influences of all activities, be they first order or second order effects, must be carefully considered. Every action, even the most innocuous seeming, will create effects that will influence someone. All activities and operations must be considered for unintended effects and plans made to avoid undesired effects. For example, a successful tactical engagement of the insurgents may cause such collateral damages that it ultimately undermines the support of the population and is further exploited by insurgent propaganda.

8. The government's and campaign's overall information/influence plan will concentrate on the two broad aims of winning the population's support and confidence, whilst simultaneously lowering the morale and effectiveness of the insurgents and their supporters. Some degree of success with the first aim may be a prerequisite for progress with the second. Leadership at all command levels must be aware of the psychological implications of and the correlation between the political, the military and the moral aspects of the campaign. In particular they should take care that action in one sphere, despite promising a quick return, does not jeopardize the success of the other two spheres and so of the campaign as a whole. For example, an opportunity to ambush a particular insurgent leader may have serious negative repercussions if the attack includes unacceptable collateral damage or the removal of a leader who may be persuaded to ultimately support the campaign.

9. The primary influence activity capabilities are PSYOPS, presence, posture and profile (PPP), PA, CIMIC and deception. All activities must be supporting of the overall objectives, and some activities such as PSYOPS and PA must maintain clear distinctions while maintaining close coordination.

10. The integration of influence activities will be complex and must be viewed as a continuous set of operations. As such, the operations staff (J/G3 and J/G5) is responsible for Info Ops planning and coordination. Influence activities (Info Ops) are not considered separately from other activities, specifically fires. They are considered, planned, targeted and conducted together with fires as comprehensive operations. Thus, in actual fact, there is no separate Info Ops plan but simply a single plan that balances fires and influence activities.

11. Moreover, because all successful COIN campaigns have possessed detailed thematic direction from the strategic and political levels, influence activities must be integrated

[92] For a more detailed discussion on comprehensive operations, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

horizontally and vertically across and up and down the chain of command. For example, the destruction of an insurgent safe house and seizure of a munitions cache may be combined with a CIMIC-coordinated project that provides resources to a non-governmental organization (NGO), publicized by PSYOPS in theatre and PA internationally, protected by a robust security element displaying a strong deterrent posture to the enemy but a friendly and helpful profile to the population and thus increase campaign and HN government legitimacy and establish a safe environment for economic development. Obviously, such a series of operations requires substantial inter-agency cooperation in both planning and execution to be successful.

Supporting Host Nation Legitimacy and Authority

An important component of the COIN campaign conducted by the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was a gun amnesty programme seeking to remove illegal firearms from the general public. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which helped to facilitate part of the gun amnesty, wanted to publicize their involvement by displaying their symbol on all signs related to the programme. Although an understandable request, RAMSI officials denied permission to display ICRC symbols in direct relation to the amnesty programme. Not all agencies involved in a COIN campaign might realize the importance of reinforcing the perception of host government legitimacy. In this case, it was felt necessary to create the impression that the amnesty program was solely a government initiative, the goal being to improve perceptions of government competence. Establishing and improving government legitimacy is a central goal of all COIN Info Ops, and even the most innocuous seeming actions should be judged against this maxim.

Source: Russell Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI), *(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007).*

SECTION 2
PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION OF INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

801. GENERAL

1. The principles that apply to Info Ops / influence activities must be carefully considered and used as a guide to the conduct of influence activities within a COIN campaign. The concept of affecting understanding, perceptions and the will of the populace and key individuals must be well understood at all levels of command in order for the campaign to be successful.

2. As with other activities, influence activities must be directly linked to the operational objectives of the campaign plan. They will likely appear on all lines of operation in the campaign plan to one degree or another.

802. COMMANDER'S DIRECTION AND PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT

1. The commander's personal involvement drives Info Ops, and he exercises control over all Info Ops activity within a framework of timely decision-making and consultation up and down the chain of command and with other agencies as appropriate. Following mission analysis, the commander formulates a unifying theme, articulated in his stated intent. Tactical-level planning is based on that intent, with its defined end-state and supporting effects, and harmonizes Info Ops activities with other activities. Without the guidance of the commander's unifying theme

and intent, the Info Ops effort will lack focus and will not achieve the desired effects in harmony and simultaneity with other activities. Messages risk becoming confused and contradictory.

2. The importance of Info Ops must be understood and communicated by the commander to his subordinates. Placing faith in influence activities may seem counter-intuitive to the commander, however, it is essential that this cognitive leap is made. No successful COIN campaign has been conducted without a sophisticated and integrated set of influence activities (even though it may not have been described as such at the time). Moreover, the commander must understand that influence activities may reside outside of some soldiers' "comfort zone." The confidence to trust in and properly employ influence activities will only occur if the commander demonstrates his own faith in non-physical activities. Furthermore, commanders and staff must realize and accept that the measures of effectiveness (MoE) of influence activities will require an extensive amount of time, years in some cases. Because of this, the commander will need to be intimately involved in planning and ensure that influence activities are given due focus and support.

803. CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

1. The principles of centralized planning and decentralized execution apply to Info Ops at all command levels. However, centralized execution may be required for certain types of targeted information activities, when all involved force elements are required to adhere rigidly to a plan or when strategic assets are used. The approval level and process for PSYOPS messages must be as low and streamlined as possible in order ensure messages are timely and relevant to the environment at hand.

804. EARLY INVOLVEMENT AND TIMELY PREPARATION

1. Planning for influence activities must start early because both planning and execution take time and results can be slow to develop. Hence, a commander's intent and direction must be viewed right from the start in relation to Info Ops capabilities and be maintained throughout the planning process. Targeting staff and advisors such as PSYOPS detachment commanders need to be fully involved in the planning process to integrate Info Ops within the overall plan.

2. Conceptualizing and providing resources for influence activities is as complicated as the planning work required for physical activities. COIN experiences demonstrate that Info Ops are far more effective when Info Ops planners are amongst the first on the ground in theatre. Whenever the security environment allows, key personnel involved in Info Ops planning should be amongst the earliest elements deployed, as this enables an early and accurate assessment of the general mood of the population. This requirement should be reflected in logistics planning.

805. CLOSE COORDINATION AND SEQUENCING

1. The very nature of Info Ops and the large, diverse target set means that there needs to be very close integration, vertically and horizontally, within a command and with other agencies to create complementary effects in support of common objectives. The principle of close coordination and sequencing is arguably of greater import in a COIN campaign than in any other type of mission because there is an adversary whose sole purpose is the de-legitimization of the host government and friendly forces. Contradictory messages or inaccurate information will undermine credibility and legitimacy and do great harm. All Info Ops activities must be coordinated, de-conflicted and synchronized horizontally and vertically across the chain of command and with other political and civil activities in order that one activity does not

compromise, negate or diminish the desired effect of another. This is the responsibility of the commander, assisted by targeting staff and subordinate commanders. The smooth integration of influence and physical activities is critical to maintaining message and theme continuity across all government and cooperating agencies.

806. TIMELY COUNTER-INFO OPS

1. Even the most effective plan for influence operations will be frustrated in execution if deliberate actions are not taken to counter the Info Ops actions of the adversary. A significant portion of the planning should be dedicated to the preparation for reaction to enemy Info Ops. There are numerous recent examples of a militarily weaker opponent effectively conducting an Info Ops programme that has influenced foreign and indigenous populations, from Kosovo in 1999, to Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, to anti-coalition elements in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Modern information technologies allow the targeting of domestic populations, seeking to undermine the political will and popular support for the mission. It is for this reason that PA must be fully integrated into the operational and tactical plans. Failure to adequately counter the enemy's story in a timely and credible fashion can undermine not only a public's morale but it can also bolster an enemy's popularity and rally public opinion against the mission. Info Ops planning must dedicate resources to monitoring enemy Info Ops and remain flexible enough to counter erroneous information disseminated by an adversary. Timeliness is paramount because the first story released is often the story that gets the greatest distribution and attention. Measures must be taken to counter the propaganda of adversaries and to reveal their falsehoods.

2. A number of factors serve to leave the initiative of Info Ops in the hands of the insurgent. First, the insurgent will have no moral or legal compunction to use only the truth in the conduct of influence activities. Second, modern information technologies enable the rapid and broad dissemination of text, audio, video and photographic material. This means that the news cycle is now much shorter than in previous eras and therefore reaction to enemy propaganda cannot wait even 24 hours. Third, because the insurgent will be operating on "home turf," his sources of intelligence will be superb.

3. The insurgents require only a small amount of truth on which to base their propaganda. Events will be staged to incite an overreaction by the security forces or simply to produce images such as wounded and killed civilians that can be claimed to be a result of security force actions. All told, friendly forces will be forced into a defensive, reactive stance, compelled to monitor local and international media and other sources of information in order that false stories can be rapidly countered with accurate information. This will likely be an unfamiliar stance for friendly forces accustomed and trained to seize the initiative in operations. Despite this, offensive Info Ops targeting the key lines of operations of the insurgent must take place simultaneous with defensive Info Ops which seek to counter enemy propaganda. Only by careful identification and analysis of the enemy's centres of gravity (physical and moral) and lines of operation can friendly forces conduct offensive Info Ops. Insurgent propaganda will work hard to undermine public, domestic and international support for the campaign. This propaganda must be actively countered and ideally precluded before it even occurs. Truthful information provided to the public domain will aid in supporting campaign legitimacy and will serve to undermine and even dislocate the insurgent propaganda. Such information provided in a timely, proactive manner will be the most effective means of countering insurgent deceit and propaganda.

807. ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

1. Like all COIN activities, accurate and timely intelligence is critical to successfully planning Info Ops. This intelligence must include information about potential adversaries, other approved Info Ops targets and the operating environment. In particular, intelligence will need to answer as many of the questions on cultural factors posed by commanders as possible. The operations and plans staff focusing on influence capabilities should work closely with the intelligence staff to define requirements necessary to plan, execute and assess the effectiveness of Info Ops. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) should include analysis of human factors (including culture, religion, languages, etc.), information technology, decision-making infrastructure and processes and network vulnerabilities. This portion of IPB forms the basis of the Info Ops contribution to the command estimate.

2. The enemy will be operating on familiar ground and will be able to gather accurate intelligence with comparative ease as long as the population is not openly hostile to his activities. It will require a significant amount of work for friendly forces to gain a similar amount and quality of intelligence. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is critical. Throughout the world, word-of-mouth and rumour is often accepted as a credible and legitimate source of information. Rumours are spread between personal contacts, not formal mediums. The only way to determine what stories, positive or negative, are being spread by these means is to develop and maintain a large and dependable HUMINT network.

808. COMPREHENSIVE TARGETING

1. At the operational level, targeting starts with a detailed understanding of the operational environment, its constituent systems and entities and the commander's objectives. Commanders and targeting staff identify Info Ops effects required to achieve the desired objectives and a range of activities that, when integrated into the overall operation plan, will achieve those effects. It is important to realize that any element of targeting activity may influence a range of target audiences and create unintended effects. The targeting staff, therefore, must analyze the impact of such activity and propose appropriate measures to avoid unintended effects. Info Ops targeting is not planned separately from the targeting of fires process but in conjunction with it so that created effects are complementary.

2. Influence activities will comprise the bulk of a COIN campaign. The use of fires will be severely circumscribed because of the possibility of unintended effects. This is not to say that physical destruction will not play a role in the campaign; rather, it is meant to reinforce the fact that the primary strategic centre of gravity for both the insurgents and friendly forces is the indigenous population. Thus the bulk of targeting in a COIN campaign will focus on the neutral and indifferent portions of the populace.

3. Although there are historic examples where the undermining of insurgent will has brought about the collapse of an insurgency, the committed insurgent will be resistant to direct influence. Particularly in groups motivated by fundamentalist religious ideology, the core members of an insurgent movement are likely highly motivated, dedicated and unafraid of mortal consequences of their actions. In fact, fundamentalist ideologues will likely view death as part of a divinely mandated act that will please whatever deity they worship and therefore will be incredibly resistant to any Info Ops message.[93] This does not mean that all insurgents are invulnerable to the effects of PSYOPS; in fact, the ephemeral actors (those not ideologically

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[93] Whalid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihad against Democracy* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 43–44.

committed to the insurgency) may be decisively influenced by PSYOPS and should be identified as a primary target audience. However, in general, the neutral or indifferent members of a population that indirectly enable the survival, movement and actions of an insurgency will always be an important target audience. The result will be a hostile operating environment for the insurgent. A second order effect of this may be the undermining of an insurgent's will due to the inability to increase public support for the cause.

809. ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING CREDIBILITY

1. In order for Info Ops to be successful in creating influences—in operating on the psychological plane—the source of the Info Ops must have significant credibility in the eyes of the target audience. Poor or non-existent credibility has been identified as a primary cause of failure of Info Ops in past campaigns. Whether a source is seeking to generate support from an indigenous population or convince enemy troops to surrender, the lack of credibility will hinder success. For example, an indigenous population with strong religious and cultural bias against campaigning troops may distrust messages created and disseminated by a western military force such as NATO.

2. Credibility will take time to develop and is intimately tied to the actions of a military force and the host government. The PPP of a force will have a significant impact on credibility. Depending on the specific context, a force may need to show strength, decisiveness, friendliness or a limited footprint or several of these at once. The credibility of a force may have to be established in a planned, incremental fashion. Even when possessing credibility, indigenous proxies such as social, religious or political leaders who have credibility with target audiences and are sympathetic to the mission should be used to broadcast desired messages. It must be remembered that all actions should reinforce the perception of host government legitimacy, credibility and competence, and the use of indigenous voices will further this goal.

Every action of the soldier must be considered a means of influence and should be judged for potential unintended effects. The simple act of picking fruit from an orchard or vegetables from a field by resting soldiers can alienate a village dependent on that produce for winter survival. Without asking permission of the farmer and offering suitable compensation, this seemingly harmless act could be misconstrued and used by an adversary for propaganda purposes (e.g., "the wealthy western invaders care little for the average person and steal your food"). Every action has effects, and all soldiers must understand the repercussions of even seemingly benign acts.

810. PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTS MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT

1. As with any military activity, the results of information operations are assessed using measures of performance (are things being done right?) and measures of effectiveness (are the right things being done to create the desired effects?) are employed.

2. Measures of performance (MoP) for info ops are relatively straightforward and similar to MoP used for other activities. MoP refer to the mechanisms of planning and implementation. They can be viewed in the same manner as the delivery of indirect fire: reaction times, quality of product, correct target identification and assessment and suitability of engagement means, to name a few. Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) refer to the desired effects and whether or not the activities conducted created the effects.

3. The successful prosecution of Info Ops relies on continuous monitoring and assessment of the short- and long-term effects of inter-related activities. This is achieved by collection of all-source intelligence and other feedback on the Info Ops activities. MoE must be included in the Info Ops planning from the outset and are integrated in the intelligence collection activities. Particular attention should be paid to changes in the adversary's or other audience's will and actions, including such items as changes in the attitude of the civilian population, political activity and expressions of unrest. Also, changes in an adversary's capability, such as reduced efficiency, disorganization and slower reactions to events and specific actions in response to deception or destruction, may be used as an MoE.

4. Influence activities may take a significant amount of time to achieve recognizable effects. In some cases, effects may not become apparent until well after an individual unit or commander's tour has ended. Short-term support and friendliness that may be a result of personal relationships with a particular commander or unit should not be mistaken for confidence in the government. Although these relationships are critical, winning over the trust of the target audience will take time and considerable effort and likely span several rotations. Furthermore, deeds at the tactical level will have the greatest effects, both positive and negative. The positive effects are critical steppingstones to success, while negative effects will carry far beyond the limited tactical context in which they originated. Negative effects will also be remembered longer and are easily exploited by insurgent propaganda.

5. Changes in behaviour may take place over a lengthy period of time and be imperceptible. For example, the effects of a radio broadcast campaign may take years to become apparent. Additionally, it is very difficult to develop a causal link between a single Info Ops action and target behaviour, even when direct messages are used at the tactical level. For example, changes in driving behaviour around military convoys may be due to several concomitant factors: PSYOPS products, previous use of warning shots or past incidents of civilian casualties when proximity to a suicide bombing targeting coalition forces resulted in collateral damage. Despite these difficulties, MoE are critical to gauging the usefulness of Info Ops.

6. With influence activities, MoE are applied to activities and changes on the cognitive plane. Given all of the individual and environmental variables in the human decision-making process, developing MoE for Info Ops on the cognitive plane may be one of the most daunting intellectual tasks facing a commander. Influence activities seek to work through external and internal filters composed of the socio-cultural, political and economic factors in order to persuade or dissuade and thus affect behaviour and action. Hence, the planning and conduct of these activities is an *art* requiring the commander's subjective feel for their potential effect. A sophisticated comprehension of the cultural factors at play is necessary to first establish a baseline measure at the beginning of a mission and to detect changes in perceptions, attitudes and behaviours throughout the campaign.

7. MoE will vary significantly between missions and even within missions. Commanders must clearly define the end-state and ideally any milestones on the path to that end-state. Using whatever means are most appropriate, MoE measure and indicate progress in the target audience towards that end-state. MoE must be tailored to the specifics of not only the overall change desired but to the environment, that is, the commander's battlespace and area of operations. Because of the intangible factors involved and the subjective nature of influencing will and perceptions, the MoE may very well be subjective. Moreover, because affecting behaviour is the ultimate aim (either by maintaining non-action or causing the target audience to adopt a particular course of action), they require a significant amount of time to determine effectiveness. Therefore, they must be assessed as a set routine to attempt to recognize changes, trends and slight yet significant indicators. The commander exercises judgement as

to when an adjustment or change to an activity against a target must be made in reaction to behavioural changes in the target audience.

8. Some fundamentals that can aid in the development of useful MoE are:

a. **Causality.**[94] A definitive cause and effect relationship must be established between the activity and the effect to be measured. There has to be a reasonable likelihood that the planned activity will create the desired effect. As well, commanders and Info Ops staff must be able to assess any other extant factors that may be causing the effect other than their own activities. Likewise, they must ascertain if the measured effect is merely coincidental.

b. **Quantifiable.**[95] An MoE that can be counted helps to remove some of the subjectivity that plagues MoE on the psychological plane. Quantification allows accurate trend measurement. For example, during a tour in Iraq, one formation monitored and counted local and international media coverage of events in their AO as an MoE. This allowed positive and negative trends to be identified, which helped to discern the effectiveness of ongoing Info Ops.[96]

c. **Observable and Attributable**. This principle may seem obvious, however, when drafting MoE, consideration should be given to the possibility that all of the variables influencing an activity and change in behaviour cannot be observed. The MoE must be able to recognize trends or alterations in behaviour and confirm the relationship between the target audience behaviour and the Info Ops activity. For example, if the presence or absence of negative graffiti is being used as an informal indicator of support for a campaign and military force in an urban area, observers will ideally be able to ascertain its timing, that is, when it was done; its attribution to a particular group (political, criminal, military) and their motive and whether it represents a minority or majority viewpoint; its attribution in terms of cause, particularly if it appears as a reaction to a specific event or action; and, its location in relation to the cultural make-up of the environment.

d. **Correlated to Decisive Points and Objectives**. Just as activities are planned to reach sequential decisive points along a line of operation, MoE should be selected to correlate to the achievement of each decisive point and should be reflective of the level of employment. Although strategic Info Ops require measures that occur throughout the length of a campaign, many MoE at the operational and tactical level will measure the incremental progress through sequential decisive points.

e. **Flexibilty**. Although MoE should be drafted at the planning stage, they should remain under regular review, and commanders must be prepared to adjust them as required. MoE must reflect mutable conditions in an AO. They must evolve as a mission progresses, particularly as decisive points are reached and

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[94] For a detailed discussion of causality, see William S. Murray, "A Will to Measure," *Parameters*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 134–147.

[95] The quantifiable, observable and timeliness fundamentals are adapted from LtCol David Grohoski, Steven Seybert, and Marc Romanych, "Measures of Effectiveness in the Information Environment," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,* Vol. 29, No. 3 (July-September 2003), pp. 12–16.

[96] Baker, Col Ralph O., "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," *Military Review*, May-June 2006 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Combined Arms Center/USCGSC), pp. 13–32.

secured. Similarly, MoE are likely not transferable from mission to mission. Even if a mission takes place in the same AO, the passage of time will force reconsideration of MoE previously employed.

f. **Collection**. The commander must possess the capabilities to collect the intelligence necessary to employ an MoE and provide the direction and guidance to do so. Plans must be made to collect and assess MoE through all units in the affected battlespace. As well, collection may be assisted by other agencies, however, absent a formal command relationship, this may have to be done informally. Notwithstanding this, non-military agencies may prove to be an effective gauge of progress through Info Ops. To this end, attempts should be made to develop working relationships with agencies from all participating governments, the HN and NGOs active in the environment.

g. **Relativity**. Improvements sought in a given environment must be relative to that environment. It is imperative that a baseline measurement of the overall environment be established as early as practicable in the campaign planning. Absent a comparative baseline, it may be impossible to accurately determine the effectiveness of Info Ops and ultimately campaign progress. Expectations for situational improvement must be reasonable given the starting state and the normal state of that particular environment. This does not mean that moral relativity should be applied to excuse gross criminal behaviour.[97] Some change in the environment may occur quickly; for example, an immediate drop in crime in a particular neighbourhood may result from the presence of regular patrols. However, systemic and social improvements that will create an enduring improvement may require a substantial amount of time and be measured in multiple years or even decades. Thus measuring an overall drop in gang and criminal activity throughout a theatre must be measured in relation to the levels that existed under pre-crisis circumstances and could take years to achieve. Furthermore, systemic change will be the result of numerous concomitant factors. Expectations for change and the related MoE should be set as incremental milestones so that improvement can be measured and demonstrated as tangible progress over time.

811. SUMMARY

1. Developing appropriate MoE to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very difficult task. Willpower, motivations, perceptions and beliefs are intangible variables that defy simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of gauging a target's attitude, will and behaviour change. Trends, however, require a definable baseline, and this will be a complex but crucial initial task. Difficulties aside, accurate MoE can make the difference between meeting desired objectives or ending a campaign in frustration.

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[97] Gross criminal behaviour such as the abuse of basic human rights, corruption or theft from the public purse cannot be justified as simply being normal. However, all situations must be judged in context. For example, an under paid schoolteacher in a struggling nation charging students to attend an ostensibly public-funded school is a different case to an armed policeman extorting funds at a checkpoint, particularly if this is the only means by which the teacher can survive. Careful judgement is necessary when establishing a baseline of conditions in an AO.

SECTION 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENT PROPAGANDA[98]

812. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

1. A substantial proportion of COIN influence activities will concentrate on refuting insurgent propaganda. This may be seen as defensive influence activities. Thus it is useful to illustrate the major characteristics of insurgent propaganda to better understand how to construct themes and messages that will support friendly Info Ops while undermining those of the enemy. Deconstructing the themes of enemy propaganda allows the commander and staff a better understanding of the enemy's lines of operation and what counter-measures will best undermine the enemy campaign. The characteristics illustrated below are broadly applicable to all insurgencies.

2. Insurgencies are supported by a closely coordinated and mutually supporting triad of political goals, propaganda and military action. Like friendly Info Ops, propaganda can take several forms and will be reinforced with action. Words will be supported by deeds and vice versa.

3. The insurgent cause is advanced predominantly by discrediting the government and security forces, reducing public morale (both indigenous and that of coalition forces) and vilifying pro-government media. Insurgents and their propaganda will exploit any government mistake, especially incidents in which the police and military may be seen to have overreacted. Unlike the government, the insurgents do not have to prove anything; they simply have to make the government appear incompetent. Because of this fact, the insurgents can use falsehoods and heavy manipulation of information to support their propaganda, while a legitimate government and campaign will be constrained by the imperative to use only truthful information while maintaining basic freedoms.

4. A consequence of all this is the necessity for campaign forces to disclose what may be considered bad news. Despite the best efforts, errors will be made in COIN campaigns, including breaches of rules of engagement (RoE) and inadvertent civilian casualties. When these errors occur, they must be quickly acknowledged and amends made to limit the potential propaganda value to the enemy. Modern technologies guarantee that bad news will eventually be disseminated; therefore, it is better to deal with the story and have some control over it than try to cover it up and have no control when it becomes widely known.

5. Propaganda must be effectively countered if a COIN campaign is to be successful. Like all Info Ops, counter-propaganda requires a unified multi-agency approach throughout the levels of command and must include political direction on approved themes and messages. Propaganda is effective and cannot be ignored. It is through propaganda that the adversary increases his popular support, reinforces his narrative, gains recruits and material resources and ultimately develops legitimacy and credibility.

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[98] Propaganda is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd ed., revised) as a mass noun meaning "information." By this definition, friendly Info Ops could be considered propaganda. However, the dictionary definition also states that propaganda is especially used to denote information "of a biased or misleading nature." The term "propaganda" is used throughout this manual in this latter, pejorative sense. The vast majority of this section is adapted from Brigadier Maurice Tugwell's doctoral dissertation *Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures* (London: King's College, University of London, March 1979). See in particular Chapter 8, pp. 295–335. Brigadier (ret'd) Tugwell graciously granted permission to reference his dissertation during a telephone conversation with Neil Chuka (DAD-4 contractor) on 13 February 2007.

6. The goal of counter-propaganda is to refute insurgent propaganda and to present the truthful justification for the legitimacy and credibility of the host government. Effective counter-propaganda is required to convince both domestic and international audiences that the campaign is legitimate. Public opinion must be considered throughout the campaign by all levels of command, including the political element. Clearly, PA will play a leading role in communicating the truth to the international public. The effort to counter enemy propaganda must explain government strategy and goals, present facts and expose the fallacies of the enemy message and the illegitimacy of enemy motives.

7. All propaganda contains some kernel of truth, however miniscule, which is distorted to play upon the preconceived notions, attitudes and perceptions of the target audience as well as socio-political trends that have led to discontent. Adversary Info Ops target the same segments of the indigenous population as friendly Info Ops: the neutral or wavering portions from which new supporters can be drawn.

8. Perhaps more importantly, modern information technologies enable insurgents to target the domestic populations of those states contributing to a COIN campaign. The internet in particular allows insurgent groups to immediately distribute propaganda internationally, monitor the political climate and public opinion in campaigning nations and synchronize activities to maximize effects on the will of the allied domestic public. This is a critical factor because most contemporary insurgent groups will be politically savvy and understand that it is far easier to undermine the will of the public in a democracy, and thus the political support for a campaign, than it is to militarily defeat a superior armed force. In fact, there is much evidence suggesting that the survival and success of a contemporary insurgent movement is dependent on the mastery of the use of modern information technologies and the manipulation of international public opinion.[99]

813. THEMES OF INSURGENT PROPAGANDA

1. There are a number of overarching themes that characterise insurgent propaganda. Although some of these themes become more prevalent as an insurgency evolves, the themes will likely be used simultaneously, targeting different specific audiences, tailored to suit the ebb and flow of the struggle.

a. **Righteousness**. The insurgent cause is right and just and supported by the divine. This theme is founded in faith and ideas rather than fact.

b. **Hatred**. The government or opposing international force is painted as heretical or morally and spiritually corrupt. Since the government opposes the righteousness of the insurgent cause and has sought to suppress the people, it and its agents are deserving of hatred and death.

c. **Inevitable Triumph**. Because the struggle is portrayed as a moral and righteous affair, the insurgency can only end in triumph, regardless of the time required to achieve victory. This theme is highlighted in conflicts involving fundamentalist ideologies.

d. **Allegiance**. "You are with us or against us" is given as a stark choice. Although insurgencies only require the ambivalence of the population to exist and thrive, propaganda will leave no uncertainty about the ultimate requirement to support

[99] See for example, Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

the cause. This theme seeks to paint those opposing the insurgency as traitors, cowards or unfaithful apostates.

e. **Moral Certainty**. A concept of moral certainty is used to bolster active supporters of an insurgency. This theme seeks to implant the notion that the moral high-ground lies with the insurgent and that all acts committed by supporters are just, both legally and spiritually.

f. **Terror**. Although terrorism is a tactic, the theme of terror is used in insurgent propaganda to coerce assistance from the civilian population and to enforce discipline within an insurgency. This theme must be supported by violent action which may be limited in scope but can cause terror out of all proportion to the act itself.

g. **Martyrdom**. Also known as glorification of heroes, this theme will highlight the actions of insurgents and glorify the fallen to bolster internal morale and impress the civilian population.

h. **Praise of Violence**. Violence is portrayed as a righteous and spiritually cleansing.

i. **Justified Reaction**. All actions are justified as a necessary and just reaction to government suppression.

j. **Long War**. Insurgencies do not succeed overnight, and in order to sustain support, it is necessary to reinforce the notion of inevitable triumph by communicating that the struggle will be long and difficult and may span several generations. This is often portrayed in religious terms to exploit belief in the transcendental nature of the divine and the afterlife to give strength to religiously motivated insurgents.

k. **Guilt**. This theme is directed at the enemy government and supporters. It will play upon the sensitivities of the populations of liberal democracies. This theme is heavily exploited using modern communications technologies to publicize real and contrived incidents.

l. **Bad Faith**. This theme seeks to undermine attempts by the government to reach out to insurgent supporters and to portray government efforts to improve the lot of the people as a façade meant to dupe the people.

m. **Security Force Incompetence**. This theme will try to demonstrate an inability of the government to provide a safe and secure environment as well as an impotence to stop the insurgency. This theme will be supported with violent actions targeting security forces themselves as well as segments of the population.

n. **Legitimacy**. Insurgencies will ultimately attempt to develop legitimacy through both deeds and words. Advance insurgent elements will use international propaganda to paint themselves as a popular representative of populations and will use reconstruction aid to create this sense of legitimacy.[100]

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[100] An example of this is Hezbollah's international propaganda campaign in the summer of 2006 and infusion of reconstruction aid in war-devastated neighbourhoods in Lebanon immediately after the cessation of hostilities with Israel. The goal was to demonstrate both the illegitimacy of the enemy, Israel, and the powerlessness of the secular government to provide for the needs of the people.

o. **Credibility**. The ultimate purpose of propaganda is to establish credibility in the eyes of the civilian population. Developing credibility is an important step to gaining the outright support of the civilian population.

814. SUMMARY

1. Commanders and planning staff must understand the aims of insurgent propaganda and seek to counter these themes and the objectives that they support. They cannot wait for the propaganda to appear and then attempt to counter it. They must anticipate the messages and aims of the insurgent propaganda and actively pre-empt them. This will be pre-emption on the psychological plane.

SECTION 4
INFORMATION OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

815. GENERAL

1. The primary influence activities grouped under the Info Ops title are PSYOPS, PA, CIMIC, PPP and deception. All may be applied in an offensive or defensive sense. All, save for PPP, are discussed in detail in their respective manuals, which should be read in conjunction with this chapter. The specific uses of each activity in a COIN campaign are discussed in this section.

816. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. The primary purpose of PSYOPS is to influence the understanding, perceptions, attitudes, will and ultimately behaviour of selected individuals or groups in accordance with mission or campaign objectives. PSYOPS has first order effects on the psychological plane.

2. Unlike PA, which simply provides truthful information for dissemination by others, PSYOPS retains direct control over content and dissemination of a message and focuses on a specific target audience. PSYOPS is not propaganda in the pejorative sense. CF PSYOPS only disseminates truthful messages. The use of falsehoods or misleading information only undermines legitimacy over the long-term and is therefore not practised.

3. Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of resources such as linguistic, support, graphics and print capability and various electronic broadcasting means. Mediums for the broadcast of messages include face-to-face contact, print, radio, television, loudspeakers, the Internet, faxes, pagers and mobile phones.

4. PSYOPS is one of the most cost-effective components of a COIN campaign. Coordinated with other influence activities and fires and properly applied, PSYOPS can ensure that the indigenous population receives and comprehends the activities and objectives of the campaign. Strategic-level direction and close coordination between all command levels are required to seamlessly integrate themes, messages and actions. All messages must be reinforced with action because deeds and words must not be contradictory. Close coordination does not indicate a requirement for rigid control. The need for consistency in theme and message is essential, but it must not be regarded as a requirement for restrictive control of subordinates.

5. Although the distributive means may be similar, the purposes of operational- and tactical-level PSYOPS differ. Operational themes will address long-term objectives. Tactical PSYOPS should support and reinforce operational themes but may also have very limited

tactical aims, such as the surrender of insurgents in a specific area. It is only through seamless integration and coordination of PSYOPS into the overall campaign plan that conflicting messages can be avoided.

6. PA is used at the strategic level to communicate information. Modern information technologies make it impossible to limit the target audience for strategic-level products and thus preclude the use of PSYOPS at this level. At the operational level, PSYOPS are typically directed at modifying general attitude sets to alter long-term behaviour. Typically, this will involve some form of rational argument that may be forcefully or subtly presented. An example of a forceful message would be continued publicizing of public infrastructure projects in a province. An example of a subtle message would be the broadcast of popular music targeting 15–25 year olds to emphasize that religious ideals and liberal societies are not incompatible. In many ways, operational-level PSYOPS can be viewed in marketing terms as building brand recognition. In essence, the messages and themes are trying to build a relationship between the target audience and the campaign, that is, the brand.[101]

Immediately prior to the launch of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a leaflet campaign was planned to communicate the purpose of the mission to the Afghan people. The first leaflet that was to be used pictured B-52s bombing a green valley. The leaflet, almost identical to one used in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, was deleted from the campaign at the last minute out of concern that the pamphlet would create the perception that the Afghan people were being targeted for retribution for 9/11. Further confusion over the proper use of both the dissemination method (leaflet bomblets) and the target audience (PSYOPS planners designed the leaflet for a tactical, not strategic, application) highlights the requirement for coordination and the need to tailor PSYOPS products to specific audiences.

Source: Christopher Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience *(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2005), p. 71.*

7. At the tactical level, PSYOPS will present a concise message geared towards modifying specific behaviours. The target audience will be more specific than at the operational level, and emotive and rational arguments may be used in the message. The goal is to cause a target audience to act rather than to think about and rationalize a message. Examples of tactical-level PSYOPS are leaflets informing a village of an impending operation or posters hung along popular thoroughfares demonstrating safe driving behaviour around a military convoy.

8. A nuanced understanding of the socio-cultural environment in which PSYOPS are conducted is essential to success. Mere awareness of the socio-cultural milieu is insufficient for those involved in the conception, design and approval of PSYOPS products. Tribal or clan relations are also a necessary consideration. Urban operations hold the potential for vastly different socio-cultural constructs in different neighbourhoods. PSYOPS products must be specifically tailored to the target audience. The potential for unintended effects is great if an error in target audience analysis is made.

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[101] Tim Calkins, "The Challenge of Branding," in Alice Tybout and Tim Calkins, eds., *Kellogg on Branding* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005), pp. 1–4. As quoted in Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul, Russell Glenn and Megan McKernan, *Enlisting Madison Avenue: the Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Forthcoming 2007). This document is not yet cleared for release to the public.

9. PSYOPS products must not endanger the target audience. Depending on a number of factors, including the security situation, some products may be unsuitable. For example, leaflets may endanger anyone possessing a leaflet in a locale where insurgents are highly active and coalition presence is sporadic. In such a situation, another medium such as television, radio or text messaging may be more appropriate. A poor product is worse than no product at all.

10. Time is an uncertain ally. On the one hand, PSYOPS themes and messages need to be lasting and continuous to make an impression; on the other hand, over-prolonged exposure to a single message may result in boredom and irritation. Fine judgement is needed to draw the line between the advantages to be gained from the consistent exploitation of a fact or theme and the dangers of saturation. The audience is not stupid.

11. Political and military oversight must ensure that PSYOPS and supporting activities are consistent with the HN and national policies and conform to any specific political guidance. The psychological dimension of counter-insurgency is so important that a PSYOPS staff officer should be nominated in all formation headquarters and indeed at the battlegroup level if deemed appropriate. A staff officer specializing in PSYOPS may work under the G3 (G5 for plans) and will be in addition to any PSYOPS detachment or platoon commander supporting the formation. At lower levels, the PSYOPS detachment commander will have the combined role of commanding his capability, advising the commander and assisting in planning.

817. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. The aim of PA is to protect the credibility and legitimacy of operations and promote widespread understanding, thereby gaining support for military operations while not compromising essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). PA accomplishes this task by communicating information to audiences through the medium of local, national and international news media and other means. Unlike PSYOPS, PA has no control over the production or dissemination of the information it presents. Its task is simply to provide information for others to analyze.

2. An important facet of any military operation is to communicate the principal themes and messages while providing a clear and complete understanding of the operation but all the while maintaining operations security (OPSEC). Although PA is primarily focused on informing and educating audiences, its impact is much wider. It is therefore essential that PA staff and those of other Info Ops capabilities work together closely to ensure that a coordinated message is delivered to the intended audiences and that all of them are coordinated with fires. Particular attention must be paid to local and regional media and to other media sources that are influential with indigenous populations. To avoid giving the false impression that the media are being manipulated in any way, a clear distinction must be maintained between PSYOPS and PA. However, this does not obviate the requirement of PA to be fully integrated into the overall plan and to understand the desired effects of influence activities.

3. In COIN operations, it is essential to conduct media relations in a positive manner. Such relations must project an accurate and balanced picture of the aims of the campaign in general and of the role of security forces in particular. They must demonstrate the practical contribution soldiers are making to the solution of a difficult and frequently hazardous mission. Creating and maintaining a positive public image of the COIN forces includes countering potentially hostile media activity.

4. Operational PA is a G3 staff function and should be coordinated at the level of the highest formation headquarters in the theatre of operations. Public affairs officers (PAO) are responsible to the commander for all aspects of news media relations, including the provision of

suitable facilities for the news media, the nomination of units to embed reporters and the requirement to escort reporters and provide other resources.

5. In periods of intense operational activity or during major incidents, the PA section may need additional support, particularly in urban areas. Sub-units should be prepared to help the PA personnel in terms of news media escorts, movement and the assistance of the news media. If the PA office is to provide an authoritative, consistent and credible information service, the news media office must receive prompt and accurate information from subordinate headquarters and units. It must also receive early warning of planned operations together with clear instructions on how to deal with news media enquiries, preferably in the form of a media response lines or questions and answers.

6. In many aspects, dealing with the news media is no different in a COIN campaign than in any other operation. When speaking to the news media, and in accordance with security regulations, individuals must talk in their official capacity only, about their own job, their own expertise and responsibility. No statements are to be made concerning government policies, political decisions or topics likely to be politically sensitive. Nor are they to speculate. A large number of journalists representing the print, radio and television can be expected to report on COIN operations. To facilitate an effective two-way passage of information and to better manage and reduce news media queries, standing orders should give guidance on the limits of information that can be disclosed. Before any information is passed to the news media, it must be cleared for release by the appropriate military agency (e.g., G2, G3) and the appropriate HN or police authorities and where applicable, approved by the commander through the PAO.

7. No unnecessary hindrance is to be offered to a journalist's freedom to do his/her job. It is in the interests of law and order that the news media should have facilities to expose terrorism, acts of violence and the intimidation of civilians. Members of the news media have the same rights, liberties and obligations under the law as any other citizen. Furthermore, enabling a free press presents a positive example to be emulated by HN government agencies and the populace in theatres where such freedoms are nascent or non-existent. If an on-scene commander believes that a member of the news media is prejudicing OPSEC, the matter should be dealt with on the advice of the PAO.

You have no influence with the press if you do not talk to them...Not talking to the press is the equivalent of ceding the initiative to the insurgents, who [are] quite adept at spinning information in adverse ways to further their objectives.

—Lt.Col. Ralph Baker, USA, on the importance of engaging domestic and international media in COIN operations

Source: Ralph Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," Military Review, *May-June 2006 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Combined Arms Center), pp. 13–32.*

818. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is defined as "coordination and cooperation in support of the mission, between commanders and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and

agencies."[102] CIMIC is a coordination and liaison function that facilitates operations in relation to civil authorities and non-military organizations and leads to activities that support local authorities. These activities may include reconstruction, infrastructure development, governance development and mentoring. Because of their ability to inform, demonstrate, persuade, influence and even co-opt, CIMIC-related activities are influence activities that affect understanding, perceptions, will and behaviour of the target audience. For example, the building of essential services and the development of governance institutions will build campaign legitimacy and influence individuals and groups to create enduring solutions to the crisis and support the successful outcome of the campaign.

2. CIMIC and the resulting activities are part of operations, for they deliver a capability that creates desired effects in support of operational objectives. They are therefore the remit of operations staff for planning and execution (G/J5 and G/J3 respectively). CIMIC detachment commanders facilitate related CIMIC assessments and activities.[103]

3. CIMIC is central to any COIN campaign because the perception of host government competence and campaign legitimacy must be reinforced. It is often a key capability in addressing the root grievances of an insurgency. The perception of competence and legitimacy is tied to security and the ability to provide for the day-to-day needs of the populace. Improving the social, physical and economic well-being of the populace is a central goal of any COIN mission. Thus, CIMIC actions aimed at infrastructure development, reconstruction and assistance to governance are crucial to achieving success.

4. CIMIC provides information in the form of physical evidence of the legitimacy, credibility and competence of the host government. CIMIC will comprise a significant proportion of the deeds that must support the words of a campaign. Failure to follow through on promises made will alienate the population and damage credibility and legitimacy. Care must be taken that expectations are not created in the population that cannot be met. CIMIC-related activities therefore need to be coordinated within the overall plan, in terms of impacts upon civil audiences and their leaders in order to ensure that activities work to support overall objectives.

5. CIMIC facilitates cooperation between military forces and the civilian environment by:

a. Considering and assessing social, political, cultural, religious, economic, infrastructural and environmental factors in support of military operations and objectives. CIMIC staff should be a valuable source of information to intelligence staff in creating a knowledge base of the environment, but CIMIC cannot be perceived as intelligence gathering assets.

b. Liaison and coordination with domestic agencies, government officials and elements of power, international organizations (IOs) and NGOs.

c. Forging an effective relationship between military and civilian authorities, organizations, agencies and populations.

6. It is critical that CIMIC projects reflect the needs and desires of the population. Moreover, it is pointless to build institutions such as a school or medical facility that cannot be staffed or funded. A satisfied population is a benign population. CIMIC is a most useful tool to

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[102] Taken from NATO Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use.*

[103] The construct of G9 staff function for CIMIC was sufficient for the conduct of conventional, major combat campaigns when CIMIC supported operations. With the development of CIMIC as a type of stability operation and set of activities, it belongs under the G3 staff responsibility.

address the underlying causes of an insurgency, as it has the potential to directly influence the day-to-day lives of the people.

During the 1899-1902 Philippine War, CIMIC formed a significant portion of the US Army strategy to gain the support of the population on southern Luzon. The improvement of civil government, the building and operation of schools and the provision of medical services enticed the population back to the villages from jungle refuges. The strategy integrated native police and village *presidentes* (mayors) into the effort. This increased support for the US mission and physically and psychologically isolated the insurgents from the population. Separated from their sources of food and other provisions and harassed by constant US patrols, the insurgents were robbed of the initiative and forced to attack US occupied towns and villages in a desperate and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to defeat the US strategy. Although not termed "CIMIC" at the time, the improvement of the day-to-day lives of the populace was instrumental to the success of this COIN campaign.

Source: Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 *(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pg. 164.*

819. PRESENCE, POSTURE, PROFILE

1. The appearance, presence and attitude of a force and its overall profile may have significant impact on perceptions and attitudes, particularly on neutral or potentially adversarial audiences. Deploying even limited capability to the right place at the right time can add substantial credibility to messages being delivered through other channels and provide a major contribution to the deterrence of a threat. Similarly, too heavy a presence with a one-dimensional, menacing profile may cause misperceptions and mistrust as to the purpose of a mission. The posture of troops on the ground can demonstrate both commitment and intent and must be considered and balanced with the requirements of force protection. The decision to wear berets instead of helmets can make a considerable difference to the perceptions of both the adversary and local people. The public profile of commanders at all levels will impact on perceptions, and therefore the public role of the commander must be carefully analyzed and opportunities used to transmit key messages. Commanders must understand and assess the attendant risk that accompanies any decision regarding posture and profile against the need to send a particular message.

2. The profile and posture of troops will have to be considered carefully in relation to the local culture. A serious, robust image will help dissuade potential attackers. However, it may be needed to impress even local, potentially friendly populations who are attracted to symbols of strength. This profile, however, cannot be the only image presented to the populace. It must be carefully blended with an approachable, cooperative and protective aspect when dealing with the local populace and its leaders.

The Importance of Posture, Profile and Presence in RAMSI 2003

One of the priorities of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was to present a strong, competent, yet friendly, posture that would reassure the populace while intimidating the warlords and gangs which had undermined lawful order on Guadalcanal. Initial planning called for the landing of C-130s loaded with infantry simultaneous with the arrival offshore of the *HMAS Manoora*. Soldiers disembarking from the C-130s were fully armed and ready to engage any resistance but held their weapons in a relaxed, non-threatening manner. Significantly, police and civilian members of the mission arrived with the initial series of flights, ensuring that the political, military and law enforcement elements were together at the start. The posture of the soldiers and the presence of the *Manoora* and other patrolling naval vessels demonstrated readiness and a decisive military superiority. The police and civilian political elements successfully created a competent, non-threatening, reassuring and committed perception with the populace. Moreover, throughout the mission, off-duty soldiers were allowed only limited freedom to frequent the capital of Honiara to minimize disruption to the local economy. The early consideration of presence, posture and profile in the RAMSI planning process proved instrumental to displacing a developing insurgency.

Source: Russell Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) *(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007).*

820. DECEPTION

1. Deception involves measures designed to mislead adversaries by manipulation, distortion or falsification, etc. Deception is defined as “Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.”[104]

2. Deception is a complex art that demands considerable effort, a high level of security and a sound understanding of an adversary's way of thinking. It is normally used to dislocate the attention and combat power of an adversary. In operations it can directly contribute to the achievement of surprise and indirectly to security and economy of effort. Deception will likely use a combination of physical means (such as a feint or demonstration) supported by other information cues such as false radio traffic.

3. Deception is aimed directly and solely at enemy forces and commanders. Although it is an influence activity, it cannot be confused and associated with those other influence activities that seek to inform and influence other audiences such as indigenous populations. Deception is a planning (J/G5) and operations staff (J/G3) responsibility.

4. Deception is a broad concept that spans tactical camouflage to sophisticated strategic-level operations. Deception also includes the planting of false information, and commanders must continually be on guard regarding insurgent uses of deception. For example, an insurgent could plant false information which could cause an overreaction or inaccurate targeting by security forces.

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[104] NATO AAP 6.

SECTION 5
CONCLUSION

1. The success of any counter-insurgency campaign hinges on the support of the indigenous population. A primary centre of gravity is the neutral and friendly portions of the populace whose support is vital for campaign success. Info Ops will play a central role in countering the adversary narrative and disseminating and supporting the friendly message. Info Ops influence activities will comprise a significant amount of the activities that a military force undertakes in a COIN campaign.

2. Info Ops forms an integral part of any operational plan through the use of influence activities. These influence activities demand complex planning, for they demand consideration of the effects across a wide spectrum of target audiences and environmental systems. Understanding how to influence those audiences requires careful consideration by commanders and staff. Furthermore, all activities eventually create influences. Thus commanders at all levels, even down to the lowest tactical levels, must understand the lasting impressions and ramifications, be they positive or negative, intentional or unintentional, that all activities create on target audiences. In the end, all activities, be they fires or influence, must seek to undermine the insurgent and build support and legitimacy amongst the populace.

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CHAPTER 9
SUSTAINMENT IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

SECTION 1
SUSTAINMENT PRINCIPLES AND PLANNING

901. INTRODUCTION

1. The principles of sustainment remain extant within a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign and are just as applicable in that context as in any other campaign. However, the characteristics of a COIN campaign will cause some to be emphasized more than others in their application. These principles are:

a. foresight;

b. economy;

c. flexibility;

d. simplicity;

e. cooperation;

f. self-sufficiency;

g. visibility;

h. responsiveness; and

i. survivability.

2. Given the characteristics of COIN campaigns, with their dispersed nature, their need of a comprehensive approach and the pervasive threat, the principles that will be emphasized the most in COIN campaigns will likely be flexibility, cooperation, responsiveness and survivability.

3. Regardless of the nature of COIN, and indeed partly because of it, the **echelon system** of integral sub-unit, unit and formation echelons remains a valuable asset that must be maintained and used. Failure to use such a system contravenes the principles of sustainment.

902. FACTORS AFFECTING SUSTAINMENT

1. Some modifications to normal combat service support (CSS) practice and procedures are necessary to allow for the circumstances under which COIN operations take place:

a. **Dispersion**. Non-contiguous deployment of the security forces in small detachments over a wide area increases difficulty in the provision of support. There may be a tendency to fragment and disperse CSS units to support widely deployed security force elements. However, the support of isolated sub-units and platoons may be a problem better solved by increasing the level of self-sufficiency through robust A echelons. Nevertheless, some dispersion of CSS units may be inevitable.

b. **Security**. There will be a host of security threats:

(1) A surface-to-air missile and small arms threat may complicate the provision of replenishment by air.

(2) Dependence on local resources/labour for endeavours such as construction, purchase, storage and perhaps distribution adds to the overall security problem.

(3) Static installations should be sited in an area secured and protected, commensurate with operational and geographical factors. If the scale and intensity of the operation warrant the establishment of forward support groups (FSGs), their elements are likely to be more at risk, requiring greater security force effort to defend them.

(4) The greater the amount of air and helicopter lift that is available, the more it will be possible to cut out intermediate bases with the advantage of economies in ground resources, convoys, guards and theatre transport. The use of aviation support will allow rapid resupply of forward echelons. Where possible, the use of a sea-based echelon would ease some of the physical security and protection demands.

(5) With respect to operational security (OPSEC), care must be taken that CSS preparations do not prejudice the security of information and plans. Sudden increases in stock levels, exceptional amounts of road, rail and air movement, the arrival of new CSS units in certain areas and the local purchase of unusual items are just some examples of changes in a normal pattern of replenishment which might betray a future operation. A combination of secrecy, insofar as it is possible to hide CSS preparations, and convincing deception plans help to preserve security. Discretion in dealing with contractors and taking care not to discuss operational matters, especially future plans, within hearing of local labour are essential if elementary precautions are to keep our intentions secret.

c. **Manpower**. Because COIN operations are manpower intensive, there will be pressure for economy in CSS manpower. While, on the one hand, low rates of expenditure of combat supplies reduce the CSS burden, the dispersed deployment of units in a COIN campaign increases it. Manpower limitations may increase dependence on local labour.

d. **Multi-national Forces**. Canada will most likely deploy as part of a multi-national coalition security force. This could lead to potential coordination and standardization problems.

Coordination in Combined Operations: Kabul Multinational Brigade IV/V

Often a COIN campaign will not be conducted by one nation unilaterally; instead, various nations will work in concert, creating a multinational force. While multilateral actions increase the legitimacy of the COIN effort, they pose a potential risk of creating coordination and standardization difficulties.

During KMNB [Kabul Multinational Brigade] IV/V, Canada acted as the head nation of the NATO-led campaign. As such, the Canadian contingent of the KMNB HQ was forced to overcome a variety of challenges when coordinating the use of numerous resources, many of which they had no experience with. For example, these included the AH-64 Apache helicopter detachment from the Netherlands, CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter detachment from Germany and UH-60 Blackhawks contributed by Turkey. Although coordination between these assets was essential, the Canadian staff would have to balance competing needs to ensure each nation's operational security.

Intelligence presents an additional challenge in a multinational campaign. The G2 section in the KMNB consisted of 27 members from various nations, some of which were not NATO members. As such, various personnel were unable to receive some intelligence, due to their home nations' non-NATO status. Consequently, intelligence operators possessed varying depths of knowledge, depending on their nationality, impacting the groups' unity and common operating picture.

Aside from the free exchange of intelligence, security classifications proved to be a difficult obstacle within operational planning process, as usable intelligence was often Canadian, British or American in origin. Unfortunately security restrictions often limited or precluded the German G2 - a key member in planning sensitive operations—from all aspects of planning.

Standardization and unity of effort was facilitated through the adoption of NATO procedures. Unfortunately, knowledge of standardized agreements (STANAGs) amongst the staff officers varied, and in many cases, was inadequate. While knowledge of NATO SOPs [standing operating procedures] pertaining to brigade operations was essential in such an operation, this knowledge was also deficient amongst participants. To combat this problem, the HQ undertook a review of the existing NATO SOPs, drafting a detailed document covering all aspects related to the KMNB.

Through overcoming these challenges, a multinational force can ensure effective, collaborative operations. For maximum efficiency to be obtained, an acceptance of cultural differences between contributing nations must occur, while a joint operations doctrine is respected. Additionally, the implementation of commonly understood and accepted standardized procedures will ease the multinational effort.

Source: Brigadier-General Peter Devlin, "Canadian Soldiers Deploy to the Kabul Multinational Brigade," *The Bulletin*, The Army Lesson Learned Centre, Vol. 10, No. 2 and Major Dany Fortin, "The Challenges of a Multinational Headquarters: The Kabul Multinational Brigade," *The Bulletin*, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, Vol. 11, No. 3.

903. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT RECONNAISSANCE PLAN

1. Given the nature of COIN, it is unlikely that campaigning forces will have to make a forced entry into the theatre of operations. Thus, the deployment of troops and supporting reconnaissance parties will have the consent of the standing government. Where no central authority exists and deployment is supported by an international or perceived mandate, an entry

may be forced or at least must expect little indigenous support until some sort of permanent presence and representation have been established.

2. The reconnaissance plan may have to be adjusted given the situation. It may have to be conducted from a third nation from which forces may be staged, or it may be the responsibility of the advance party. Regardless of the situation, the need for some form of reconnaissance and confirmation of planning details needs to occur prior to the deployment of the main body.

904. RECONNAISSANCE PARTY

1. Prior to initial deployment to the campaign or in support of a relief in place, a CSS reconnaissance party will be deployed. It may return prior to deployment of the main body or remain in theatre to link up with the advance party and main body upon their arrival. Information would thus be passed back by electronic means. Points to note in the mounting and conduct of the reconnaissance party are:

a. The reconnaissance party sent to a new theatre will be organized on a joint service basis. The party will aim to make early contact with the host nation (HN) government through the local diplomatic representative. In doing so, an assessment of the resources available in the theatre must be undertaken to provide an estimate of the requirements, which must be sent out from Canada.

b. Ideally, the reconnaissance party will represent the campaign's comprehensive approach in that the support elements of other government departments also deploy in support of their planning. If this is not the case, but the campaign is to include known agencies other than the military, then CSS planners may have to consider the sustainment of these other agencies. Ideally, responsibilities between agencies for sustainment will be clearly delineated prior to the departure of reconnaissance parties.

c. The joint reconnaissance party must include a strong CSS element headed by a sufficiently senior officer who is fully aware of the envisaged operation and of the CSS requirements to support it. He should have the executive authority to arrange liaison with the HN and allies, to make decisions and to make recommendations to the task force commander and, through the diplomatic staff, to the appropriate HN ministry.

d. The earlier the reconnaissance party is sent out and the sooner CSS preparations for the arrival of forces are made, the better.

905. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE

1. J4 logistics staff and other national representation will possibly conduct a strategic reconnaissance, depending upon the security situation in theatre. The CSS element of the reconnaissance party must make arrangements with the HN government for facilities and procedures regarding the reception and logistic support of campaign forces. The following points must be considered:

a. **Liaison**. Liaison procedures for coordinating CSS requirements with the HN, any other allies and Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) must be established.

b. **Accommodation and Real Estate**. The estimated requirement for operational and logistic accommodation and real estate must be assessed prior to and during the reconnaissance. It may be given to the HN's government liaison or

representation if such indigenous control and bureaucracy exists. Suitable locations for deploying forces must be found within their planned area of operations (AO). It will violate the principles of COIN if forces are located at a base camp outside of their AO, in which case they will not be able to establish control of their AO or properly respond to situations. Ideally, it will be arranged so that forces may deploy directly to their own AOs. The procedures for obtaining accommodation on loan—by requisition, by leasing or by purchase—must similarly be worked out with the HN's authorities with all possible speed. The availability of local labour, building material, services (electricity, water, sewage, etc.) must be ascertained quickly.

c. **Provision of Resources**. The capacities of the HN or coalition partners to provide combat supplies, services and consumer items must be determined before finalizing what must be brought in from Canada or neighbouring countries.

d. **Infrastructure**. Availability and capacity of HN infrastructure must be assessed. This assessment should include the following:

(1) **Port Facilities**. As well as berthing, the reconnaissance party should consider discharge rates using existing unloading facilities and storage accommodation at and near the main port of entry, unloading and lighterage facilities at small ports, inland water transport and road and rail exits. Liaison with the harbour authorities should occur if possible.

(2) **Airports**. Agreement should be sought on the main entry airfield and availability of forward airfields or airstrips in conjunction with the air force component of the reconnaissance party. Agreement should be reached on aircraft schedules, leading to a planned flow of troops, reinforcements and supplies.

(3) **Railroads**. Rail transport within the nation must be assessed along with access from third nations.

(4) **Road System and Network**. Roadways need be assessed along with the measurements and classifications of bridges and tunnels on main supply routes and theatre entry routes. Border controls and access from third nations must be assessed.

e. **Arrival of CSS Units**. The build up of CSS units must be planned to support the combat elements as they arrive, taking into account the assistance available from the HN and other coalition forces.

f. **Accounting**. There will be a need for financial staff representation on any reconnaissance party. Agreement with the host government, if such local authority exists, will be needed on cost sharing, accounting procedures and domestic banking facilities.

2. **Operational Reconnaissance**. The deploying force J/G4 will conduct an operational-level reconnaissance as part of a reconnaissance party. This level of reconnaissance may be combined with the tactical level. The following will be considered:

a. **Firm Bases and Potential Forward Operating Bases**. Detailed planning for the establishment of CSS installations, medical facilities and the siting of unit camps needs to be concurrent. In conjunction with the intelligence (J/G2) and operations (J/G3) staffs, it will be necessary to draw up a plan for the provision of

protection from blast, indirect fires and rocket attack for key or exposed headquarters, installations, isolated bases and positions.

b. **Allocation of Main Supply Routes.** In a country with a limited road network, it may be necessary to allot time blocks for the road movement of resupply convoys and routine troop movements.

c. **Level of Self-Sufficiency Required**. Based on the deployment of the force elements, basic load quantities must be established. Despite the establishment of a centralized support element for the theatre, the integral echelon system of combat and combat support units must be maintained to ensure adherence to the principles of sustainment.

d. **Equipment Support**. The equipment support plan must be geared to providing special requirements:

(1) enhanced electronic repair facilities to deal with extra radios, security systems, alarms and electronic warfare (EW) equipment;

(2) modifications to vehicles to be made in theatre (e.g., armouring) along with local repair facilities; and

(3) operational stocks must be estimated and maintained with the exception of significant vehicle casualties from operation.

e. **Security**. The G4 must work with the G2 and G3 to establish a responsive and appropriate security plan for CSS elements, convoys and activities.

f. **Labour**. Detailed requirements must be developed for each installation and area in terms of skilled and unskilled labour.

g. **Interpreter Support**. Plans will have to be made to obtain sufficient interpreter support for the deploying forces. The option of using expatriates should be considered. Rules of engagement must clearly articulated and make provisions for the moral obligation to defend interpreters.

h. **Civilian Contractor Services**. A determination should be made regarding what levels of civilian contracting services are appropriate for the initial stages of the campaign given the threat and availability of in theatre services.

i. **Requirement for the Conduct of Stability Activities**. CSS elements will undoubtedly be expected to undertake stability activities in theatre in support of certain operational objectives. Possible activities and tasks might include assistance to other agencies (e.g., delivery of humanitarian aid), the mentoring or training of indigenous security forces (especially staff and planners) and the provision of medical services to other agencies and the conduct of local medical clinics. The anticipated level of support and activities should be forecasted to the greatest extent possible in consultation with the commander and take into account his expectations and envisioned scheme of manoeuvre. National authority is required to undertake activities and tasks such as the provision of national medical supplies to the indigenous population.

3. **Lack of Host Nation Support**. It must be remembered that a situation may exist in which the HN government lacks real control over ports of entry into the nation or in which a forced entry is required in order to initiate the force deployments into the theatre. In such cases, the reconnaissance may be limited to neighbouring third nations. CSS bases may have to be established in neighbouring territories until the initial entry force has secured sufficient bases

and routes to allow the deployment of CSS elements. The initial entry force will have to be self-sufficient and resupplied by air or sea until the echelon system can deploy forward to ground bases.

SECTION 2
SUSTAINMENT AND RESOURCES

906. SUSTAINMENT SYSTEM

1. In developing the sustainment system and architecture in support of the campaign, the G4 staff must:

a. Decide on the stock levels to be held in the echelon locations and the self-sufficiency level of units to provide for:

(1) the predicted intensity of operations;

(2) the length of time by which the echelon system can be established to full capacity within theatre;

(3) a cushion of reserves to meet interruptions in the replenishment system by insurgent action; and

(4) the changing dependency of units.

b. Demand commodities through the national authority or contract through the HN and work out a movement and distribution plan to transport materiel from the entry points to the base installations.

c. Organize distribution for commodities in the operational areas and allocate dependency for units based on the nearest or most appropriate source of supply.

d. Arrange rail transport, road convoys, inland and coastal water transport, fixed or rotary wing airlift and/or air dropping.

e. Along with intelligence staff support, conduct an assessment on the insurgent threat to CSS units and the means of resupply.

f. Confirm resupply procedures, methods and levels of security and protection to be implemented.

g. Develop a traffic control and route protection plan. In conjunction with the G3 staff, it will be necessary to arrange:

(1) escorts and pickets;

(2) route opening and closing policies and procedures; and

(3) avoidance of a routine and predictable pattern of convoy movements in areas where there is high risk of insurgent attack.

h. Determine locations and procedures for distribution points and transition between echelons.

i. Advocate for enlargement and reinforcement of echelons at unit level in order to provide for an increase in unit self-sufficiency, robustness and force protection.

j. Determine unit and sub-unit responsibility for the movement of material from the distribution points to their own areas. Units may require helicopter lift or even pack animals in difficult country.

907. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Situational awareness (SA) is critical to sustainment in COIN operations. Enemy forces will likely put a high priority on destroying or disrupting CSS elements as they will be seen as soft, predictable targets. CSS units down to the lowest level must have the ability to react immediately to enemy action and changing support requirements.

2. SA also demands that up-to-date and accurate figures be known for sustainment requirements of the lower echelons. Robust communications on dedicated administrative nets from unit level upwards will provide such SA and allow for a suitable balance between push and pull replenishment. In times of deployment and engagement, the command net is too busy to support communications for administrative, recovery, evacuation and sustainment needs.

908. REPLENISHMENT THROUGH AIR, AVIATION AND SEA BASING

1. In certain situations—be they influenced by terrain, threat or a combination of other elements—fixed or rotary wing aircraft may become the method of choice for replenishment for the following reasons:

a. Forces can be supplied in inaccessible areas, thus avoiding the necessity for a vulnerable surface supply route.

b. Troops are better able to move with light scales of equipment, unencumbered with echelon transport, thus exploiting the principle of flexibility to give them a good level of tactical mobility.

c. Subject to the capacity of the airlift resources, weather and terrain air replenishment is quicker than overland resupply.

d. Reserve stocks can be reduced and held centrally, allowing the establishment of fewer but larger bases situated in more secure areas.

e. Reducing the dependency on surface routes lessens the risk of ambush and cuts the convoy protection commitment. Aviation replenishment may become the preferred method in situations of high threat.

f. Rapid casualty evacuation improves wounded soldiers' chances of survival, thus improving morale.

g. The urgent needs of the civilian population in isolated areas can be met quickly.

2. Aerial delivery (parachute or unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV]) means of replenishment is less economic than air or aviation landed resupply but is often necessary in very broken country where there are no landing zones, even for helicopters and for covert Special Forces. The penalties for air dropping are that the recovery of parachute equipment may be difficult or impossible and there may be a risk that the supplies fall into insurgent hands.

3. Landing strips and helicopter landing zones (LZs) should be constructed whenever possible and as soon as possible to economize in airlift. It should be standard operating procedures (SOP) that whenever a forces stops or plans a deliberate activity, such as a cordon and search, helicopter LZs are designated (initially from the map and confirmed once on the ground) in order to support emergency evacuation.

4. There is a need for close cooperation between the CSS, operations and air staffs. A detailed analysis will have to be conducted regarding the threat to aviation and air and the general, routine demand that will be placed on air and aviation resources.

5. Consideration should be given to the concept of at least initially basing CSS elements and supplies at sea, from which they can operate in a fairly secure manner. This will be a possible solution early in the campaign, however, once security forces have established a firm base and begun to expand, CSS echelons will have to be deployed forward if the campaign is to be conducted for any length of time.

909. USE OF LOCAL RESOURCES

1. The maximum use of local resources to reduce the CSS lift resources deployed from national resources must be made. Simultaneously, care must be taken not to cause shortages in the HN's home market and consequent price rises, although this must be balanced against the advantages to be gained by boosting the local economy. If the civil population suffers from increased shortages and inflation, the campaign will loose legitimacy and the insurgents will be handed a ready grievance to exploit through propaganda.

910. SECURITY

1. **Insurgent Infiltration of Labour**. It must be assumed that hostile intelligence agents will infiltrate local labour. At the very least, their supporters will exist amongst ready labour pools. It will be difficult for incoming units and security sections to distinguish between loyal and disloyal elements. To reduce the potential threat to base installations, ports, airports, roads and railways, reliance must be placed on good unit and installation security and an efficient local vetting system. The method of vetting must be agreed with the host government, whose police and security units may be largely responsible for its implementation. The system may never be foolproof, and measures must be taken to guard vulnerable installations from attack and to prevent the leakage of plans and intentions. All soldiers, especially CSS troops employing civilians, must be carefully briefed on security matters.

2. **Protection of Labour**. Labour must be protected from insurgent attack and intimidation. If the HN cannot provide suitable protection, additional forces may have to be deployed in an escort and protection role. Rules of engagement must clearly reflect the moral obligation to protect civilian labour in the employment of campaigning forces. This is especially important for interpreters employed with combat units.

3. **Installations**. CSS installations must be suitably sited for security and defence, and they must be effectively guarded. In the best case, the HN will provide protection. If this is not possible, extra forces may have to be provided because CSS units do not normally have sufficient personnel to carry out their functions and guard themselves except against the lightest of threats. Nevertheless, CSS troops must be sufficiently well trained in combat skills to be able to defend themselves.

SECTION 3
PERSONNEL

911. MORALE

1. **Soldiers and their Families**. Troops will often be operating in small groups for long periods in trying conditions often out of regular contact with their families. Soldier's families may be worried by press coverage of action and casualties in the areas where the soldier is stationed. When a campaign lasts for a considerable time, lack of progress may discourage soldiers and their families. The insurgents may try to aggravate a discouraging situation with propaganda means. With or without hostile propaganda, rumours spread and may be difficult to

dispel or refute when troops are deployed in small detachments over a wide area. Families will require regular updates and reassurance regarding the conduct of the campaign. This is best furnished by home units and garrisons.

2. **Promoting Good Morale**. Morale is a key element to the moral component of a force's fighting power.[105] While motivating soldiers by pointing out good and sound reasons for the conduct of the campaign itself and the need for continued, patient commitment is the duty of the commander and a function of leadership at all levels, certain other measures can be taken to help maintain morale. They include:

a. Reliable information services, Internet and national and local newspapers.

b. A quick and frequent mail service to and from home.

c. Welfare telephones and Internet services at reasonable rates or free.

d. Access to television and radio receivers.

e. Gymnasium equipment in protected areas where outdoor recreation is not feasible.

f. Local leave centres in secure and attractive surroundings, if possible in a temperate climate, and periodic home leave if sustainable from a mission and manning perspective.

g. Responsive unit rear parties that take appropriate action to preclude problems with families and family support. Many problems or frustrations can be avoided through thorough family pre-deployment briefs that lay out the points of contact, manage expectations, articulate limitations to available support services and help families create their own support networks.

h. Confidence in a robust and efficient casualty evacuation and treatment system.

i. A rapid and efficient system for notifying relatives of deaths and casualties as they occur.

912. MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. Providing medical support for small and widely scattered detachments places a strain on the medical services. The problem can be alleviated by consideration and implementation of the following:

a. refresher training for all ranks in combat first aid;

b. training at least one member of isolated detachments in advanced first aid and providing such trained soldiers with additional medical supplies and the means of stabilizing casualties;

c. providing sufficient combat medics, even down to rifle platoon level;

d. provision for quick casualty evacuation on all operations, including armoured ambulances and aviation, especially in urban areas, remote areas or on routes subject to insurgent targeting; and

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[105] For further discussion of fighting power and its components, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations*.

e. ensuring that all ranks receive a comprehensive health briefing before deployment.

2. Ideally, a period of acclimatization will be possible for troops deploying to environs with extreme conditions. This may occur in a third, neighbouring nation. Where this is not possible, such as early entry forces and advance parties, activities will have to be paced whilst troops become accustomed to the climatic extremes and conditions. At any rate, the idea of opting out of coalition operations in times of crisis for want of acclimatization should be avoided.

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CHAPTER 10
COUNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

1. Training for conventional campaigns provides a sound basis for the conduct of counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in terms of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for offensive and defensive activities. However, in preparation for COIN, there is a requirement for additional training that is campaign and mission specific. This training and preparation across all ranks is as much intellectual as it is physical. Not only do units and sub-units have to undertake skill training in preparation for the likely tactical tasks (stability activities such as urban presence patrolling, cordon and searches and vehicle checkpoints) but they have to be trained in the principles unique to COIN, the importance of the support of the civilian populace and the importance of local cultural and social dynamics.

2. It must be remembered that doctrine for COIN operations will provide guiding principles and methods for the conduct. The most successful armies in COIN operations have not treated doctrine as dogma but have afforded commanders trust and confidence and freedom of action within the allocated mission. Sound TTP can be identified and practised prior to any deployment, but TTP will change rapidly in a theatre of operations as the insurgents come to learn the TTP used by security forces and vice versa. Commanders at all levels must be flexible and dynamic, and lessons learned at the lowest levels must be passed quickly for wider implementation.

SECTION 2
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL, JOINT AND COMBINED TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS

1. The military is only one of many agencies that will be used in the conduct of COIN. It is vital that the agencies involved in a comprehensive approach plan, train and prepare to the greatest extent possible in order that responsibilities and requirements can be identified and addressed prior to deployment.

2. At the earliest opportunity, all agencies and civilian and security forces should come together to conduct joint training. In some cases, the military may have to take the lead in the education of agencies less knowledgeable in the conduct of COIN. This training can begin with seminars and conferences before developing to actual field exercises. Standing points of contact and positions for liaison teams can be identified in much of this training.

3. All security force elements designated for COIN operations should come together at the earliest opportunity. Training should begin with seminars and war games for leaders and progress to tactical field exercises for all levels. Incorporating other COIN partners may be useful during such seminars and war games so as to provide the most accurate scenario possible and to become familiar with expectations.

4. Such early collaboration across agencies will help a unity of purpose become a unity of effort.

5. Training in simulated environments and in the field should encompass full-spectrum operations. Hence, field training exercises (FTXs) should, whenever suitable, ensure that scenarios reflect the continuum of operations and the required changes to force structures, tactics and intellectual challenges. For example, a scenario may begin with entry into a major combat campaign and then progress to an insurgency situation that will require a greater balance between offensive, defensive and stability operations. This will force commanders and

soldiers at all levels to adjust their plans, orders, TTP and mindsets in order to reflect the changing scenario.

6. Training with coalition partners will readily identify differences in approaches and methods in a COIN campaign and will identify potential for liaison positions, particularly in the early stages of a campaign. This will also offer the opportunity to circumvent some of the coordination and standardization problems routinely encountered.

1001. LESSONS IDENTIFIED DURING CAMPAIGNS

1. It is vital that as actual campaigns progress, lessons identified are captured, assessed by doctrine staffs, schools and training systems and then implemented pervasively. This will require formal and informal reporting methods, the submission of detailed after-action reports, their widest dissemination and staff visits to operational theatres. Formal links between lessons-learned staffs, doctrine writers, training authorities and trainers need to be established and exploited.

2. Commanders in the field must be forthright in lessons learned and honest and candid in the acknowledgement of errors so that others may learn, missions may be better accomplished and unnecessary loss of life avoided.

SECTION 3
TRAINING PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

1. Training plans in preparation for a COIN operation should consider inclusion of the following:

a. Training in TTP for COIN operations, with great emphasis on the sub-unit level, probably in a non-contiguous battlespace. There must be an emphasis on junior leader training. Computer based training in simulated environments offers very little benefit for section and platoon commanders. Their skills will only be truly developed when leading their subordinates through physical and intellectual challenges, ranging quickly across the full-spectrum of operations.

b. Instruction in the root causes, grievances and conditions that led to the insurgency and reasons for the motivations of the non-committed populace. The need to gain the support of the population must be placed foremost in the mind of the soldiers and their commanders, and they must come to understand that all their actions will be seen to either build or undermine campaign legitimacy and public support.

c. Instruction in the insurgent operational techniques, their TTP, structures and equipments. All forces, particularly those of the echelons, must be made aware of and trained in the pervasive, asymmetric threat that is posed by insurgent forces.

d. Acclimatization and environmental training, reflective of the planned operational theatre.

e. Cultural training regarding the indigenous populations to be encountered, their customs, laws, beliefs, etc., including their motivations for supporting or not-supporting the insurgency.

f. Specialist training required to expand the force capabilities in urban operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil-military

cooperation (CIMIC), the local language(s), health aspects, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines.

g. The marry-up of specialist detachments such as public affairs and PSYOPS to the units and formations to which they will belong during the deployment.

h. The use in training of PSYOPS and other influence activities so that they may be integrated with fires in a routine and seamless manner.

i. The skills required for human intelligence (HUMINT) collection through presence patrolling and other stability activities. Soldiers and their commanders must understand the important role that they play in gathering information and intelligence for the development of targets and measures of effectiveness.

j. Intensive training to ensure physical fitness, as troops acclimatize more quickly if they are in good physical condition upon arrival in the theatre.

k. Intellectual training for all ranks to ensure that they all understand the unique aspects of a COIN campaign, the potential operational and strategic impacts that low-level decisions and actions can have and the need to influence the will of the local population in order to support the campaign.

l. Rules of engagement (ROE) training.

m. Media training.

n. Crowd control operations (CCO). The use of CCO equipment, which can cause death if not used correctly, and CCO TTP cannot be learned in theatre, at the time of its employment. It must be part of pre-deployment training and refreshed in theatre.

o. Training teams from units already in theatre or just recently returned and reverse technical assistance visits (TAVs) should be used to train on the local situation and up-to-date TTP and threats.

2. Good tactical training will prepare soldiers well in the conduct of a COIN operation. At the same time, however, commanders must ensure that all ranks, particularly those in daily contact with the populace, understand the pervasive threat posed by insurgents and the vital importance of gaining and holding the support of the local populace.

SECTION 4
IN THEATRE TRAINING

1. When deployed on operations, training must continue and commanders must ensure that they allocate appropriate time, resources and supervision to it. Commanders should ensure that regular refresher training of TTP, ROEs and equipment is conducted in theatre throughout the mission. In addition, commanders and staff should consider the following:

a. Reconnaissance and advance parties must quickly assess the operational and tactical situation and identify any aspects in training that troops may have not yet covered or that require greater emphasis. If these training requirements cannot be met prior to deployment, then they must seek training venues for the units to use following their arrival but prior to operational commitment. Temporary battle schools may be established by the in theatre force to provide training to troops, on new enemy TTP or equipment, which was not available for pre-deployment training. Staff planners must balance the training need with the need to at least

begin to undertake tactical operations in support of the besieged authority and a coalition commander.

b. Commanders may precede their main bodies and be attached to units already committed to operations. The lessons they learn can then be used to hone final training or guide in theatre training. Commanders need not return home but may marry-up with their troops once they deploy.

c. Physical fitness training should continue in theatre to any extent possible. Physical fitness will save lives.

d. Troops should be given regular situation updates in terms of the overall mission and campaign progress and their contribution to it. They should be briefed on what measures are proving successful, and they should be given feedback as to the usefulness of the intelligence that their patrols are providing. This will keep the troops motivated and focused on the success of the mission.

2. Units engaged in COIN campaigns should undergo continuous training at all levels to ensure that basic individual and collective skills are maintained to a high standard. Particular attention should be paid to the maintenance of individual skills during periods of little activity.

SUGGESTED READINGS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

As well as these books, there is an enormous body of periodical and academic journal literature on counter-insurgency. While the books below will provide a solid foundation for understanding insurgency and counter-insurgency, the reader is encouraged to look to some of the material in periodicals, much of which is available online.

Anderson, David. *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire.* New York: Norton, 2005.
A multitude of variables influence insurgencies. This volume provides a look at some of the legitimate grievances that may drive an insurgency, including some of the self-interested parties in the colonial government, and some of the less than palatable techniques used by British counter-insurgents in Kenya.

Armstrong, Karen. *Islam.* New York: Random House, 2000.
This book provides a comprehensive and easy to understand introduction to Islam, its origins, history, and sects.

______________. *The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism.* New York: Ballentine, 2001.
This work documents how fundamentalism has taken root and grown in all three of the monotheistic religions. A useful volume to provide a basic understanding of the root causes of radicalised religion and to provide context for one of the major factors in contemporary global affairs.

Asprey, Robert B. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History.* New York: Morrow, 1994.
A comprehensive overview of guerrilla warfare, from the Scythians to the Afghan-Soviet War, this volume helps develop perspective on insurgency and counter-insurgency, forms of warfare that are often characterised by the layman as 'new'.

Bickel, Keith. Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine: 1915-1940. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001.
This work examines details the process that led to the creation of one of the best and most durable military doctrinal manuals ever produced, the US Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual.* Bickel's book details the operations, lessons learned, and bureaucratic process that led to the creation of the manual.

Birtle, Andrew. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941.* Washington: Centre of Military History United States Army, 1998.
This work documents the initial COIN operations engaged in by the US army and their impact on advancing the evolving doctrine. Part I of a detailed study of the origins of US Army counter-insurgency doctrine.

_________. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976.* Washington: Centre of Military History United States Army, 2006.
Building on the first volume, Birtle continues his analysis of US Army counter-insurgency practices, and the effect of operations upon doctrine. These two books are critical to understanding the roots of the oft-criticised counter-insurgency practices of Canada's most powerful ally.

Clifford, Bob. The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Clifford Bob's recent study helps to detail the relationship between insurgent groups, information technologies, the media, and non-governmental organisations. This book

rejects dominant views that needy groups readily gain help from selfless nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Instead, the author argues that they face a Darwinian struggle for scarce resources where support goes to the savviest, not the neediest.

Bohannan, Charles and Napolean Valeriano. *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience.* Westport: Praeger, 1962.
Written by two officers who fought as guerrillas against the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in WW II and who went on to defeat the Huk rebellion in later years. This work examines the means to assess the strengths and weaknesses of insurgencies with a focus on the importance of intelligence in combating insurgent movements

Charters, David, and Brig. (Ret'd) Maurice Tugwell, eds. *Armies in Low Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis.*London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989.
This edited volume is a comparative analysis of how Western armies adapted to unconventional roles and missions in the post 1945 political-military environment of low intensity conflict.

Elkins, Caroline. *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya.* London: Henry Holt and Company, 2005.
A detailed account of the brutal counter-insurgency techniques used alongside more palatable efforts by the British in Kenya. Elkins' work is founded on new archival and field research that counters the common view of British post-WW II COIN as a universal model to be followed in contemporary times. This book must be read to understand the entirety of past British COIN techniques so that alternatives to unsuitable techniques can be devised for modern COIN operations.

Galula, David. *Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958.* Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1963 (2005).
Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the Algerian district of Greater Kabylia, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he discusses the larger political, psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for present-day counterinsurgency operations.

______. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York*: Praeger, 1964 (2006).
Galula builds upon his first study for RAND to "define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics." His book provides an analysis of how to undermine insurgency and the broad elements that the counter-insurgent will likely face.

Geraghty, Tony. *The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British Intelligence.* Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2000.
This work explores the role of British Intelligence and the SAS in Northern Ireland. A useful study that details the complexity in the use of intelligence and special forces in combating an insurgency in urban terrain, underscoring the requirement and effectiveness of intelligence-driven operations.

Glenn, Russell. COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2007.
This study is an example of a recent and ongoing COIN campaign that highlights the importance and effectiveness of the comprehensive approach to operations. A number of highly relevant points are drawn out by the author, including the role of criminal

elements in destabilisation, the importance of intervening at the earliest stages to halt budding insurgencies, the absolute necessity for careful consideration of influence activities throughout a campaign, and the critical role of law enforcement in COIN.

Gunarathna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror.* New York: Beverly Books, 2002.
This book, which details al Qaeda's leadership, ideology, structure, strategies, and tactics, is useful to understand the difference between insurgency and global terrorism. The two are not the same, and personnel deployed on counter-insurgency must understand how to differentiate between terrorists and insurgents and the role of al Qaeda-like terrorists in modern conflict.

Hennessy, Michael. *Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972.* Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.
The US Marines in Vietnam conducted some of the most successful COIN in the Vietnam War while simultaneously fighting a conventional war of attrition against regular units of the North Vietnamese Army. This book helps draw out the fact that there are highly relevant lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command. Of great interest should be the development and application of the CAP program, the US Marine version of the *tache d'huile* technique of COIN in a rural setting as well as an enemy strategy that successfully employed a comprehensive approach to operations.

Jalali, Colonel A, and Lester W. Grau. *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet Afghan War.* Volumes I-III. London: The Military Press, 2000.
This three volume series outlines the operations of the Afghan Mujahideen resistance during their struggle against invading Soviet forces. This series is critical to understanding the learning process and origins of tactics that continue to be used in Afghanistan to this day on the exact same terrain as in the Afghan-Soviet War.

Kitson, General Sir Frank. *Bunch of Five.* London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977.
This work discusses General Kitson's personal involvement in a variety of British conflicts, specifically focusing on Oman, Kenya and Malaya, to provide a first hand account of the implementation of COIN strategy.

Kitson, Frank. *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping.* London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971.
This work outlines the why non-traditional methods will not defeat an adversary in low intensity operations before delving into particulars regarding the army's contribution and the preparation required.

Lawrence, T.E. *Revolt in the Desert.* U.S.A.: Tess Press, 2004.
An abridgement on Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, this work offers insight into the author's First World War experience with irregular troops in the Arabian Desert.

McAllister Linn, Brian. *The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
In this book, Linn details the complex environment faced by the US Army as it began its occupation of the Philippines after Spain's defeat, looking at the shape of both the insurgency and US counter-insurgency activity in different parts of the Philippines. Not all the US efforts were successful and this volume provides a useful contrast between different methods as well as the role commander personality can play in COIN.

Mockaitis, Thomas. *British Counterinsurgency in the Post Imperial Era.* Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1995.

This work offers a history of the development of British counter-insurgency principles and practices since 1960. Through case studies in Borneo, South Arabia, Oman and Northern Ireland, Mockaitis links emerging British approaches to internal conflict to colonial and post colonial policies.

Mockaitis, Thomas. *British Counterinsurgency 1919-69.* London: MacMillan, 1990.
Here Mockaitis discusses the differences between insurgency and counter-insurgency, along with the learning process inherent in the British evolution from Imperial Policing to counterinsurgency, and subsequent Lessons Learned.

Nagl, John A. *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger, 2002.
In this popular book the author compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice by the British in the Malayan Emergency to that of the US Army during the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. Nagl argues that the ability to analyse operations, learn lessons and adapt as an institution is critical for any military to succeed in COIN.

Newsinger, John. *British Counter Insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland.* New York: Palgrave, 2002.
Newsinger highlights the successes and failures of British COIN in the post-WWII era highlighting both the useful and brutal techniques employed. This book provides a balance to other works that tout the 'British model' as the ideal COIN methodology to be followed in the modern era.

O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency and Terrorism—Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*. New York: Brassey's, 1990.
This author systematically dissects insurgency and terrorism, examining the nature of revolutionary war, strategies used by terrorists and insurgents, and supporting factors before providing a framework so one can understand the nature of a particular conflict.

Paget, Julian. *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967.
In this work Paget, who fought in a number of the post-WWII British COIN campaigns, emphasises the need for political supremacy in COIN, while outlining the various factors affecting counter-insurgency operations.

Carment, David and Martin Rudner, eds. *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries.* New York: Routledge, 2006.
This book is an edited collection of essays that evaluates the role and dynamics of intelligence in peace support operations. It considers the intelligence requirements for successful PSO and is applicable to COIN as well. The book also addresses the roles of coalition forces, law enforcement agencies, development institutions and NGOs that commonly influence operations.

Phares, Walid. *The War of Ideas: Jihad Against Democracy.* New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
At a broad level, this book can help the reader understand the role of the narrative in motivating people. It highlights the role of ideology in contemporary conflicts and the use of information technologies and the manipulation of the media by ideologues.

Smith, M.L.R. Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement. London: Routledge, 1995.
This work examines the evolution of the complex military strategy of the IRA over the entire length of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It is an excellent study of the internal struggles common to insurgent groups as well as the critical importance of words and

deeds in propaganda targeting both the will of the indigenous population and that of the security forces.

Tanham, George. *Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong.* USA: Fredrick Praeger, 1967.
This work, whose author managed the US rural development program in South Vietnam, was among the first major published analyses by an American expert on the insurgency in Indochina. In addition to tracing the Chinese influence on the Vietminh cadres and the French military response, the book describes the organization, logistics, and tactics of the communist movement.

Taylor, Philip M. *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda From the Ancient World to the Present Day.* 3rd Edition. Oxford: Manchester University Press, 2003.
Taylor, one of the foremost authorities on propaganda, traces the use of propaganda throughout history. A highly readable book, this study illustrates the importance of synchronising words and deeds when conducting influence activities.

Thompson, Sir Robert. *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam.* St. Petersburg FL: Hailer, 2005.
This work presents keys to victory and success in COIN operations waged against communist structured insurgencies, based upon the author's experience in Malaya.

Trinquier Roger. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, New York: Praeger, 1964.
A classic of COIN literature, Trinquier examines how French officers in Indochina fought fierce rear-guard actions against ideologically motivated insurgents in the 1940s and 1950s, revealing COIN techniques and tactics from a French perspective.

Tse-tung, Mao. *On Guerrilla Warfare.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961.
In this book Mao discusses the differences between guerrilla and "orthodox" military forces, as well as how such forces can work together for a common goal. Other topics covered include propaganda and political concerns, the formation of guerrilla units, the qualities of a good guerrilla officer, discipline in a guerrilla army, and guerrilla bases.

Tugwell, Maurice. "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures" PhD Dissertation, London: King's College, March 1979.
Brigadier Tugwell, who has operational experience with the British Army in a number of COIN campaigns, dissects the role and features of ideological propaganda through the use of historical case studies. This is one of the best works examining propaganda, the role of narratives, and the importance of coordinated words and deeds in motivating fighters as well as undermining the will of the adversary. Available through inter-library loans.